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Abstract 
 
Governmental authorities are known for zealously protecting their ‘turf’, 
which is usually seen to inhibit them from coordinating their work with 
rival authorities. In the EU, however, national regulators often engage 
proactively in coordination with sister authorities in the forum of EU 
regulatory bodies. This is puzzling if one considers that this means that 
national authorities actively support EU bodies –potential rivals- in their 
work. The thesis hence examines what determines the coordinative 
behaviour of national regulators at a transnational level in the European 
Union. It analyses the engagement of UK and German authorities in 
transnational coordination in the regulatory regimes of drug safety, 
maritime safety, food safety, and banking supervision.  
 
The study demonstrates that coordinative behaviour is driven by strategic 
considerations of national regulators that want their coordination activities 
to add value to their own work, rather than being determined by their 
professional norms, functional pressures or the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, as 
stipulated in the EU governance literature. Their strategic assessments of 
whether they are getting something out of transnational activities are 
informed by the interpretative filters of the social relations they are 
embedded in at the domestic level. They are also fundamentally shaped by 
the institutional frameworks provided by the tasks of the EU regulatory 
bodies in which national regulators come together. This explains variation 
of coordination patterns across policy areas and national regulators, which 
the EU governance literature has not accounted for.  
 
The argument of the thesis implies that the engagement with coordination 
can be linked to an enhancement –rather than a loss– of bureaucratic 
autonomy. By identifying the determinants of coordinative behaviour at a 
transnational level, this thesis hence also seeks to contribute to our 
understanding of the conditions in which transnational administration 
functions. This, in turn, is vital for understanding of how capacity to manage 
cross-border risks is created in the absence of a ‘European’ state. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Coordination between governmental authorities is key to the functioning of 
public administration (Wilson, 2000, [1989], p. 268f). The capacities of 
public administrations can often only be realised if authorities coordinate 
their work with each other. Indeed, the efforts of public authorities will 
often be ineffective if inter-connected issues are administered by separate 
organisations (Hood, 1976). If, for example, a policy problem cuts across the 
jurisdiction and expertise of a variety of agencies, coordination is usually 
needed. An instance of this can be found in relation to the integrated market 
of the EU, in which a ‘single’ market is administered by separate regulators 
in each Member State. In the absence of hierarchical capacity of EU 
institutions to manage cross-border risks, specialised EU regulatory bodies 
have been created as a means to coordinate the practices of national 
regulators at the transnational level. These EU bodies lack formal authority 
and expertise. Despite these potential limitations, they have developed into 
significant regulatory actors which create transnational capacity to regulate 
through coordination between national regulators.  That national regulators 
apparently coordinate their practices –and thus support EU regulatory 
bodies in their work is– puzzling if one considers that coordination between 
public authorities is known to be perennially problem-ridden: Government 
authorities are keen to protect their ‘turf’ and the engagement with 
coordination processes is costly for them, especially since it usually
1. Introduction   
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represents an auxiliary activity to their main line of work. This thesis hence 
poses the question of what determines the coordinative behaviour of 
national regulators at the transnational level. The answer to this question is 
crucial for elucidating the conditions for transnational administration. 
Section 1.1 elaborates on the motivation for this research project. 
  The relevant literature on EU governance has mainly focused on the 
professional norms of regulatory officials, functional pressures, and the 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ in order to explain what determines coordinative 
behaviour of national regulators at the transnational level. This thesis 
argues that –whilst each approach points out crucial factors that are likely 
to affect coordinative behaviour– they remain too restricted in their 
assumptions, and their ability to account for variation in coordination 
processes across policy sectors and national regulators. They also neglect 
the potential extent of coordination problems that has been pointed out by 
the public administration literature.    Section 1.2 expands on this discussion 
of the relevant literature. 
 In this light, the thesis suggests that the coordinative behaviour of 
national regulators at the transnational level is in fact determined by 
strategic concerns of national regulators that the auxiliary activity of 
engaging in coordination needs to add value to the main regulatory work 
they fulfil ‘at home’. National regulators’ perception of their own interests, 
in turn, are formed in the setting of the social relations they are embedded 
in, as well as during the process of carrying out tasks in the forum of EU 
bodies: National regulators evaluate whether the task carried out by a given 
EU body ‘adds value’ through the filter of the social relations they are 
embedded in. These conceptualisations are then also affected by the act of 
carrying out specific tasks in EU bodies. The variation in tasks fulfilled by EU 
bodies and the differences in the social relations that national regulators 
operate in have the potential to explain variation in coordination patterns 
across different policy areas and national regulators. Section 1.3 discusses 
this argument at greater length.  
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1.1 Managing European Risks without a European State? 
The establishment of specialised EU regulatory bodies –in which national 
regulators come together to coordinate their practices– has been seen as a 
means to counter-act the so-called ‘capacity gap’ between the highly 
differentiated regulatory responsibilities of the EU and its administrative 
capacity (see Section 1.1.1). These EU bodies, however, lack formal 
authority and expertise: In order to carry out their regulatory tasks they are 
reliant on the willingness of national authorities to come together in their 
forum to coordinate their practices with their sister authorities. Despite 
these circumstances, the specialised EU bodies have developed into 
regulatory actors to be reckoned with (Section 1.1.2). This is puzzling since 
governmental authorities are usually better known for the zealous guarding 
of their turf, rather than their proactive support of a potential rival agency 
and coordination with other governmental authorities. The thesis thus 
poses the question of what determines this coordinative behaviour of 
national authorities at the transnational level (see Section 1.1.3.). 
 
 
1.1.1 Specialised EU Regulatory Bodies as Answer to the Capacity Gap 
of the EU? 
In order to manage policy problems such as risks,1 governments need to set 
standards about accepted safety levels, whilst also being able to gather 
information on whether these standards are met and modifying behaviour if 
                                                 
1 Risk as a problem of public administration has traditionally been seen as calculable entity. In this 
regard, the ‘classic’ technical definition of risk and uncertainty has been provided by Frank Knight 
(1921, see especially pp. 197-232). In his conception, ‘risk’ can be calculated, whereas uncertainty is 
immeasurable: ‘To preserve the distinction […] between a measurable uncertainty and an 
unmeasurable one we may use the term “risk” to designate the former and the term “uncertainty” for 
the latter’ (p. 233). Risk as a calculable property in this case is defined as the probability of the 
occurrence of an event taken times the potential harm of this event (Royal Society, 1992, p. 2f). The 
meanings of risk and uncertainty, however, have become blurred: Many forms of ‘risk management’ 
are indeed ‘uncertainty management’ in the Knightian definition since governmental authorities are 
faced with possible future events of which no calculable probability exists. Uncertainty is indeed a key 
factor attached to risk, which renders it into a particularly difficult problem for government: We do 
not have information on the long-term effects of recent risk-producing technologies, such as the 
effects of genetically-modified organisms. Risk, then, has a strong connotation with calculability (see 
Knight’s definition) and uncertainty (which Knight separated strictly from risk as calculable 
property). This has led to the paradoxical situation in which risk and ‘risk management’ are now often 
associated with the ‘calculation of uncertainty’ (which, according to Knight, is an impossibility). Risk 
can thus be said to represent an (adverse) future event, of which the incident is uncertain (although 
sufficient experience and data might allow the minimisation of uncertainty through the calculation of 
statistical probabilities in some cases).   
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practices on the ground are not in line with these safety standards  (Dunsire, 
1978; Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 2001). Whilst the EU sets regulatory 
standards and has the responsibility to manage cross-border risks in its 
integrated market –which should entail information gathering and 
behaviour modification- its administrative capacity is far too small to fulfil 
this duty (Eberlein and Newman, 2008; Kelemen, 2005, p. 173f; Majone, 
2000; Van Boetzelaer and Princen, 2012, p. 819), and national 
administration remain responsible for the implementation of EU law 
(Versluis, 2007).2 In this regard, the ‘single’ market of the EU is 
administered by separate entities (f. Hood, 1976, p. 17), i.e. the authorities 
of each Member State. The resulting “capacity gap” has been associated with 
the EU and international organisations alike (Eberlein and Newman, 2008; 
also see Abott and Snidal, 1998): 
 
One of the most obvious defects of the EC regulatory system is the 
mismatch between the Community’s highly complex and 
differentiated regulatory tasks, and the available administrative 
instruments (Majone, 2000, p. 279). 
 
The demand/supply equation for international coordination [...] 
rarely clears as nation-states tend to jealously guard their 
sovereignty. International organizations, then, often lack the tools 
and skills to monitor and oversee the development and 
implementation of international rules (Eberlein and Newman, 
2008, p.25).3 
 
 
Whereas the EU has been entrusted with the management of cross-border 
risks, the resources and expertise to control risks continue to exist mainly at 
the national level: National officials –not EU officials– have the 
administrative capacity to verify the safety of ships on the ground. National 
                                                 
2 How to define and evaluate administrative capacity remains highly difficult: For example, the EU 
accession process requires candidate countries to possess the necessary administrative capacity to 
implement the EU’s body of law. However, the European Commission has reportedly not found a 
means to judge the quality of an administration (Dimitrova, 2002, p.179f). At its heart, however, the 
concept seeks to capture administrations that are able to address the problems for the handling of 
which they have been created (Nelissen, 2002, p.12f). Limitations in this regard might not only be 
institutional, but also be about how legitimate a regulator is seen to be and how their work ties in 
with political issues (ibid., p.13).  At the most general level, administrative capacity entails running 
the machinery of a political or economic system, a government, and its international or global affairs, 
executing policy decisions, and translating political or collective will into actions and management 
(Farazmand, 2009, p.1016, also see p.1016ff for an in-depth discussion of the various angles of the 
concept of administrative capacity).    
3 In order to describe this mismatch between regulatory tasks and administrative capacity, Eberlein 
and Newman (2008) borrow Keohane’s notion of the ‘Governance Dilemma‘ (2001). 
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experts –rather than EU experts– have the resources and the knowledge to 
monitor and evaluate whether a medicine on the market is indeed safe to 
use. As Majone notes “regulation is not achieved simply by rule-making; it 
also requires detailed knowledge of, and intimate involvement with, the 
regulated activity” (Majone, 2000, p.280). This ‘intimate involvement’ is 
found in national administrations –rather than in supranational bodies– in 
the regulatory regimes of the EU. The ensuing capacity gap has not only 
been noted to threaten the legitimacy of the EU (Eberlein and Newman, 
2008; Majone, 2000), but also to question its very governability (Scharpf, 
1999).  
 Indeed, the integrated market of the EU –and the cross-border risks 
associated with it– are a prime example of a “situation where different parts 
of inter-connected systems are separately administered in such a way as to 
render the total administrative effect ineffective or counter-productive” 
(Hood, 1976, p. 17), which characterise the limitations of government to 
realise its capacities: One set of rules supposedly applies to the internal 
market of the EU; however, the implementation and enforcement of these 
regulatory standards are administered by national regulators in each 
Member State. If, for example, food control authorities in France do not 
carry out effective controls, health risks from unsafe food could quickly 
spread to all EU countries, thus rendering regulation ineffective. If 
authorities in one country do not enforce rules –or interpret them in a lax 
manner– regulatory loopholes are created that can render the given EU-
wide regulatory regime counter-productive.4 
This has provided (perceived) functional pressures for action 
(Majone, 1996), which political actors in the EU have responded to within 
the framework of the dominant norm of ‘the need’ for delegation to non-
majoritarian institutions that has been observable across the globe (Gilardi, 
2005; McNamara, 2002): Specialised EU regulatory bodies –such as 
agencies, committees and offices– have mushroomed over the past decades 
(Busuioc, Groenleer and Trondal, 2012; Dehousse, 1997; Kelemen, 2002, 
                                                 
4 Hood refers to such a situation as multi-organisational sub-optimisation (1976, p. 17).  
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2005; Maggetti and Gilardi, 2011; Majone, 1997; Levi-Faur, 2011 Rittberger 
and Wonka, 2011). As expressed by The Economist in 2001, “the idea took 
hold that no area of EU business was complete without its agency or 
authority”.5 In the field of economic and social regulation, the number of 
such bodies has been continuously on the rise, especially since the early 
2000s. Whilst the European Medicines Agency was already established in 
1995, other policy areas soon followed suit, such as the founding of the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors in 2004, which was then 
surpassed by the European Banking Authority in 2011. Equally, we saw the 
emergence of the European Maritime Safety Agency and European Food 
Safety Authority in 2002, whilst the European Chemicals Agency started 
working in 2007. In total, the EU currently has 35 of these so-called 
‘decentralised agencies’. In 1990, only three of such bodies had existed. By 
2000, this number had risen to twelve, and by 2005 this number had 
reached 25.6 
Some commentators have described this as an exercise in 
“bureaucratic self-aggrandizement” on part of the European Commission 
(Kelemen, 2002, p.98). The formal authority and regulatory capacities of 
these EU bodies, however, are in fact miniscule. Instead of building a 
regulatory interface with the regulated industry, EU regulatory bodies 
                                                 
5 ‘The EU: Wider still and wider’. The Economist, 2 August, 2001. 
6 See the following list of EU decentralised agencies and the years in which they were created (i.e. the 
year of the ratification of the legal text establishing them; also note that many of these agencies 
evolved from previous ‘committees’). 
1975: European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EUROFOUND; 1990: European Training 
Foundation (ETF); 1993: European Environment Agency (EEA), European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA); 1994: Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union 
(CdT), Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-
OSHA), Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM); 1995: European Medicines Agency 
(EMA); 1998: European Police Office (EUROPOL); 2000: European Police College (CEPOL); 2002: 
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), The European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit 
(EUROJUST), European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC); 2003: European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA); 2004: European Railway Agency (ERA), European Defence Agency (EDA), European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX), European GNSS 
Agency (GSA), European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA); 2005: European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA); 2006: 
European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE); 2007: European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA); 2009: Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC); 2010: European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), European Asylum Support Office (EASO); 
2011:European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA).  
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create an interface with the relevant authorities in the Member States 
(Eberlein and Grande, 2005). As a result, EU regulatory bodies are usually 
not involved in risk management ‘on the ground’. This remains the 
responsibility of national regulators that represent the operative arm of this 
transnational bureaucracy (see Wilson, 2000 [1989], pp.31-110). Indeed, 
other commentators have argued that the proliferation of EU regulatory 
bodies equates to a strengthening of Member States since national officials 
hold crucial positions in these EU regulatory bodies (Kreher, 1997, p. 226): 
National officials constitute the executive boards and expert committees of 
EU agencies and other regulatory bodies. This means that the decisions 
emanating from these bodies effectively represent the coordinated views of 
national authorities. In fact, EU regulatory bodies –themselves highly 
restricted in their formal authority and resources– have been described as 
hubs of transnational networks of national regulators (Chalmers, 2005, p. 
649; Dehousse, 1997; Eberlein and Grande, 2005; Majone, 2000).  In order 
to be able to fulfil their tasks, EU regulatory bodies hence need to closely 
bind national authorities into their work to make use of their resources and 
expertise (Eberlein and Grande, 2005; Majone, 1997; Sabel and Zeitlin, 
2008, 2010, 2012): In the absence of proactive engagement with their tasks 
on part of national counterparts, they can usually not carry out their work 
(Busuioc, Curtin and Groenleer, 2011).  
In this regard, then, transgovernmental ties have been established 
through the direct interactions between national authorities (Slaughter, 
1997, 2004, 2011; also see contributions to Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 
2006).7 Slaughter goes as far as to proclaim that these ties represent a “new 
world order” in which regulators that coordinate their actions need to be 
seen as the “new diplomats” (2004). In the context of the EU, the 
establishment of these transgovernmental links has been described as an 
instrument of capacity-building through the coordination of practices 
                                                 
7 The majority of research on transogvernmental networks originates from the governance literature, 
which is rooted in public policy approaches. Slaughter’s work on transgovernmental networks, 
however, departs from an international relations angle.   Her work demonstrates that research on this 
topic is of relevance beyond the interest of governance and government since it studies how sub-units 
of governments establish relationships that might indeed be decoupled from the diplomatic and 
political relationship between the given countries. 
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between national regulators at a transnational level (Dehousse, 1997; 
Hobolth and Martinsen, 2013).  
 
  
1.1.2 Capacity Building through Transnational Coordination Processes 
Despite their limitations in resources and authority, EU regulatory bodies 
have developed into influential regulatory bodies that have come to fulfil a 
variety of crucial regulatory functions. Some of them assess risk. For 
instance, the European Food Safety Authority and the European Medicines 
Agency are responsible for formulating scientific opinions on questions of 
safety and risk emanating from particular products and materials.8 Other EU 
regulatory bodies –like the European Securities and Markets Authority– are 
responsible for the setting of detailed technical standards that govern the 
behaviour of national regulators and the regulated industry. Bodies like the 
European Aviation Safety Agency and the Food and Veterinary Office, in 
turn, inspect the regulatory practices of national authorities. In other words, 
EU regulatory bodies are heavily involved in key regulatory tasks, such as 
the setting of safety standards and the monitoring of whether these are 
adhered to (see Hood et al., 2001).9 In taking decisions on whether a given 
                                                 
8 Please note that these agencies do not take legally binding decisions. Rather, the European 
Commission decides on the basis of these scientific opinions. This is so because powers cannot be 
fully delegated to specialised EU regulatory bodies. If, for example, and EU agency has the task to 
authorise products for the market –such as the European Medicines Agency- the European 
Commission remains formally in charge of authorisation on the basis of an expert opinion of the 
specialised agency. This is a result of the so-called Meroni doctrine established in case law: It does not 
allow for a delegation of decision-making powers to independent EU agencies in order to keep the 
‘institutional balance’ between EU institutions intact (Meroni SpA v ECSC High Authority (Meroni I) 
[1957 and 1958] E.C.R. Spec. Ed. 133, and Meroni SpA v ECSC High Authority (Meroni II) (10/56) [1957 
and 1958] E.C.R. Spec. Ed. 157). For further commentary see, for example, Griller and Orator (2010). 
Recently the European Court of Justice seems to have lifted these restrictions on agencies. The 
consequences of this ruling are unclear at the time of writing. For an analysis, see Chamon, 2014. In 
practice, the European Commission generally ‘rubber-stamps’ the decisions of EU regulatory bodies.  
9 In this thesis, regulatory regimes are conceptually viewed as control systems: Inspired by 
cybernetics, each control system (i.e. regime) is assumed to have the capacity of directing (i.e. 
standard-setting), of detecting (i.e. information-gathering), and of effecting (i.e. behaviour-
modification) (Dunsire, 1978, p. 59; Hood, 1983). This analytical view helps us to direct our attention 
from multi-level conceptualisations of bureaucracies in the EU –and the inevitable categorisation of 
their nature in relation to supranationalism and intergovernmentalism- to the organisations that are 
all involved in the pursuit of the same objective (i.e. the management of a given risk). Hood et al. 
conceptualise regulatory regimes as entailing a variety of actors dispersed over private and public 
organisations and different levels of government, which all work towards the control of the same risk 
(2001, p. 8f). Please note, however, that this does not mean that this thesis indeed regard government 
to be ‘machine-like’ in practice: Any governmental system is bound to have flaws (Hood, 1976). 
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product is safe, or which rules regulators and industry in the EU should 
follow, they perform powerful regulatory activities.  
That EU regulatory bodies have developed into forces to be reckoned 
with is visible in how they are viewed by national governments and EU 
institutions alike: For example, a review of the powers transferred to 
Brussels by the Dutch government has –amongst other issues- focused on 
EU agencies. In this review, the Dutch government voices stark concern 
about the need for EU agencies to take the view of national governments 
into account when taking decisions or devising regulatory guidelines 
(Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2013, p.2 and 4f). The potential 
influence these bodies can wield has indeed been the subject of numerous 
parliamentary inquires in the Member States.10 Also, the European 
Parliament has on occasion refused to sign off the accounts of several EU 
agencies.11 These bodies are thus regarded as important players that need 
to be constrained by political actors. Overall, then, they appear to have 
developed into powerful regulatory bodies that facilitate European capacity 
to regulate through transnational co-ordination. 
The de facto capacities of these organisations can only be understood 
as a result of the active participation of national regulators in their activities. 
Take the European Banking Authority, for example: It is responsible for the 
setting of technical regulatory standards aimed at ensuring the financial 
soundness of banks.12 It has roughly 120 members of staff and an annual 
budget of around €20,000,000.13 In comparison, the German Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) has around 3200 staff members 
and a budget of approximately €224,000,000. Whilst direct comparisons 
need to be treated with care –after all tasks and responsibilities are never 
identical across different regulatory bodies– it is clear that the 
administrative capacity and regulatory expertise continues to reside with 
                                                 
10 A case in point is the British House of Lords Inquiry about the EU regulatory bodies concerned with 
financial regulation (see House of Lords, 2009).  
11 As a result of concern about the influence of industry on the work of EU agencies, the European 
Parliament delayed its approval of the past expenditure of the European Food Safety Authority, the 
European Medicines Agency and the European Environment Agency for the year 2010.  
12 See Regulation No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC. 
13 EBA, 2013, p.12 and 73. 
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national authorities despite the emergence of EU regulatory bodies. The 
small administrative capacity of EU regulatory bodies becomes especially 
visible in comparison to their US counterparts. In order to manage risks 
from foods and medicinal products in a market of around 320,000,000 
consumers, the US Food and Drug Administration employs around 14,500 
people and has an annual budget of roughly €3.2billion ($4.3billion).14 In 
comparison, the combined number of staff and annual budgets of the 
European Food Safety Authority and the European Medicines Agency add up 
to around 1,100 people and €328,000,000 per year in order to regulate a 
market of a population of around 510,000,000.15  
How similar regulatory demands can be fulfilled despite this stark 
difference in resources can only be understood if one takes into account that 
national regulators devote resources and expertise to the regulatory 
activities of EU regulatory bodies. Without this engagement of national 
authorities, EU regulatory bodies would not be able to fulfil their 
responsibilities.  
 
 
1.1.3 What Determines Coordinative Behaviour at the Transnational 
Level? 
EU regulatory bodies are usually able to fulfil their responsibilities, although 
they are reliant on the willingness of national regulators to engage with 
their work and to coordinate their practices with sister authorities. That 
national regulators indeed seem to engage in coordination in the forum of 
EU bodies is puzzling given that coordination between governmental 
authorities is perennially riddled with difficulties. Indeed, coordination 
among public authorities has been described as one of the most pervasive 
problems of government (Wilson, 2000, [1989], p. 268f; also see Hood, 
1976, p. 17ff). The need for coordination in interdependent settings –and 
the difficulty of maintaining coordination processes– have been described as 
one of the central limits of administration (Hood, 1976, p. 17ff).
 Coordination between governmental authorities is often problem-
                                                 
14 Up-to-date numbers can be retrieved from the Distribution of Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) 
Employment Program Level and the Annual FDA Budget Summary. 
15 See EFSA, 2013, p.21; EFSA, 2013b, p.3; and EMA, 2013b, p.17f. 
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laden as a result of the tendency of bureaucratic actors “to get and to keep 
as much [turf] as they can” (Wilson, 2000 [1989], p.28). Protecting their turf 
equates the maintenance of their autonomy –for example vis-à-vis the 
governments that there are accountable to– is usually seen as a key 
motivation for bureaucratic behaviour (ibid., p. 179ff): In order to maintain 
their organisations, public authorities are known to strive for autonomy 
from other actors since this allows them to define their work in their own 
terms. This, in turn, helps to establish a sense of mission within an agency, 
which is usually helpful in order for the organisation to stay in control. For 
example, this helps executives to ensure that officials throughout the 
organisation are carrying out their work as required, which again feeds into 
the authorities’ ability to maintain its autonomy vis-à-vis potential rivals 
and political actors (ibid., p. 26; p. 183f).  
The protection of autonomy –or ‘turf’– is hence inextricably linked to 
public authorities’ strategic aim to survive. In this respect, the proactive 
engagement of national regulators with transnational coordination efforts is 
particularly intriguing since bureaucratic actors are usually more likely to 
attempt to limit the influence of any rivals that fulfil similar tasks to them: 
Governmental authorities are usually seen to want to be the only ‘sheriff in 
town’. In coordinating, however, national regulators in the EU create 
capacities for an EU regulatory body that can potentially rival them in their 
field, thus supporting them actively in their work, rather than trying to limit 
their influence. In light of what we know about the importance of the 
protection of turf on part of governmental authorities, it is puzzling that 
national authorities seem to proactively help to maintain potential rivals 
(i.e. EU regulatory bodies).  
 Coordination between governmental authorities –or organisations 
and organisational units more generally– is also known to be particularly 
difficult if the aims of this exercise are not clear to the involved 
organisational units, when there is a high turnover of participants that are 
involved in the coordination process, and if these participants have limited 
time and resources since they have other issues to handle than the 
coordination process (see Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972). Considering the 
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high number of officials involved in an EU of 28 Member States and the 
great variation in the contexts they are embedded in at home, transnational 
coordination in the EU seems to be affected by such unfavourable 
circumstances at least to some degree. Also, national authorities’ primary 
task is usually the regulation of a particular industry in their home country. 
Engagement with transnational coordination in EU regulatory bodies to 
support their work is hence indeed an auxiliary task in relation to national 
regulators’ ‘main line of business’. Time and resources devoted to the 
engagement with transnational processes cannot be devoted to the main 
regulatory work of an authority in their home country.  
That transnational coordination between national authorities seems 
to function is also particularly interesting since these efforts often come 
closer to ‘positive coordination’ than to ‘negative coordination’. Scharpf has 
coined the term of positive coordination in order to describe coordination 
processes which entail proactive participation by a variety of actors to agree 
on mutually beneficial rules or practices (1993, 1994). Negative 
coordination, on the other hand, does not involve the proactive engagement 
of all potentially affected actors. Rather, potentially affected organisational 
units only become involved if a reached agreement is seen to obstruct their 
practices, in which case they block the coordination process.  In comparison 
to negative coordination, positive coordination is rare because it requires an 
extraordinary willingness of the involved actors to invest their time and 
resources to coordination processes (ibid.). Transnational coordination in 
the EU is mandated, hence not rendering the involvement of all affected 
actors surprising as such. What remains puzzling, however, is the 
willingness of national authorities to proactively engage in coordination 
despite the strains these activities can put on their resources. In this regard, 
the engagement in ‘positive coordination’ requires the willingness to 
overcome collective action problems. 
Even though national authorities might have a common interest 
under conditions of interdependence, conflicting interests might persist at 
the same time, rendering it difficult to solve such collective action problems. 
Under the assumption of limited resources, active engagement with positive 
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coordination is costly for national regulators. Costs are not only accrued by 
investing time and resources in the coordination process itself. Rather, as an 
outcome of engaging in coordination and defining new working practices, 
national authorities will need to invest resources into modifying their own 
practices: They may have to change the computer systems they use to 
collect data, change their organisational set-up or retrain staff (etc.). Since 
their existing practices are usually based on underpinning regulatory 
philosophies, administrative traditions and norms these changes can run 
into resistance within national regulators (Van Boetzelaer and Princen, 
2012, p.821).  
The thesis is hence devoted to the research question of what 
determines the coordinative behaviour of national regulators at a 
transnational level. At its heart, this question is of immediate importance for 
understanding the capacity of the EU to manage cross-border risks despite 
the absence of supranational capacity as such (Egeberg, 2006; Trondal and 
Peters, 2013, p.299f and p.303), as well as for setting out the conditions for 
transnational administration. Capacities to manage cross-border risks in the 
EU are being established through transnational coordination without 
supranational capacity, and this thesis is devoted to the study of the 
functioning of transnational administration. This means that we need to 
understand which conflicts arise in coordination processes, through which 
mechanisms they are resolved and why national regulators are willing to 
engage with coordination activities despite the potentially material and 
immaterial costs of doing so.  
 
 
 
1.2 Discussing Previously Identified Determinants of 
Coordinative Behaviour 
The literature on EU governance offers three dominate lines of thought in 
order to account for the coordinative behaviour of national regulators at the 
transnational level. Whilst constructivists argue that the norms of their 
professional communities drive the coordinative behaviour of regulatory 
actors (see Section 1.2.1), the functionalist school of thought stresses the 
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pressures of interdependence as determinant of coordinative behaviour at 
the transnational level (see Section 1.2.2). Rational choice institutionalists, 
in turn, focus on the strategic behaviour of national regulators within the 
framework of the institutional framework of the EU (i.e. ‘the shadow of 
hierarchy’) (Section 1.2.3).  
Each of these three schools of thought identifies crucial factors that 
affect coordinative behaviour. However, they all neglect the potential 
problems associated with coordination between government authorities 
pointed out in the public administration literature (as discussed in the 
previous section). Moreover, as is the case in any literature their 
assumptions restrict their analysis in some regards. Whereas the 
assumptions of the constructivist and functionalist accounts do not allow 
enough room for the political (i.e. actors’ interests and power struggles), the 
rational choice institutionalist approach assumes interests to be 
exogenously given, and hence neglects the multiplicity of factors that inform 
interest-driven behaviour beyond the institutional framework of the EU. 
Overall, these three approaches over-characterise coordination processes at 
the transnational level, which results in a lack of observance of variation in 
how coordination functions in varied settings. This thesis suggests that we 
need to be able to account for variation of how coordination functions if we 
are to explain what determines coordinative behaviour.  
 
  
1.2.1 The Constructivist Lens: Professional Norms as Determinants of 
Coordination? 
The constructivist lens emphasises that the coordinative behaviour of 
regulatory actors is determined by the norms of their professional and 
epistemic communities. In this view, professionals are keen to exchange 
practices, learn from each other and maintain their professional reputation 
amongst their colleagues (Eberlein and Grande, 2005; Slaughter, 2004, p.59; 
Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008, 2010; Trondal, 2010, p.22). Regulators coordinate 
because this means ‘acting professionally’ to them and learning and 
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deliberation are used to solve coordination problems (Majone, 1997, 
p.271ff; 2000, p.295ff).16 
 
[…] an agency that sees itself as part of a transnational network of 
institutions pursuing similar objectives and facing analogues 
problems […] is more motivated to defend its policy commitments 
and/or professional standards against external influences. This is 
because the agency executives have an incentive to maintain their 
reputation in the eyes of the other members of the network. 
Unprofessional or politically motivated behaviour would 
compromise their international reputation and make co-operation 
difficult to achieve in the future (Majone, 1997, p.272). 
The constructivist literature hence draws our attention to the importance of 
the norms of professional communities of experts that regulatory actors are 
embedded in as drivers of transnational coordination. In this view, 
coordination processes are determined by the peer pressure exerted in 
professional communities, such as the perceived need to enhance and 
maintain reputation amongst expert colleagues. Information as valuable 
resource is seen to play a key role in driving coordination: Although EU 
regulatory bodies do not have the formal authority to induce coordination 
between national authorities, they are seen to possess crucial information 
through which they can exercise regulatory control and promote 
coordination (Majone, 1997; Eberlein and Grande, 2005, p.100). In a similar 
vein, the literature on EU comitology committees has emphasised that 
coordination between highly specialised national officials happens through 
persuasion and deliberation in an expertise-based and consensus-driven 
problem-solving mechanism (Joerges and Neyer, 1997; Joerges and Vos, 
1999; Rhinard, 2002). Trust between regulatory actors is usually described 
as facilitating factor of coordination in this context (Eberlein and Grande, 
2005, p. 103; Börzel and Heard-Lauréate, 2009, p.143).  
In doing so, the constructivist lens of the EU governance literature 
neglects that regulators are embedded in wider social relations –such as the 
national regulatory regimes they form part of– which also inform their 
                                                 
16 Please note that Majone would commonly be classified as a ‘functionalist’, rather than a 
‘constructivist’ scholar. However, it is put forward here that in relation to his arguments about the 
determinants of coordination he needs to be including in the ‘constructivist’ line of thought in the EU 
governance literature due to his focus on professional norms. This does not mean, however, that his 
way of thinking about the rationale for the establishment of EU agencies is not decidedly functional.  
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interests. Whilst professional norms certainly play a crucial role in shaping 
the attitude of regulators, it is likely that their interests –and hence 
behaviour– are shaped by more complex settings of social relations. 
Moreover, the focus on consensus-driven deliberative forms of coordination 
disregards that differing regulatory tasks of EU regulatory bodies set up 
different relations between national regulators: Technical standard-setting, 
for example, is likely to cause more contention between regulators than 
regulatory tasks focused on information exchange. The generalised focus on 
professional norms hence disregards important sources of variation in 
coordination patterns across different policy areas and different national 
regulators. Since professional norms are not seen to vary across Member 
States and policy areas in the constructivist literature, coordination 
processes are seen to be alike in very different settings. Also, the focus on 
trust does not help us to understand why the same set of actors coordinate 
in relation to one aspect of their work (thus ostensibly trusting each other), 
whilst not doing so in other areas of their work (for an example, see the case 
of banking supervisors in Chapter 6 of this thesis).  
The deliberative approach has also argued that national officials 
engage in deliberation, mutual exchange and learning in order to define 
common ways of doing things because they know that a centrally imposed 
solution would be ‘unworkable’ on the ground: By engaging in coordination, 
national officials can find common solutions which they can adapt to the 
circumstances in their own country (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010, p.15; also see 
Eberlein, 2010).17 This idea takes into account the national contexts of 
regulators, without, however, considering that the circumstances across 
countries might shape regulators ideas and interests to a considerable 
extent, rendering agreement on common solutions difficult. 
Overall, the assumption that regulators are inherently interested in 
exchanging practices and in learning from each other underestimates that 
engaging in transnational processes is a resource intensive and time-
                                                 
17 Sabel and Zeitlin capture this idea in the concept of the ‘penalty default’: If national officials do not 
engage in coordination they know that the European Commission (potentially in conjunction with the 
European Parliament and the Council) will impose a harmonised standard on them. In the diverse 
setting of the EU, in turn, such a centrally imposed solution is seen as unworkable by Sabel and Zeitlin 
(and in their view national officials also this as an untenable outcome) (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010, p.15). 
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consuming process for national authorities. As such, then, the constructivist 
lens of the EU governance literature underestimates the nature of the 
coordination problems that can arise between governmental authorities, as 
highlighted by the public administration literature (see Section 1.1.3). 
Whilst national authorities might indeed have an inherent interest in 
exchanging views with their peers, the realities of getting their day-to-day 
work done under time-constraints and their aim to keep existing practices 
intact render it more questionable whether professional norms are indeed a 
primary determinant of coordinative behaviour of national regulators.  In 
this regard, it has been put forward that regulators need a stronger 
incentive to coordinate their work. In other words, they need to ‘get 
something out of’ coordination (Van Boetzelaer and Princen, 2012, p.822).  
 
 
1.2.2 Functional Explanations: Does Interdependence Drive 
Coordinative Behaviour? 
Functional explanations focus on the interdependence of regulators as 
driving force of coordinative behaviour. In this view, regulators proactively 
engage with coordination processes since they cannot carry out their work 
effectively if other regulators fail to do their job in a context of 
interdependence. 
 
The aim is not altruism. It [engagement with coordination] results 
from the recognition that a global regulatory system based on 
transgovernmental networks is only as strong as its weakest link 
(Slaughter, 2004, p.57). 
 
These explanations hence emphasise that rationally acting regulators have 
an interest in coordinating their actions: Due to the cross-border nature of 
risks they cannot successfully pursue their regulatory goals without 
coordination. This approach usefully highlights that regulatory authorities 
are interested in carrying out fruitful work: They would like their regulatory 
activities to be effective, as a result of which they coordinate. Research has 
demonstrated that the higher the perceived level of interdependence 
between regulators in the EU, the more intensive their cooperative efforts in 
EU agencies and committees (Van Boetzelaer and Princen, 2012). 
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(Perceived) interdependence is seen to provide the involved regulatory 
actors with the necessary incentive to commit resources to coordination. 
This approach argues that the main potential benefit of the engagement 
with transnational coordination is an increase in the homogeneity of risk 
management practices. National regulators hence do not receive an added 
value from coordination in cases where national authorities are not directly 
affected by the activities of authorities in other Member States. In such cases 
–it is put forward– the coordination activities of national regulators mainly 
benefit the European Commission, rather than the national regulators 
engaged in coordination. Thus, in such cases of low (perceived) 
interdependence national regulators lack an incentive to engage with 
transnational processes (ibid., p.822). This perspective highlights that 
regulators would like to go about their work effectively and in order to do 
so, they coordinate. This approach hence makes a crucial contribution in 
demonstrating that regulators care about the results of their work, which –
under conditions of interdependence– are necessarily linked to the work 
carried out by sister authorities in other countries. This idea is also present 
in public administration literature on the motivations of bureaucratic 
behaviour, which has found that officials would like to ‘do their jobs well’ 
(Brehm and Gates, 1997). 
Whilst perceived interdependence might hence be crucial for 
providing national authorities with a sense of purpose when coordination is 
concerned, this approach struggles to explain cases in which regulators fail 
to coordinate despite (perceiving to be) interdependent. Also, this approach 
tends to neglect that national regulators can potentially gain other ‘added 
values’ from transnational coordination than the approximation of 
regulatory practices that directly affect them. Although functional accounts 
usefully point out that regulators have a reason to care about the 
effectiveness of the work of their sister authorities, they neglect the 
possibility that they also care about the their regulatory work ‘at home’: 
After all, they are the operative arm of this regime that carry out the day-to-
day work of risk management within the institutional contexts of their home 
countries.  Similarly to the constructivist approach they neglect the 
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possibility of politically motivated behaviour of regulators. National 
authorities are likely to form their preferences in wider settings of social 
organisation –such as their relations to actors within their national regimes 
in which they carry out their primary work. In this regard, the functionalist 
approach underestimates the problems that usually associated with 
coordination between governmental authorities identified in the public 
administration literature. Overall, this theoretical lens provides for an 
overly general explanation since functional pressures are deemed to induce 
coordination regardless of the formal rules that structure interaction 
between national regulators (i.e. the regulatory tasks of EU bodies) and the 
specific (national) contexts national regulators operate in. Similarly to the 
constructivist approach, then, the functionalist account overstates its 
argument in relation to the neglect of variation of coordination patterns 
across vastly different institutional contexts of regulatory actors across 
different policy sectors. 
 
 
1.2.3 Rational Choice (Institutionalist) Approaches: Interest-driven 
Coordinative Behaviour? 
Rational choice institutionalists suggest that national regulators’ behaviour 
at the transnational level is strategically driven. The ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
view of the EU governance literature emphasises that in principal-agent 
relationships national officials coordinate if there is a threat that 
coordination will otherwise be replaced by hierarchical intervention (i.e. 
intervention by the principal) (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008, 2010; Eberlein, 
2010b; also see Börzel, 2010; Rhodes, 1996; and Scharpf, 1997). This idea 
usefully highlights that despite the lack of formal authority of EU regulatory 
bodies, ‘hierarchy’ is not necessarily absent when coordination between 
national authorities in the EU is concerned and might hence indeed be a 
determinant of coordinative behaviour: After all, these interactions take 
place within the framework of a legal system in which hierarchical authority 
is present in the form of the legislative process of the EU, as well as the 
European Commission and the European Court of Justice as ‘guardians’ of 
the European legal order. Nevertheless, these approaches tend to neglect 
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that the EU regulatory bodies that bring together networks of national 
authorities are largely a result of the lack of capacity on part of the EU’s 
central institutions to formulate technical regulatory standards, guidelines 
and behavioural standards (Dehousse, 1997; Eberlein and Grande, 2005; 
Eberlein and Newman, 2008; Majone, 1997).18  
As such, it is unlikely that the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ can fully explain 
the coordinative behaviour of involved actors: In many regards, it is the lack 
of sufficient hierarchical capacity which brings national regulators together 
to coordinate their practices in the first place. The assertion that these 
hierarchical ‘threats’ shape behaviour have been largely based on 
assumptions underpinning theoretical principal-agent modelling, rather 
than empirical substantiation. It assumes that actors’ behaviour is shaped 
by the formal rule frameworks in which they operate, rather than by the 
immediate activity they have been tasked to carry out, which differ widely 
across EU regulatory bodies. Regulatory actors across all policy sectors and 
Member States are embedded in this larger formal rule framework, whilst 
coming together to fulfil a variety of activities at the transnational level. The 
assumption that actors consider the large scale implications of their actions 
in relation to the ‘grand’ institutional framework they are embedded in 
remains questionable, especially since it has difficulty capturing variation in 
transnational coordination patterns. Regulators are also embedded in 
micro-level frameworks that govern their immediate interactions with other 
actors (such as the tasks of EU bodies). These are also likely to be of concern 
to involved actors, which the rational choice institutionalist approach tends 
to neglect. Nevertheless, this approach helpfully points out that the larger 
formal rule framework that regulatory actors operate in (such as the legal 
system of the EU) cannot be neglected.  
Importantly, this approach counteracts the weaknesses of the 
constructivist and functionalist lenses by acknowledging that regulators can 
have political interests, such as power and the accumulation of resources. 
This is crucial since it takes into account that national regulators are 
unlikely to be only motivated by professional norms. However, rational 
                                                 
18 In the literature on coordination, Lindblom has also pointed out that the coordination of complex 
policies is too difficult for a central decision-maker (1959, 1965).  
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choice institutionalist approaches tend to focus on material and 
instrumental interests. In this regard, this approach seems to regard the 
interests of national regulators to be exogenous to the institutional 
framework of the system of the EU. Interests, however, are arguably formed 
in complex institutionalised settings, which include –but go beyond– the 
professionally motivated seeking of reputation, ‘power’ or resources within 
the incentive structures of the EU system (in relation the role of social 
relations in informing views of what is ‘rational’, see Wildavsky, 1987, 
1992).  
In this regard it is also worth mentioning rational choice approaches 
since they explicitly acknowledge the importance of interest-driven 
behaviour of bureaucratic actors.  (To the author’s knowledge, however, 
these have not been applied to transnational coordination between 
regulators in the EU so far). The rationalist budget-maximising approach, for 
example, stipulates that bureaucratic actors are motivated by the aim to 
maximise their organisation’s budget as a means to increase their own 
power (Niskanen, 1994 [1971]). This approach directs our attention to the 
rational behaviour of regulators as operative arm of an emerging 
transnational bureaucracy (Trondal, 2010; also see Wilson, 2000 [1989], 
pp.31-110): Since the engaging in the solving of coordination problems is 
costly, national regulators are likely to want to receive some kind of added 
value from transnational processes. Yet, such approaches leave little room 
for the different incentive structures provided by differing formal rules –
such as the regulatory tasks of EU regulatory bodies– that structure 
relations between national regulators in specific ways. They also over-
emphasise the material and instrumental nature of preference formation at 
the expense of interests that are shaped by institutional contexts (for 
example, Wildavsky, 1994). In this respect, they cannot adequately explain 
how national regulators are able to perform cost-benefit analyses that 
would enable them to decide whether or not to coordinate. For example, 
how they define and weigh potential collective gains against potential losses 
of reputation as a result of engaging at the transnational level is arguably 
impossible to understand without taking into account the settings of social 
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relations that regulatory actors are embedded in: Regulators are likely to 
apply interpretative filters that enable them to conceive of such costs and 
benefits in ways that correspond to their way of seeing the world (ibid.).   
On the empirical level, this rational choice inspired framework also 
does not necessarily hold up well in relation to transnational coordination 
of regulators in the EU. If national regulators in the EU are budget-
maximising, we can expect them to engage extensively in transnational 
processes because the additional task of coordinating with their colleagues 
endows them with extra resources. Indeed, in some cases national 
authorities receive EU funds to partake in the work of EU agencies: For 
example, national food risk assessors receive money from the European 
Food Safety Authority for their contribution to transnational coordination.19 
Also, drug and food safety experts receive remuneration for scientific 
assessments they prepare for the European Medicines Agency and the 
European Food Safety Authority.20 In the former case, however, these 
contributions are relatively small amounts, which are reportedly insufficient 
to cover the costs of even the most formalised coordination activities.21 
Indeed, national regulators usually experience a (perceived) loss of 
resources through their experts’ involvement in the work of EU agencies 
since their experts are often busy with ‘European businesses’ instead of 
doing their job at home. In other cases, national experts heavily involved in 
EU working groups do not receive any remuneration, such as in the case of 
the European Banking Authority.  
It hence seems difficult to explain engagement in coordination purely 
from a budget-maximising perspective. Even though medicines regulators 
receive relatively substantial remuneration for their work in the European 
Medicines Agency, national officials in other policy sectors receive little or 
no financial reward for their efforts. This, however, does not correspond to 
the absence or presence of engagement with coordination on the empirical 
level. Nevertheless, such a rationalist perspective reminds us that regulators 
                                                 
19 Financial contributions are attached to the so-called ‘Focal Point Agreements’ that EFSA concludes 
with each national authority individually. These payments, however, do not have an official legal base 
and remain informal in character (EFSA, 2013c, p.16ff). 
20 For example, see MHRA, 2013, p.6. 
21 EFSA, 2013, especially p.23. 
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are likely to want to see some kind of ‘pay-off’ from their engagement with 
coordination processes. 
 
Overall, these three theoretical strands point towards important underlying 
motivations for coordination: Professional norms, instrumental rational 
action, and the pressures of interdependence are all likely to play crucial 
parts in shaping coordinative behaviour. However, all three approaches 
neglect that the coordinative behaviour of national regulators is likely to be 
shaped by the context of social relations they are embedded in, as well as 
the specific relations that are set up between them by the regulatory tasks of 
EU bodies. These insights are reflected in the next section of the Chapter 
that elaborates the theoretical framework of this study and the central 
argument of the thesis that is derived from it. 
 
 
 
1.3 Defining the Determinants of Coordinative Behaviour: 
Social Relations and Tasks 
Whilst previous literature has put forward that regulatory actors’ 
coordinative behaviour is determined by professional norms, (perceived) 
functional necessity, or the shadow of hierarchy, this thesis argues that 
coordinative behaviour is determined by strategic behaviour of national 
regulators that is aimed at ‘getting something out of’ coordination. Interests 
of national regulators, however, are not seen to be determined by 
professional norms, material utility or perceived functional pressures alone. 
Rather, national regulators’ perception of their own interests are formed in 
the complex setting of the social relations they are embedded in (see Section 
1.3.1), as well as during the process of carrying out tasks in the forum of EU 
bodies (see Section 1.3.2). National regulators evaluate whether the task 
carried out by a given EU body is desirable through the interpretative filter 
of the social relations they are embedded in, which are usually the national 
contexts in which they carry out their main regulatory work. These 
conceptualisations are then also affected by the act of carrying out specific 
tasks in EU bodies: Tasks provide specific institutional frameworks for 
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strategic interaction. A particular task hence requires interests of national 
regulators to be expressed in a particular way and sets out a particular 
calculus of reward.  This study hence argues that coordination patterns 
found in transnational processes vary significantly since the tasks of EU 
regulatory bodies and the social relations national regulators are embedded 
in vary across policy areas and countries. Although the discussed literatures 
explain important aspects of the coordinative behaviour of the involved 
regulatory actors, they fail to account for the variation that this thesis 
argues fundamentally characterises transnational coordination processes.  
The thesis takes an analytical outlook that is aligned with an actor-
centred institutionalist approach (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995; Scharpf, 1997, 
2000). This means that the strategic interactions of actors are placed at the 
heart of understanding what determines coordinative behaviour. However, 
strategic interactions are shaped by the specific relations set up between 
actors through the tasks they are performing in EU bodies and the social 
relations national regulators are embedded in.22 The thesis applies a 
cultural institutionalist understanding of social organisation. This 
theoretical approach emphasises that actors’ perception of their own 
interest is shaped by how they see the world as a result of being embedded 
in particular forms of social organisation (Douglas, 1986; Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1982; Wildavsky, 1992; Thompson, Ellies and Wildavsky, 1990).  
 
 
1.3.1 Social Relations Inform Coordinative Behaviour 
Regulators are embedded in social relations beyond the EU, which act as 
interpretative filters and as vehicles for interest formation since they inform 
the way these actors view the world. National regulators are effectively 
involved in a multi-level game, in which transnational coordination with 
their colleagues only represents one (often rather small) aspect of their 
work.  The social relations that actors are embedded in represent their main 
frames of reference in relation to which they structure their behaviour. In 
                                                 
22 Scharpf has referred to the former aspect as ‘actor constellation’, whilst calling the latter factor 
‘actor orientations’ (Scharpf, 2000, p. 775ff), which, in this thesis are defined in a socio-cultural 
manner. In contrast to his formulation of actor-centred institutionalism, however, these factors hold 
greater importance in the approach of this study than he has ascribed to them. 
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engaging in transnational coordination, then, national regulators assess the 
value they can derive from this process in relation to the social relations 
that matter most to them in their regulatory work. These are usually found 
in the national arena (whilst not being restricted to this). This thesis hence 
argues that the assessment of the value of tasks carried out by EU regulatory 
bodies –and whether proactive engagement with them is seen as desirable 
by national regulators– are informed by factors outside the EU framework 
of coordination.  
 
Social Relations Represent Interpretative Filters 
National regulators evaluate the task carried out by an EU regulatory body 
through the interpretative filter of the social relations they are embedded in. 
This thesis hence takes a theoretical outlook that emphasises that actors 
create meanings through interactions: They interact with other actors in 
frameworks of social relations –i.e. patterns of interpersonal relations– and 
cultural biases –i.e. shared values and beliefs– which inform the way in 
which they view the world (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990).23 Social 
relations and biases fundamentally frame how regulatory actors approach, 
view and evaluate a particular situation or activity. These include (but are 
not limited to)  formalised relationships with other (governmental) actors in 
or beyond their country, informal relations –such as their relation to the 
media or other societal actors– as well as the professional norms of their 
expert communities. How confined national regulators are in the framework 
of the social relations they are embedded in (such as the institutional ties 
they have to other governmental authorities in their home country) and 
                                                 
23 This thesis is hence based on a theoretical framework of cultural institutionalism. Without taking 
into account the social relations and cultural biases which inform how actors create meanings and 
interpret the world, we cannot understand how formal rules systems come about or how actors make 
use of these formal systems, such as the regulatory tasks that are deemed to structure coordination at 
the micro-level in this thesis (see next sub-section). The cultural theory of institutions emphasises 
that meaning is constructed by social actors through their experience of everyday life, their 
interactions with other actors, their interpersonal (or organisational) relations, values and beliefs (for 
example, Douglas, 1986, 1992;  Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Thompson et al., 1990; Wildavsky, 1987).23 These aspects form the basis of 
institutions, which, in turn, structure how actors confer meaning upon situations, events, relations 
and objects (Thompson et al., 1990). Cultural theory approaches as defined by Mary Douglas, 
Wildavsky and Thomposn et al. hereby bear the crucial advantage that they clearly include formal and 
informal forms of social organisation in their theoretical understanding of institutions and make 
these tangible through their definitions of social relations and cultural biases.  
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how much their thinking is informed by particular biases (such as the norms 
of their professional communities) affects how they evaluate the tasks 
carried out by EU regulatory bodies (compare to Thompson et el., 1990, 
p.5f).  
 
Social Relations as Vehicles for Interest Formation 
As rational actors, national regulators seek to offset the costs related with 
engagement with transnational coordination with the potential benefits that 
are attached to it. Engagement with transnational coordination is costly for 
them: They invest time and resources in these processes and other costs are 
potentially associated with the support of the work of an EU regulatory 
body, such as a potential loss of their own sphere of influence or 
professional reputation as a result of the presence of an EU body in ‘their 
field’. However, whether such costs indeed exist –or are perceived as such– 
by a particular national authority is framed by the interpretative filter or the 
social relations they are embedded in: The conceptualisation of actors’ 
interests can only be understood in the framework of social relations in 
which they create meaning. For example, whilst the particular national 
context an authority is embedded in might render proactive engagement 
with the work of an EU body costly in terms of reputational losses in its 
home country in favour of the EU body, in a different national context a 
national regulator might perceive the work of an EU body as beneficial for 
bolstering its own reputation within its home country. How regulators 
assess the costs and the benefits of transnational coordination is hence 
context dependent in that it is filtered through the lens of the social 
organisation a national regulator is embedded in (see Wildavsky, 1987, 
1992, 1994).24 Congruent with the thinking of actor-centred 
institutionalism, then, actors’ interests include subjectively defined material 
and immaterial interests (Scharpf, 1997, p. 19-22). Since these ‘cost-benefit 
analyses’ can potentially vary from regulator to regulator as well as from 
policy area to policy area to the extent that regulators are embedded in 
                                                 
24 As put forward by Mary Douglas, we need to “treat cultural categories as the cognitive containers in 
which social interests are defined and classified, argued, negotiated and fought out” (1988, p.473): 
Any meaning can only ever be constructed socially.   
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different forms of social organisation, we can expect engagement with 
coordination to vary across country and policy area.  
 
Social Relations Inform what Regulators Value 
National regulators perceive transnational coordination through the 
interpretative filter of the social relations they are embedded in beyond the 
EU framework. Through this prism they conclude whether –and in which 
way– the task carried out by a particular EU regulatory body is of value to 
them. This thesis puts forward that this evaluation takes place in relation to 
the social relations that constitute the primary frame of reference of a given 
actor, i.e. the social relations at which an actor primarily aims its practices. 
In relation to the EU, this is mainly –but not necessarily only– the national 
context in which national regulators are embedded. The social relations at 
the national level have usually shaped regulators’ administrative capacities, 
regulatory philosophies and administrative traditions over decades. These 
factors all inform the practices and ideas that regulators bring to the 
transnational level and constitute the interpretative filter for evaluating 
whether they can gain an added value from the tasks performed by EU 
regulatory bodies. Effectively, national regulators are embedded in multi-
level games: Transnational coordination in the forum of EU regulatory 
bodies is not a closed system in which only the directly involved actors 
shape the functioning of the coordination process. Rather, whether national 
regulators see a value in the task carried out by an EU body –and hence 
whether they are willing to engage with this task proactively– depends on 
whether they see this to be desirable in relation to their main regulatory 
work, which usually takes place in the context of their home country, but is 
also often framed by other aspects, such as the importance of international 
regulatory bodies to the involved national regulators.  
National regulators’ coordinative behaviour is hence informed by 
parameters outside the EU framework, which reflects that national 
authorities are the operative arm of this transnational bureaucracy: Their 
main line of work is not to coordinate their actions with sister authorities 
from other EU countries. Rather, their main duty is usually the carrying out 
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of regulation ‘on the ground’ in their home countries. Auxiliary activities 
such as transnational coordination are hence evaluated in relation to this 
primary frame of reference which is constituted of the social relations that 
are most crucial for national regulators in their day-to-day regulatory work. 
These are essentially the ‘situational imperatives’ that the operative arm of 
a bureaucracy is embedded in: Wilson has drawn our attention to the fact 
that the behaviour of bureaucratic actors ‘on the ground’ is informed by the 
situations with which they have to cope on a day-to-day basis (2000 [1989], 
pp. 36ff). In this respect, key insights from public administration research 
can help us to refine our understanding of the determinants of regulatory 
actors in the EU.25  
 
 
1.3.2 Tasks Shape Coordinative Behaviour 
Whilst the wider social relations national regulators are embedded in act as 
interpretative filters for evaluating the work of an EU agency, the 
assessment of its desirability is also shaped by the tasks that national actors 
carry out in the forum of EU bodies. EU regulatory bodies fulfil specific tasks 
within transnational regulatory regimes: Some EU bodies have the task to 
set technical regulatory standards. Another task carried out by national 
officials in the forum of EU regulatory bodies is the generation of new 
knowledge about specific risks (such as food safety risks). Others have the 
task to take decisions on the safety of specific products before they enter the 
market or to inspect the regulatory practices of national authorities. This 
thesis argues that regulatory actors define and re-define their own interests 
while they are in the process of carrying out particular tasks in EU 
regulatory bodies. This means that their conceptualisation of their interest 
is not unwaveringly fixed when they enter the transnational arena. Rather, 
their own interpretation of their interests –conceived of through the filters 
of social relations– is affected by the tasks of EU bodies: These tasks 
represent the particular institutional framework that structures strategic 
interaction between the involved actors. Particular tasks hence require 
                                                 
25 This is reflected in wider ‘public administration turn’ of EU studies (Trondal, 2010). 
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interests to be expressed in particular ways since they configure the 
involved actors into specific relations and set out a specific calculus for 
reward. In fulfilling a series of different control functions, tasks also set in 
motion different dynamic feedback loops that constitute coordination 
processes. National regulators hence evaluate whether the nature of the 
coordination process –which is structured by the task of a given EU body– is 
desirable in their eyes, rather than merely assessing the desirability of a 
given task at face value. This also means that tasks set specific frames for 
actions since regulatory actors define and re-define their evaluation of a 
particular task while carrying out the activities required by the task.  
 
Tasks Represent Institutional Frameworks for Strategic Interaction 
The regulatory tasks of EU bodies provide the institutional frameworks for 
interactions between regulatory actors at the transnational level. Tasks 
represent institutional frameworks that set up specific relationships 
between involved actors. They hence arrange the involved actors into 
particular constellations (Scharpf, 1997, p. 44ff; 2000, p.775ff). They 
arrange how, when, where and with whom actors meet for a specific 
purpose. An inspection task of an EU regulatory body, for example, arranges 
the involved actors into a constellation that has the EU body at the apex of 
all involved relations: It configures the main coordinative relation between 
the EU body and individual national authorities and sets out in which format 
their interactions take place (and hence to which extent this configures a 
top-down relationship between EU and national regulators). Depending on 
the task, then, horizontal or vertical relationships between involved actors 
are established through this institutional framework. Outside the 
framework provided by a particular task, the involved actors might have a 
different relationship with each other than when the carrying out of this 
particular task is concerned: Depending on the task, an actor meets fellow 
actors eye-to-eye or on a top-down basis. The institutional framework 
provided by an inspection task of an EU body, for example, sets up a vertical 
relationship between the EU body and national authorities whilst they are 
being inspected by the EU body. When, however, they come together outside 
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the institutional framework provided by this task they might meet as 
partners on a horizontal level.  
Tasks hence also define the specific roles actors play in a particular 
process, which are mutually enforcing with the specific relations that are set 
up by a given task. This means that the very same actors might play 
different roles in the context of the carrying out of different tasks. Take 
standard-setting, for example: If an EU regulatory body has the task to set 
technical standards national regulators come together in its forum to 
formulate and decide on these rules. In that setting, their role is defined as 
one of being competitors in the seeking of influence on the end result. It 
defines their role to be one of adversaries in this particular context, even if 
the involved actors have very friendly relations with each other outside the 
context of the institutional framework provided by a standard-setting task. 
These institutional frameworks also set up particular incentive 
structures for the strategic behaviour of involved actors. Standard-setting, 
for example, provides for an incentive structure to influence proceedings to 
the greatest degree possible.  An inspection task of an EU body, in turn, sets 
up the incentive for national regulators to do everything in their power to 
appear compliant with the required norms. These incentive structures are 
mutually reinforcing with the relations and the roles that are established by 
tasks. 
Moreover, tasks shape the interaction dynamics between actors by 
providing arenas for contention and agreement, which mutually reinforce 
the relations, roles and incentive structures created through the 
institutional frameworks which tasks represent.  For example, one-off 
decision-making and standard-setting tasks both set up coordination 
patterns that are based on horizontal links between national regulators. 
However, by providing different incentive structures for strategic behaviour 
for regulatory actors the former presents an arena in which coordination is 
based on the seeking of agreement between regulatory actors: Since the 
decision that is taken does not constrain all further actions of national 
regulators the task provides an arena in which opinions can be openly 
exchanged and consensus sought. The latter, in turn, supplies a container for 
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coordination that is based on the resolving of contention between national 
regulators: After all, their further actions will be constrained by the decision 
taken.  
This thesis hence suggests that tasks provide institutional 
frameworks at the micro-level, and hence provide specific incentives for 
strategic behaviour. Contrary to the dominant view in the constructivist 
literature, then, mutual exchange and learning is not necessarily on the 
cards when national regulators come together in EU bodies: National 
officials do not simply enter the room at the premises of EU regulatory 
bodies to be together and exchange views (even though this is likely to be 
part of their get-togethers). Rather, they carry out their actions in specific 
institutional frameworks that provide different incentive structures for 
strategic behaviour. Since the institutional frameworks provided by 
regulatory task differ across EU bodies, we can expect coordination patterns 
to vary as well. This approach can hence capture and explain variation that 
has been overlooked in the relevant literature.   
 
Tasks Set in Motion Different Patterns of Control 
The effects of tasks on behaviour are not static in nature: Tasks fulfil specific 
control functions in dynamic feedback loops of coordination, in which 
national authorities become aware of each other’s practices, set (informal) 
standards for coordinated practices and modify their behaviour to match 
these standards (whilst then continuing the feedback loop of becoming 
aware of each other’s practices, setting standards, etc.).26 For example, the 
task of setting a shared norm for how much wine each group member needs 
to consume per week fulfils the function of setting a standard of acceptable 
group behaviour. In a dynamic conceptualisation, however, the coordinative 
process is not ‘fulfilled’ at this point. Rather, this is an on-going process: 
‘Coordination’ of behaviour requires that group members gather 
information on whether their ‘wine standard’ is adhered to and if not 
change their behaviour accordingly (or re-wise their standard instead) 
                                                 
26 Such a ‘feedback loop can be conceptualised in cybernetic terms, whereby a control system needs to 
have a means to set standards of acceptable behaviour, of gathering information on whether this 
standard is met and of modifying behaviour if the standard is not met (Ashby, 1956; Beer, 1966; 
Dunsire, 1978; Hood et al., 2001).  
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(Dunsire, 1978; Hood et al., 2001). Coordination is usually referred to as a 
process (‘coordinating’) or/and an outcome (‘is coordinated’) (Alexander, 
1995, pp.3ff; Chisholm, 1989, p.28; Mintzberg, 1979). A dynamic 
conceptualisation firmly emphasises its nature as a process and shows that 
tasks fulfil particular functions in feedback loops:  Coordination is as a 
process that entails mechanisms of setting standards, gathering information 
on whether they are adhered to and modifying behaviour if there are not 
(Dunsire, 1978; Hood et al., 2001). Whilst some tasks fulfil a standard-
setting function in these cybernetic feedback loops, others fulfil 
information-gathering or behaviour modification functions (or a mixture of 
some of these control function).  
Dynamic coordination processes entail the establishing of 
agreements on regulatory practices (standard-setting), the becoming aware 
of each other’s practices (information-gathering) and a mechanism to 
change regulatory practices as a result of the newly emerged (informal) 
standards (behaviour-modification). Specific tasks, in turn, fulfil particular 
control functions in such a coordinative feedback loop and hence set in 
motion different forms of coordination patterns. For example, a task that 
mainly fulfils a standard-setting function (such as taking one-off decisions 
or technical standard-setting) sets a control loop in motion which puts 
standard-setting at the heart of interactions and hence requires 
information-gathering and behaviour modification to support the standard-
setting function through formal or informal means. For instance, when 
regulators come together to set a technical standard, the discussions about 
which standard should be chosen can serve as an information-gathering 
exercise in which national authorities disclose their current practices, and 
try to persuade each other to change these practices. These aspects of the 
coordination process then form part of the assessment of the perceived 
value a given task is offering to a national regulator. For example, if that 
national regulator particularly values to receive information about the 
practices of other authorities this authority might see the task of the given 
EU body as desirable. Particular tasks hence fulfil specific control functions 
in the dynamic feedback loop of coordination. These functions need to be 
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complemented by the ‘missing’ control functions through mechanisms that 
complement the function carried out by a formal task. The (informal) 
mechanisms that develop as a result will form part national regulators’ 
assessment of whether this task is desirable in their perception. Cybernetic 
insights from bureaucracy studies thus help us to re-define our 
understanding of what determines coordinative behaviour of regulatory 
actors in the EU. 
Coordination is hence not an outcome that is ‘achieved’ and then 
stopped and evaluated by national regulators on such a static basis.27 
Rather, national regulators evaluate the process of coordination unleashed 
by a particular task of an EU body. This dynamic conceptualisation of 
coordination bears the advantage that it avoids the pitfall of describing 
coordination as an inherently desirable state of affairs that is either 
‘achieved’ or ‘failed to achieve’ (Alexander, 1995, p.5ff) and thus evaluated 
by involved actors. This view was already present in Lindblom’s pioneering 
work on coordination, in which he conceptualised coordination to produce 
positive outcomes to participating actors: Coordination in this view avoids 
negative consequences (Lindblom, 1965, p.23 and p.154).28 If 
conceptualised as a dynamic process, however, coordination is a continuous 
feedback loop, rather than an outcome that has a beginning and an end. It is 
this process –rather than an outcome– that national regulators assess when 
evaluating whether the task fulfilled by an EU body is desirable in their 
view. As a result, national regulators discover –and potentially redefine– 
their assessment of a task of an EU body in the process of carrying out 
activities in the forum of this EU body.  
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Indeed, this thesis suggests that this conceptualisation is most appropriate in a context in which a 
regulatory problem is likely to have altered by the time the regulatory response might be fully 
‘coordinated’: In the context of permanently changing EU rules, industry structures, and regulatory 
problems, this process needs to be regarded as being permanently ongoing.  
28 Importantly, Lindblom clarified that coordination can happen through direct interaction between 
actors, but also through ‘mutual adjustment’: In this case, actors change their behaviour as a response 
to the actions of other actors with whom they do not interact directly, such as found in competitive 
markets (Lindblom, 1965, p.154). It has been noted, however, that such an all-encompassing 
definition of coordination runs the danger of almost making the concept meaningless (Alexander, 
1995, p.5). 
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Tasks Set Frames for Action 
Since regulatory bodies evaluate and re-evaluate the task of a given EU body 
in the process of coordinating, their own definition of their interest –and 
hence their coordinative behaviour– is activity related. Tasks hence set 
frames for action because the act of carrying out a specific activity affects 
how actors view the process in which they are involved. In this regard, the 
role of tasks in establishing institutional frameworks, in setting in motion 
different patterns of control, and in providing frames for action reinforce 
each other. Tasks do not just prescribe what EU regulatory bodies –with the 
support of national officials– should achieve. They also require specific 
actions of the involved actors and hence frame their strategic behaviour in 
specific ways. This means that regulators do not arrive at the transnational 
level with unwavering pre-determined interests that are not affected by the 
activities they perform when coordinating. Rather, they at least partially 
start to conceive of their own interests (through the filter of social relations) 
in the act of carrying out an activity (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972, p.2). 
Regulatory actors hence “arrive at an interpretation of what they are doing 
and what they have done while in the process of doing it” (ibid.). Since 
different tasks require different activities of regulatory actors, we can 
expect coordinative behaviour to differ across EU bodies with different 
tasks. Whilst a standard-setting task, for example, requires strategically 
acting authorities to perform acts of bargaining and persuasion, an 
inspection task requires acts of immaculate self-presentation.  
Organisational theory literature –such as the just mentioned insight from 
the garbage can model– hence help us to re-conceptualise the determinants 
of coordinative behaviour from explanations based on norms and functional 
pressure to activity based explanations. 
 
Overall, the theoretical approach taken in this thesis hence argues that 
actors act strategically (i.e. in their interest). Their strategic behaviour, 
however, is shaped by the particular task they are performing and informed 
by the social organisation they are embedded in.  The remainder of this 
thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 sets out the research strategy of the 
1. Introduction   
 
46 
 
thesis which is aimed at the verification and substantiation of the above 
thesis argument. Chapters 3-6 then present the empirical findings of the 
study in the form of four case studies. This is followed by a concluding 
Chapter 7 which recaps the main results and expands upon the more 
general contributions of the thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Research Strategy 
 
 
In-depth qualitative study of the involved regulatory actors and their 
interactions in individual regulatory regimes is most appropriate in the 
context of this study. It allows the analyst to study the perceived interests of 
actors emerging from their social relations, while also providing us with an 
opportunity to study the functioning of transnational coordination –as 
shaped by the task of a given EU body– in detail. Only if we ascertain the 
way in which coordination functions can we understand why national 
regulators evaluate the tasks carried out by EU bodies as desirable or not. In 
this regard, coordination in the field of drug safety, maritime safety, food 
safety and banking supervision, and the regulatory authorities of the UK and 
Germany are selected as cases for analysis (see Section 2.1). These cases are 
then used to verify and substantiate the observable implications that can be 
derived from the theoretical argument of this thesis that was developed in 
Chapter 1 (see Section 2.2).  
 
 
 
2.1 Case Selection 
The cases of drug, maritime, and food safety, as well as banking supervision 
are chosen since the given EU regulatory bodies have differing tasks, 
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ranging from technical standard-setting, over one-off decision-making, to 
knowledge generation and inspections. This allows us to gauge the effect of 
tasks on coordinative behaviour. The cases also provide us with relevant 
similarities and differences in relation to the social relations that the 
involved regulatory actors are embedded in. This gives us an opportunity to 
ascertain in which manner social relations inform coordinative behaviour 
(see Section 2.1.1). Moreover, the UK and German regulators are selected in 
order to study the engagement of national authorities with transnational 
processes in-depth. What specifically a regulator can ‘get out of’ 
transnational coordination depends on the social relations it is embedded 
in. The UK and Germany were selected to represent an interesting diversity 
in this regard (see Section 2.1.2). 
 
 
2.1.1 Case Selection of Regulatory Regimes 
Suitable case selection is vital in order to provide for analytical leverage: We 
need to have confidence that the chosen case studies indeed show 
something about the effect of the hypothesised determinants on the 
observed outcome (i.e. coordinative behaviour) (Gerring, 2006). Hence, the 
case selection needs to represent variation across the hypothesised 
explanatory parameters (and thus most likely variation in the observed 
outcome). Case selection according to this principle has been coined the 
diverse case method (ibid., p.97ff). This ensures that the effect of the 
explanatory parameters is at least partially assessable (which is not given if 
the cases do not differ in the value of the explanatory factors). In other 
words, by choosing cases that differ on the value of the ‘independent 
variables’ we can expect the observed outcomes to differ in line with these 
different values. Whereas regulatory tasks can be clearly identified a priori 
by the analyst, the study of social relations that directly affect coordinative 
behaviour is less tangible. It was hence decided to select cases in which the 
tasks of EU bodies vary (see Table 2.1). This allows us to verify whether the 
institutional frameworks provided by different tasks indeed result in 
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different patterns of coordination (i.e. different types of conflicts and 
mechanisms to resolve them).  
Nevertheless, an attempt was made to incorporate the interpretative 
filter provided by the social organisation that regulators are embedded in 
into the research design. A comparative framework was chosen in order to 
gain a better understanding of the way in which social organisation shapes 
the evaluation of the desirability of the tasks carried out by EU bodies on 
part of national regulators: Firstly, cases in which EU bodies have a similar 
task but the social relations of the studied national regulators differ were 
selected. This allows us to study how the different social relations that 
underpin different policy areas affect national regulators’ evaluation of a 
similar task of an EU body. Secondly, cases were chosen in which the 
involved regulators have similar professional norms (or ‘cultural biases’), 
but EU bodies have differing tasks. Since the relevant literature 
overwhelmingly emphasises the norms of professional communities as 
driver of coordinative behaviour, this comparison is vital in order to study 
whether the coordinative behaviour across these two cases differs despite 
their similar professional norms.  
 
 
Table 2.1: Case Selection 
 
 Maritime 
Safety 
Drug  
Safety 
Food  
Safety 
Banking  
Supervision 
 
Inspection Task 
 
    x 
  
   xi 
 
 
One-off Decision-
making 
 
    
  x 
     
 
Knowledge  
Generation 
 
 
   
  
  xii 
 
Standard Setting 
 
         x 
                                                 
i Food control (i.e. food safety inspections). 
ii Food risk assessment. 
 
2. Research Strategy  
 
50 
 
In line with the argument of this thesis, coordination patterns should 
vary in line with the respective task, and national regulators should evaluate 
their value in relation to the social relations that represent their main frame 
of reference (i.e. usually national contexts). A further comparison aims at 
bolstering the argument of this thesis, which is a case in which the resources 
and authority of the EU regulatory body changed during the studied period 
whilst its tasks and the relevant social relations remained unchanged. We 
can hence analyse whether tasks and social relations indeed constitute the 
main drivers of strategic coordinative behaviour, even if the formal 
authority of an EU body is altered (see Table 2.2).  
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Comparative Framework 
 
 Maritime 
Safety 
Drug  
Safety 
Banking 
Supervision 
(CEBS) 
 
Food Control 
 
Most similar in 
regard of the task of 
the EU body (study 
of the effect of 
embedding in 
different social 
relations) 
  
 
Food risk 
assessment 
 
 
 
Banking 
supervision 
(EBA) 
  
Most similar in 
regard of 
professional norms 
(study of the effect 
of the tasks of the 
EU bodies) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most similar in task 
and social relations 
(study of the effect 
of formal authority 
and overlooked 
factors) 
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As a result of these case selection criteria, the regulatory regimes of 
maritime safety, food safety, banking supervision and drug safety were 
chosen (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2).  
 
 
Cases of Regulatory Regimes 
 
Drug Safety The European Medicines Agency (EMA) has the task to take 
one-off decisions on whether drugs can be deemed safe before they enter 
the market and when they are already in circulation. This offers a crucial 
comparison to coordination among food risk assessors.   In both cases the 
experts involved form part of scientific communities that arguably share 
similar professional norms (or ‘cultural biases’). Yet, the regulatory bodies 
in the two cases have differing tasks. This helps us to analyse to what extent 
different tasks and social relations at the national level –rather than 
professional norms– indeed drive coordinative behaviour. 
 
Maritime Safety In the case of maritime safety, the EU regulatory body 
‘EMSA’ (the European Maritime Safety Agency) has an inspection task: It has 
to inspect the practices of national maritime safety authorities in relation to 
their conformance with EU requirements. It hence represents a case of an 
EU body with an inspection task in order to study its effect on coordinative 
behaviour. This entails the study of whether national maritime safety 
authorities accept the oversight of an EU body over their work and if so why 
(i.e. how their evaluation of the desirability of this task is informed by the 
social relations they are embedded in). Also, the maritime safety case serves 
as a comparative case in relation to food controls: In the food safety regime 
the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) has the task to inspect the practices of 
national authorities. However, the social relations national authorities are 
embedded in differ significantly: Whilst national maritime safety authorities 
have been cooperating for decades in the International Maritime 
Organization, food control authorities are widely dispersed and lack an 
overarching professional community. This comparison thus serves to 
further our understanding of the manner in which the social relations that 
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actors are embedded in inform the assessment of the task performed by an 
EU body.  
 
Food Safety The food safety case allows us to study two EU regulatory 
bodies: Food risk assessment is the responsibility of the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA).  The Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) is in charge 
of the realm of food controls (i.e. inspections of food businesses). As already 
mentioned, the FVO has the task to inspect the practices of national 
authorities (see above). EFSA, in turn, has the responsibility to issue risk 
assessments and provide scientific advice. In comparison to other EU 
regulatory bodies, its scientific panels are constituted of ‘independent’ 
experts, rather than representatives from national authorities. National 
officials, however, have the task to come together in the forum of EFSA to 
generate knowledge in order to support the European agency in its scientific 
work. The case offers a fruitful comparison to the drug safety case since the 
they two cases represent two different tasks under conditions of similar 
professional norms (see above).  
 
Banking Supervision    The case of banking supervision represents a 
case in which the EU regulatory body (the European Banking Authority, 
EBA) has the task to set technical standards. This means we can explore the 
form of coordination unleashed by such a task. The case is of special interest 
for two further reasons: The EBA also has the task to orchestrate 
information exchanges between banking supervisors in relation to their 
day-to-day supervision of banks. We can hence study whether the 
coordinative behaviour of the same set of actors indeed differs if they 
perform a different task (thus also being assessed differently by national 
regulators). Moreover, the EBA was preceded by the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS), which possessed less formal authority and 
resources than the EBA. This provides us with an opportunity to analyse 
whether the formal authority and resources of EU regulatory bodies have an 
impact on the coordinative behaviour of the involved actors.  
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2.1.2 Case Selection of National Regulators 
In order to analyse and substantiate the theoretical propositions of the 
thesis adequately we need to analyse the social relations in which national 
regulators are embedded ‘at home’ (and beyond).  We hence need to select 
cases of national regulators that potentially represent a significant variation 
in the social organisation they are embedded in.  
National authorities represent the operative arm of the transnational 
bureaucracy that is under scrutiny in this thesis. They are the units of this 
administrative system that go about the day-to-day business of managing 
risks ‘on the ground’. At the same time, they come together in EU regulatory 
bodies to coordinate their practices. This thesis suggests that we cannot 
comprehend national authorities’ coordinative behaviour without 
incorporating the analysis of the social organisation they are embedded in, 
which is usually (but not only) the national context in which they operate. 
After all, the context of their ‘home’ regime can be expected to not only 
shape their perceptions of what an ‘added value’ is, but also shape what 
precisely national regulators seek to gain through coordination. In order to 
account for this, it is necessary to conduct in-depth analysis of national 
regulators and their regulatory regimes. Moreover, since the regulatory 
capacity of EU bodies is largely based on the active participation of the 
regulators that have the necessary capacity –i.e. the resources and the 
expertise– to contribute to transnational processes (Maggetti and Gilardi, 
2011), the thesis suggests that it is most fruitful to study the engagement of 
‘high capacity’ regulators. This is also sensible since it is more questionable 
what –if anything– ‘high capacity’ regulators can get out of transnational 
coordination in contrast to ‘low capacity’ authorities.  
What specifically each regulator can ‘get out of’ transnational 
coordination depends on the social relations they are embedded in. The UK 
and Germany were selected to represent a variation in this regard. They are 
often described as having different regulatory philosophies and 
administrative traditions (Bekke and Van der Meer 2001, p.12ff and p.61ff; 
Knill, 1998; Knill, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p.47ff; also see Moran, 
2003 and Müller, 2002). Administrative traditions capture administrative 
structures and styles, and the manner in which these are embedded in the 
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political-administrative and legal systems of a country (Knill, 2001, p.61). 
Germany’s administrative system is decentralised as a result of its federal 
structure. Germany’s administrative system is hence of a highly segmented 
character, which, however, is accompanied by hierarchical oversight 
structures. Moreover, it has a civil service culture focused on civil servants 
with legal training that serve life-long careers in specific parts of the 
administration. Actions of officials are usually guided by formal rules. The 
UK’s administrative system, in turn, is far more centralised, which, however, 
is accompanied by relative autonomy of local government to act with large 
margins of discretion on a day-to-day basis.  This is accompanied by a civil 
service culture that is more flexible in its expectations of the training 
officials should receive, and officials frequently rotate to various positions in 
the civil service. At the same time, administrative units responsible for given 
areas often have significantly more autonomy from other government 
actors than their German counterparts (for more a detailed elaboration, see, 
Knill, 2001, p. 61-84). In relation to differing regulatory philosophies a 
pertinent example of variation across Germany and the UK is the much 
higher level of up-take of ‘risk-based’ (as well as ‘principles-based’) 
approaches by UK regulators than by German authorities (Rothstein, Borraz 
and Huber, 2013). Such regulatory approaches are based on broad 
underlying principles, rather than detailed formal rules that guide 
regulatory behaviour.  
Such differences in administrative structure and style can be crucial 
in the sense that national authorities assess the added value of participation 
with transnational activities in relation to these institutional ties, 
administrative cultures and regulatory philosophies. Overall, such 
(structural) differences render it likely that the national authorities of the 
UK and Germany are embedded in differing social relations that affect their 
evaluation of the desirability of the tasks of EU regulatory bodies in different 
manners. However, which social relations most crucially inform what a 
given regulator values can ultimately only be revealed in in-depth inductive 
research and these are likely to go much beyond the general differences that 
were briefly described here. Hence, the empirical chapters engage in 
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inductive analysis of the social relations that are of direct relevance for the 
assessment of EU bodies’ tasks by UK and German authorities.   
Regulators in both countries have important industries and a (long) 
history of regulation in all four chosen policy sectors (i.e. pharmaceutical 
industry, banking sector, maritime industry and coastline that foreign-
flagged ships call at, and a food industry). This is crucial for understanding 
why they are deemed ‘high capacity’ in the context of this thesis: They have 
had the chance the build regulatory resources and capacities over decades 
(this is further substantiated in each case study chapter), not least because 
there is an economic interest in doing so in case of these industries. As a 
result, German and British regulators have relatively large administrative 
capacities in these areas in comparison to authorities from Member States 
with smaller industries and/or less differentiated public administrations.29 
It is crucial to note that ‘high capacity’ here is only used in such relative 
terms: Ultimately, it remains difficult to define what regulatory or 
administrative capacities indeed are. Here, they are regarded as a relatively 
high amount of resources (such as budgets and staff numbers) and 
regulatory expertise, which, for example, might develop as a result of the 
presence of a long-standing and large industry in a given field.  
 
 
 
2.2 Empirical Study of Observable Implications 
We can derive concrete expectations for observations on the empirical level 
from the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 1 and the selected 
cases elaborated in the previous section (see Section 2.2.1). These 
observable implications guided the empirical analysis in order to verify and 
                                                 
29 For example, the Latvian Financial and Capital Market Commission has 124 staff members (FKTK, 
2012, p.66) and a budget of approximately €5,779,000 (ibid., p.72). In comparison, the German 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) has around 3200 staff members and a budget of 
approximately €224,000,000. The Czech pharmaceuticals regulator employs around 340 people and 
its annual budget is around €88,800,000 (SUKL, 2013, p.72f). The British equivalent, in turn, has a 
budget of around €144,000,000 (MHRA, 2013, p.66) and it has around 930 members of staff (ibid., 
p.16). However, capacity is not best addressed in quantitative measures alone. Rather, it also crucial 
whether a given regulator is usually seen as highly expert and competent by its peers in the EU and 
beyond, and whether its actual performance –rather its potential– is realised (Nelissen, 2002, p.13). 
In the end, administrative capacity might differ across tasks within the same regulator and whether it 
exists always remains an empirical question. 
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substantiate the argument developed in this thesis (see 2.2.2 for a brief 
overview of the empirical material that was analysed).  
 
 
 
2.2.1 Observable Implications 
This thesis suggests that the tasks of EU regulatory bodies structure the 
strategic interaction of regulatory actors in a specific manner and hence 
shape how coordination functions. National regulators’ perception of the 
value of these tasks –and whether they should engage with them- are 
formed by the social organisation they are embedded in, i.e. the contexts in 
which they carry out their main regulatory work. We can derive observable 
implications about the functioning of the coordination processes across the 
different cases of regulatory tasks selected for this study from the premises 
of this theoretical argument. These observable implications are analysed 
and substantiated in the subsequent empirical chapters of the thesis.  
 
Standard-Setting 
The following observable implications will be analysed in relation to 
banking regulation and supervision: Standard-setting tasks of EU regulatory 
bodies can be expected to set up adversarial relations between national 
regulators. Decisions on standards impact all further behaviour of national 
regulators, as a result of which they can be expected to coordinate in order 
to influence the decision to the greatest degree possible. Their existing 
practices are likely to be an expression of their regulatory philosophies and 
the specific realities they face in the social organisation that inform what 
they value, i.e. usually the context they operate in ‘at home’. As a result, it 
can be expected that national authorities will usually favour to agree upon a 
shared standard that supports their current embedding in the social 
organisation of their home country. A standard-setting task of an EU 
coordinating body, then, arguably sets into motion a contentious 
relationship between national authorities and their sister authorities from 
other countries. The main line of conflict we can expect to observe runs 
between national authorities (on a horizontal level), rather than national 
2. Research Strategy  
 
57 
 
authorities and EU bodies (vertically). As a result, coordination can be 
expected to function through a process of bargaining and persuasion in 
which national authorities attempt ‘to get their way’: National authorities 
can derive an ‘added value’ from engagement with the transnational process 
by influencing the proceedings in their favour, thus minimising the risk of 
needing to alter regulatory practices as a result of a new shared standard.30 
How coordination functions when an EU body has a standard-setting task 
can be expected to be dominated by the ‘uploading’ preferences (Börzel, 
2002, p.195ff), rather than by peer pressure and learning as emphasised by 
the constructivist literature.  Standard-setting hence sets in motion a 
feedback loop in which national regulators gather information about each 
other’s behaviour in bargaining and deliberative processes of persuasion, 
which can act as a vehicle for behaviour modification.  
 
One-off decision-making 
The subsequent observable implications will be studied in the drug safety 
case study: When an EU body has a one-off decision-making task we can 
expect coordination to be based on epistemic competition. Whilst an 
agreement on a shared technical standard constrains all further regulatory 
behaviour to be in line with these new standard, one-off decisions usually 
restrain the behaviour of the risk producing industry, rather than the 
regulators. As a result, the decision-making process between regulators is 
likely to be guided by things they agree on, rather than being focused on 
issues they disagree on as expected in the case of standard-setting. Since the 
decision will not constrain all subsequent behaviour, they do not need to 
worry about convincing their peers of their ‘way of doing things’ to the same 
degree. Nevertheless, it requires an explicit or implicit agreement on how 
decision should be reached (for example, which methods or approaches 
decisions should be based on). Such a task hence sets up relations between 
national regulators in a competitive manner. At the heart of this competition 
which forms of data gathering and data evaluation techniques one-off 
                                                 
30 This idea is expressed in the concept of ‘uploading‘ in the Europeanisation literature, albeit in the 
context of legislative policy-making, rather than expert decision-making about technical regulatory 
standards: In this view, Member States governments have an incentive to ‘upload‘ their policies to the 
EU level in order to minimise the costs of ‘downloading‘ EU policy to the national level (for example, 
see Börzel, 2002, p.195ff; Radaelli, 2003). 
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decisions should be based on. In this respect, data-gathering and evaluation 
techniques of national authorities can be expected to be at the heart of the 
interpretative filter they apply to evaluate the transnational process taking 
place in an EU body: National regulators attempt to be or to become a 
dominant model of decision-making in order to avoid the material and 
immaterial costs of adjustment as they define it in the context of the social 
relations they are embedded in. Competition hence presents the vehicle of 
becoming aware of each other’s practices and modifying them in the 
continuous cybernetic feedback loop of coordination. 
 
Knowledge Generation 
The following propositions will be studied in relation to food risk 
assessment: The regulatory task of knowledge generation involves the 
purposeful exchange of information between national regulators in the 
forum of an EU regulatory body and hence mainly fulfils an information-
gathering and corroboration function to support the work of an EU 
regulatory body. At the heart of such a task is the gathering of specific 
information by national authorities that is collated at the transnational level 
in order to provide novel sources of expertise that expert decisions and 
advice can be based on.  The task to exchange information leaves national 
authorities to be freer in their deliberation and sharing of ideas and 
practices than technical standard-setting or one-off decision-making allows 
for since future behaviour will not be constrained and no shared decision-
making model needs to be agreed on. Mutual exchange of ideas and 
practices can develop in such a contexts (social organisation of national 
regulators permitting), and can hence be expected to be the vehicles of the 
feedback loop set in motion by this task. The existence of this mutual 
exchange can be expected to result in mutual adjustment if the involved 
national authorities regard such an adjustment to other regulators’ 
practices or outputs to be beneficial to them in the framework of the social 
relations they are embedded in. 
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Table 2.3: Regulatory Tasks and Associated Coordination Patterns 
 
Standard-Setting One-Off 
Decisions 
Knowledge 
Generation 
Inspections 
Bargaining and 
deliberation  
 
 
Epistemic 
competition 
 
Mutual exchange 
and adjustment 
Hierarchy 
 
Inspection Tasks 
These propositions will be corroborated in the maritime safety and food 
safety (food inspections) case: When an EU agency has an inspection task 
we can expect the observed pattern of coordination to be largely based on 
hierarchical mechanisms since an EU body inspects national practices in a 
formal top-down procedure. Whilst EU regulatory bodies do not have the 
legal authority to act on their findings, their institutional link to the 
European Commission provides for potential hierarchical enforcement: The 
Commission can act on inspection findings of EU bodies, including the 
option of starting an infringement procedure against a Member State. Whilst 
this does not resemble the truly hierarchical options that are, for example, 
available to the Commission in competition policy,31 the Commission’s 
interpretation of EU law nevertheless remains a potentially potent source of 
coordination in these cases (see Andersen, 2012; Börzel, 2003; Mendrinou, 
1996; Tallberg, 1999, 2002). This is closest to what has usually been 
described as ‘hierarchical’ or ‘bureaucratic’ coordination, in which the 
guiding principles of coordination are formal rules, ladders of authority and 
conscious oversight (Alexander, 1995; Hood, 2000, p.51ff; Ouchi, 1979, 
835f).  This task hence sets up a vertical relation between EU regulatory 
actors and national authorities. In order for hierarchical coordination to 
function national authorities need to accept the oversight of their work on 
part of EU bodies (Ouchi, 1979, p.836). This set-up of relations bears the 
                                                 
31 The European Commission is responsible for enforcing the competition policy of the EU directly 
(see Art.105, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). This means that it intervenes in 
industry interactions directly, i.e. it represents a regulatory interface with industry. In other fields of 
EU regulation, national authorities -rather than the European Commission- directly intervene in 
industry activities and enforce legislation vis-à-vis the industry. (For a discussion of the European 
Commission’s role in competition policy, see, for example, Wilks, 2005). 
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potential to cause conflicts if national authorities do not willingly accept 
inspection of their work: In order for these conflicts to be overcome or to be 
accepted by all involved actors, national authorities hence need to derive a 
benefit from hierarchical coordination for achieving their regulatory 
objectives. How they define such a benefit (i.e. an added value) emerges 
from the social organisation they are embedded in. 
 
 
2.2.2 Empirical Analysis  
The empirical analysis conducted for this study aimed at a deep 
understanding of the studied regulatory regimes and the social relations 
that are associated with them, rather than attempting to empirically ‘test’ 
hypothesis with a defined set of empirical data. Hence, research for each 
case study commenced with the development of an extensive historical 
understanding of regulation in each field of regulation at the international, 
European and national (i.e. British and German) levels through the study of 
secondary sources. In-depth empirical analysis of primary sources then 
focused on the time-period of the establishment of the given EU regulatory 
body and the year in which the research was carried out. Consequently, the 
analysis of primary data in the case of drug safety monitoring focused on the 
time span of 1995 to mid-2012, it covered the years 2003 to 2012 in 
maritime safety, in banking supervision analysis was focused on the years 
between 2004 and 2013, and in the case of food safety the primary material 
covered extended from 2003 to mid-2014 (in food risk assessment) and 
1998 to mid-2014 (in food controls). 
 The primary material analysed varied across the four policy sectors 
and precise references are made to it in each substantive chapter. In broad 
terms, the material used to verify the above observable implications was 
mainly focused on the following documents:  
 EU Legislation and guidelines governing the interactions between 
regulatory actors and the management of risk in the four regulatory 
regimes. 
 Official documents of the studied regulatory actors (i.e. the given EU 
regulatory body, the British and German regulators, and the 
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European Commission). These included annual reports, minute 
meetings (especially of the administrative boards and expert bodies 
of EU regulatory bodies in which national officials coordinate their 
practices, as well as of meetings of boards and expert panels in 
British and German regulators), reports, position papers, and 
guidelines for and documentation of direct interactions between 
national officials in EU bodies, and between EU officials and national 
officials, as well as speeches of regulator executives.  
 Regulatory outputs of EU, British and German regulators, such as 
technical standards, guidelines for industry and regulatory action, 
scientific opinions, risk assessments and inspection reports. 
 Expert literature, such as journal publications of regulatory officials 
pertaining to the issues they perceive to be crucial in relation to risk 
management in their field. 
 Semi-structured interviews with high-level officials from EU 
regulatory bodies, British and German regulators and ministries, and 
the European Commission. These were mostly officials who are 
directly involved in coordination activities in the forum of EU 
regulatory bodies.  Wherever possible, interviewees covered the time 
periods stated above by selecting former and present officials for 
interviews. It was agreed for interviewees to remain anonymous, and 
interviews lasted between 30 minutes to 2 hours and more (see 
Appendix for an anonymised list of interviewees). Where 
interviewees are quoted in the thesis this serves as illustration of 
points that were supported by the corroborated empirical material, 
rather than being the only evidence available (see references to 
empirical material in the substantive chapters in this respect). 
 
 
The subsequent four chapters report on the results of the empirical analysis 
carried out on this basis.   
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Drug Safety Monitoring 
 
 
The case study on drug safety monitoring investigates the effect of a one-off 
decision-making task on the coordinative behaviour of the involved 
pharmaceutical regulators. Almost all drugs need to be authorised before 
they can enter the market, which is used as a tool for ensuring sufficient 
standards of quality, efficacy and safety (Permanand, 2006). 
Pharmaceuticals regulators hence take one-off decisions about the safety of 
applicant drugs, as well as about the safety of medicinal products that are 
already on the market: Information about the safety of drugs is limited 
when they first enter the market since they have commonly only been tested 
in a very limited number of people and over short time periods (for 
example, Routledge, 1998). These groups usually exclude children and 
pregnant women, and studies presented in market authorisation 
applications cannot provide knowledge about the effects of long-term use of 
a given drug (Mann and Andrews, 2007).32 As a result, countries have 
systematic monitoring schemes of adverse drug reactions in place, which 
are mostly based on the spontaneous reporting of adverse reactions by 
healthcare professionals and the industry to regulatory authorities (ibid.).33 
                                                 
32 Moreover, the interactions with other medicinal products will not have been established during 
pre-authorisation clinical studies. Especially very rare adverse reactions to drugs can only be 
detected through the monitoring of drugs used by the wider population. 
33 The WHO defines adverse drug reactions (ADRs) as unintended, harmful reactions to medicinal 
products that occur at a normally used dosage of the medicine (2008). A widely cited review of the 
relevant scientific literature shows that around 5% of hospitalisations are due to adverse drug 
reactions (Einarson, 1993). Also, a UK study shows that 0.15% of all patients admitted to hospital die 
due to such an adverse reaction (Pirmohamed et al., 2004). 
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National officials come together in the European Medicines Agency (EMA) to 
take decisions on the safety of drugs on the market based on the data 
gathered in their respective systems. Information about adverse drug 
reactions is collated and evaluated at the transnational level in this respect. 
In evaluating the safety of a drug that is already on the market, national 
regulators take one-off decisions about whether they can continue to be 
seen as safe, or whether they should be taken off the market. 
    As outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, we can expect such a one-off 
decision-making task to result in a coordination pattern that is based on 
epistemic competition. The task to exchange and evaluate information 
provides an incentive for competition between them: In order to avoid the 
potential cost of adjusting to the data gathering and decision-making models 
of other national authorities, regulators have an incentive to become the 
dominant model that other authorities strive towards. At the heart of such a 
competition driven coordination process is the motivation to provide 
expertise and decision-making approaches that are seen as ‘the best’ by 
officials from other authorities.  
 This case study also serves as an excellent opportunity to compare 
the coordination pattern that has emerged between drug safety officials to 
that which we observe in the case of food risk assessors (see Chapter 5). 
Officials in both cases form part of a scientific community that arguably 
share relatively similar professional norms. However, at the transnational 
level they perform different tasks and are embedded in differing social 
relations beyond their professional norms. Such norms are seen as 
significant determinant of coordinative behaviour in the EU constructivist 
literature (for example, see Majone, 1997, also see Chapter 1). This thesis 
argues that coordinative behaviour is instead mainly driven by strategic 
action that is shaped by tasks and informed by social relations. In line with 
the argument of this thesis, then, we would expect coordination patterns to 
differ across drug safety and food risk assessment, rather than being similar 
as a result of the similar professional norms of the involved officials.  
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3.1 Social Relations and Tasks in Drug Safety Monitoring 
The UK and German regulators are embedded in widely differing social 
relations in their respective drug safety monitoring regimes. The British 
regulator is embedded in a regime which has developed manifold data 
sources and data assessment tools over the years. German authorities, on 
the other hand, are more restricted in their access to data on adverse drug 
reactions (see Section 3.1.1). The lenses provided by these differing social 
relations can be expected to inform the assessment of the coordination task 
of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) on part of UK and German 
pharmaceuticals regulators. The coordination task of EMA is to take one-off 
decisions about the safety of drugs that are already on the market: Officials 
from national regulators come together in the expert bodies of EMA to 
evaluate and take decisions on safety in light of data that is collated from all 
Member State authorities. Such a one-off decision-making task can be 
expected to result in a competitive coordination pattern, in which regulators 
attempt to supply the best possible expertise and evaluation techniques to 
the transnational process in order to avoid the cost of adjustment to the 
models of other regulators (see Section 3.1.2).  
 
 
3.1.1 Social Relations in the UK and German Drug Safety Monitoring 
Regimes 
An awareness of potential harm arising from pharmaceutical products has 
been around for hundreds of years; however, market authorisation and 
safety monitoring procedures only came about in the 1960s as a response to 
the Thalidomide tragedy (Routledge, 1998). Thalidomide was first 
introduced in 1957 (in West Germany), followed by numerous countries in 
succeeding years. Supposedly a harmless cure for morning sickness and 
nausea, it led to severe birth defects in children of mothers who had taken 
Thalidomide during their pregnancy (for example, WHO, 2004).34 Before 
                                                 
34 In this respect it is vital to note that Thalidomide has undergone a ‘revival’ in recent years since it is 
now recognised that harm caused by this drug can be prevented if avoided during pregnancy (Waller, 
2010, p. 3). This reflects the new tendency to conceptualise pharmacovigilance as ‘risk management 
process’ (Waller, 2010, p. 2; Mann and Andrews, 2007, p. 10). This refers to the identification of the 
specific risks attached to a product, followed by finding a way to manage these risks by ensuring that 
adverse effects cannot materialise. Thus, recognised risks are managed through targeted 
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Thalidomide, virtually the only way to draw attention to safety concerns 
was the publication of adverse reactions in the medical literature (Waller, 
2010, p. 1). In this regard, the Thalidomide crisis represented a veritable 
turning point in the history of pharmaceutical regulation by bringing about 
formal market approval systems and schematic surveillance of adverse drug 
reactions  after authorisation (which is called ‘pharmacovigilance’). The UK 
and Germany both adopted comprehensive medicines acts as a consequence 
of Thalidomide, and established so-called spontaneous reporting systems 
for adverse drug reactions.  
In the UK, the Committee on Safety of Drugs was formed in 1963 as a 
direct response to the Thalidomide tragedy. A successor of this committee 
(the Commission on Human Medicine) today forms the expert body advising 
the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA),35 which 
is responsible for running the UK pharmacovigilance regime (and thus also 
for the British spontaneous reporting system, called ‘Yellow Card 
Scheme’).36 In the 1980s more proactive information-gathering tools for 
adverse drug reactions were developed by way of tracking the records of 
specific patients. Disillusioned by successive drug safety disasters which had 
demonstrated the weaknesses of spontaneous reporting (Waller, 2010, p. 6), 
an expert in the field (Professor ‘Bill’ Inman, who had been influential in the 
development of the Yellow Card Scheme) developed a more proactive form 
of gathering data about adverse drug reactions, called prescription-event-
monitoring (PEM).37 This scheme is today run by the Drug Safety Research 
Unit (DSRU, which works independently from the MHRA). Under this 
scheme, GPs fill in a questionnaire to record all observed events in the first 
10 000 patients they prescribe a newly authorised drug to. As the GPs are 
obliged to report all events listed in the patients’ notes, they do not have to 
evaluate independently whether a certain event is causally linked to the 
                                                                                                                                    
interventions (such as providing a female patient who is taking Thalidomide with effective birth 
control) (Mann and Andrews, 2007, p. 6f). 
35 See Part 1, Section 2 and 3 of the Medicines Act 1968. With regard to pharmacovigilance, it is the 
Pharmacovigilance Expert Advisory Group of the Commission on Human Medicines that advises the 
MHRA. 
36 The MHRA was formed in 2003 as a result of a merger between the Medicines Control Agency 
(MCA) and the Medical Devices Agency (MDA). 
37 William Howard Wallace (‘Bill’) Inman has been a crucial figure in the development of British 
pharmacovigilance. For a history of British pharmacovigilance (including details about the 
development of the DSRU) from the personal perspective of Bill Inman, see Inman (1999). 
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treatment with the new prescription medicine (for an overview of the 
system, see Shakir, 2007). Another approach to data collection used for 
pharmacovigilance in the UK is the General Practice Research Database 
(GPRD), which also has its roots in an individual initiative (an individual 
family doctor who developed a database containing his patients’ records). 
The GPRD consists of anonymous records of patients registered at around 
480 GP (family doctor) practices in the UK and today forms a sub-unit of the 
MHRA. No comparable database exists anywhere in the world, thus making 
it a popular source of data for research, especially with regard to 
pharmacovigilance (Parkinson, Davis and Van Staa, 2007).38 The MHRA is 
hence embedded in social relations that have produced a great variety of 
data sources on adverse drug reactions. This is likely to inform how this 
authority approaches and evaluates transnational coordination of 
pharmacovigilance activities.  
Unlike the British system, Germany has not developed a multitude of 
information-gathering tools over the years. The German system of 
pharmacovigilance hence relies largely on spontaneous reporting of adverse 
reactions. The German authorities responsible for the spontaneous 
reporting system are the Paul-Ehrlich-Institut (PEI, responsible exclusively 
for biomedical products)39 and the ‚Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical 
Devices‘ (Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte, BfArM) 
(responsible for all other categories of medicinal products). The BfArM and 
PEI work with almost identical procedures and instruments when 
pharmacovigilance is concerned (Hagemann and Paeschke, 2007, p. 228). 
Spontaneous reporting in Germany also began in the first half of the 1960s 
                                                 
38 The model of compiling patient data developed by a family doctor spread to other practices, firstly 
through personal contact with the developer, then through a Venture Capital set up for this purpose. 
Reuter bought this business in 1993, and then donated it to Department of Health in 1994. It was 
operated by the Office for National Statistics until 1999, and was henceforward operated by the MCA 
(now MHRA) (for a documentation of the history of the GPRD, see Lawson, Sherman and Hollowell, 
1998; Wood and Coulson, 2001). At the time of writing the database has undergone another large 
change, as it became part of the Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD) in March 2012. This is 
jointly funded by the MHRA and the National Health Service (NHS) National Institute for Health 
Service (NIHS). As the empirical data collection for this chapter was completed when this change 
entered into force, the chapter refers to the ‘GPRD’, rather than the ‘CPRD’.  
39 More precisely, the Paul-Ehrlich Institut is reponsible for vaccines for humans and animals, 
medicinal products containing antibodies, allergens for therapy and diagnostics, blood and blood 
products, tissue and medicinal products for gene therapy, somatic cell therapy and xenogenic cell 
therapy. 
3. Drug Safety Monitoring  
 
67 
 
as a response to Thalidomide. At that time, however, no national authority 
charged with the tasks existed (ibid.). Rather, the Drug Commission of the 
German Medical Association (‘Arzneimittelkomission der deutschen 
Ärzteschaft‘) collected reports of adverse drug reactions in the immediate 
aftermath of the Thalidomide tragedy (ibid., p. 229). The predecessor of the 
BfArM was only founded in 1975 after a lengthy period of putting together 
the medicines act (‘Arzneimittelgesetz’) as a consequence of Thalidomide. 
The PEI had already existed since 1896 but only took up a role as public 
authority of medicines control in 1972. The existence of a research insitute 
(which also acts as federal regulatory authority) focusing specifically on 
biomedicines (PEI) renders Germany an expert country in this field. 
However, Germany has not matched the UK in its availability of data on 
adverse drug reactions, and data gathering tools resembling the British case 
would be unlikely to develop in Germany due to data-protection concerns. 
Instead, recently Germany decided to establish dedicated 
pharmacovigilance research units in hospitals to obtain more information 
on adverse drug reactions occurring in specific patient groups (such as 
children); which was inspired by the French pharmacovigilance model 
(Hagemann and Paeschke, 2007, p. 229f; Vogel, 2007, pp. 38-43).40 The 
relative lack of diverse data sources on adverse drug reactions in the 
context of social relations in the German pharmacovigilance regime can be 
expected to inform how German authorities assess the value of the one-off 
decision-making task they have at the transnational level. 
 
 
3.1.2 The One-Off Decision-Making Task of EMA 
At the European level, the concept of pharmacovigilance was introduced in 
1993 by Council Directive 93/39/EEC.41 The introduction of EU-level 
pharmacovigilance hereby formed part of the wider European 
                                                 
40 As introduced in an amendment of the Arzneimittelgesetz in 2004 (‘12.AMG-Novelle‘),§ 62. 
41 Regulation concerned with the market authorisation of drugs and drug safety has since been 
collated in ‘Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 
on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use’, and ‘Regulation (EC) No 
726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down Community 
procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use 
and establishing a European Medicines Agency’. 
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pharmaceuticals policy developed at the time, which became 
institutionalised in 1995 through the establishment of the European Agency 
for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA, now the European 
Medicines Agency, EMA). The main focus hereby was the set-up of EU-wide 
market authorisation procedures for pharmaceuticals: The centralised 
procedure in which EMA and the European Commission are responsible for 
granting market approval and the decentralised procedure and mutual 
recognition procedures, in which a national authority is responsible for 
authorising a product for the European market.42 Pharmacovigilance stayed 
in the background during these developments, and it is only very recently 
that the regulatory framework has been strengthened vis-à-vis the 
regulation of market authorisation, thereby becoming more closely 
integrated with the latter (Bahri, Tsintis, and Waller, 2007; European 
Commission, 2007; Waller, 2010, p. 92f). 
The requirements of the original pharmacovigilance regime of 1993 
were relatively restricted in their scope, mainly demanding each Member 
State and manufacturer to have a pharmacovigilance system in place, 
enabling them to gather, collate and evaluate reports of adverse drug 
reactions.43 The emphasis has been on rules extended towards the industry, 
which comprise of detailed reporting obligations, i.e. the type of information 
that companies need to pass on to the industry and the timeframes within 
which they need to do so. Regulations for national pharmacovigilance 
systems have been of a very broad scope, largely leaving the running of 
these systems up to the Member States. These provisions remained mostly 
unscathed during reforms of the EU pharmaceuticals regime in 2001 and 
2004. The introduction of the data-base EudraVigilance in 2001, however, 
represented a turning point, at which all spontaneous reports started to be 
assimilated and shared electronically at the European level. The amount of 
data (i.e. spontaneous reports) to be handled by this electronic system 
quickly increased from a few hundred to tens-of-thousands of reports (the 
                                                 
42 There is extensive literature about the European market authorisation procedures, for example, 
Abraham and Lewis, 2000; Gehring and Krapohl, 2007; Mossialos et. al., 2004; Hauray and Urfalino, 
2009; Permanand, 2006. 
43 Art.29a-i, Council Directive 93/39/EEC of 14 June 1993 amending Directives 65/65/EEC, 
75/318/EEC and 75/319/EEC in respect of medicinal products. 
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facilitation of which has since become one of the major administrative 
pharmacovigilance responsibilities of EMA) (see EMEA/EMA Annual 
Reports 1997-2010).  
The most dramatic departure from the status quo of the European 
pharmacovigilance regime occurred with a reform in 2010.44 In contrast to 
previous changes to the pharmaceuticals legislation, this reform was 
entirely devoted to the field of pharmacovigilance (thereby also linking it 
more clearly to the pre-marketing and market approval stage). In general, 
the approach of the reform has been to ‘strengthen’ pharmacovigilance 
practices, i.e. to give them a higher profile and more wide-ranging tools 
instead of mainly focusing on the market-authorisation procedure to ensure 
the safety of drugs (European Commission, 2007).45 The 2010 reform is 
crucial in that it shifts the power balance towards the regulator at the 
expense of the pharmaceutical industry: Regulators are now able to request 
specific post-authorisation studies from the manufacturer.46 Moreover, the 
system has become more centralised since pharmaceutical companies now 
have to enter reports on adverse reactions into EudraVigilance, instead of 
reporting to their national database.47  
                                                 
44 Please note that this reform was due to be implemented by July 2012. The empirical analyses 
conducted for this chapter focused on the time period of the early 1990s to spring 2012, and hence 
did not include empirical study of the functioning of the reformed regime in action. Nevertheless, 
adequate references are given throughout the chapter to highlight any possible changes that could 
have affected the coordinative behaviour uncovered in this case study. However, since the central 
tasks of the EMA have not changed as a result of the 2010 reform, the coordination pattern described 
in this chapter is unlikely to have altered fundamentally.  
45 In the EU regime as it stood before the 2010 reform, regulators effectively found themselves in a 
power vacuum in relation to the industry in the phase between market authorisation and a situation 
in which there was clear evidence that a drug is unsafe (Waller, 2010, p. 92f). Regulators were thus in 
control before a drug entered the market as the industry had to supply additional information if 
requested by the regulator. The moment a drug was on the market, however, this power-balance 
shifted towards the manufacturer, who was (and still is) usually best informed about the drug in 
question after this point. The regulator only reached the lost degree of clout in the presence of 
compelling evidence against the safety of a given drug, in which moment the ‘nuclear option’ of 
revoking the market authorisation can be employed (ibid.). However, such instances are relatively 
rare, and often a company will voluntary withdraw a product if it thinks it will lose the battle of data 
analysis against the regulatory experts. 
46 Art.22a(1)(a), Directive 2010/84/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
December 2010, amending, as regards pharmacovigilance, Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community 
code relating to medicinal products for human use. 
Art.10a(1)(a), Regulation (EU) No 1235/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
December 2010 amending as regards pharmacovigilance of medicinal products for human use, 
Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Medicines  Agency, and Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007 on advanced therapy medicinal 
products.  
47 Art.107(3), Directive 2010/84. 
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The pharmacovigilance tasks of EMA and the national officials 
meeting in its forum have remained stable over the years despite the 
mentioned reforms:  EMA has the task to make decisions about the safety of 
drugs on the market by collating and evaluating information obtained 
through spontaneous reporting.48 Within EMA, the Committee for Medicinal 
Products for Human Use (CHMP), comprised of officials from national drug 
regulators,49 debates and decides whether a drug is safe in light of the 
collated data.50 This is also the committee that authors opinions on whether 
to grant market authorisation for a drug in the first place (on the basis of 
which the Commission takes the official decision).51 The CHMP was advised 
by the Pharmacovigilance Working Party (PhVWP) –also comprised of 
national experts– until the most recent reform was implemented in July 
2012. This Working Party was subsequently superseded by the 
Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee (PRAC). Its membership 
basis goes beyond the delegates of national authorities since a 
representative of a patient organisation and of the health professions are 
also represented.52 Both expert committees –the CHMP and the 
PhVWP/PRAC– meet once a month during the same time.53 The 
PhVWP/PRAC usually discusses and formulates scientific advice about post-
marketing safety of a drug on the request of the CHMP or a Member State 
authority.54 In this regard, then, this EMA committee holds the advice the 
CHMP about the evaluation of the safety of marketed drugs on the basis of 
collating the spontaneous reporting data from all Member States and 
                                                                                                                                    
Please note that this is not a comprehensive list of the 2010 reform.  
48 Art.21-29, Regulation 726/2004. The EMA has this task only in relation to products that were 
authorised by EMA and the European Commission. If products are concerned which were authorised 
in the decentralised procedure, the national authority in question remains the responsible body for 
pharmacovigilance (Art. 101-108, Directive 2001/83). Please also note that the EMA and the 
Commission have issued various guidelines and standard operating procedures for national 
pharmacovigilance systems in order to facilitate the correct implementation with the European 
legislation. The most crucial guidelines in this respect are the Volume 9A Guidelines. Also see EMA’s 
website for an up-to-date overview of pharmacovigilance Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); 
relating to, for example, vocabulary to be used in reporting and communicating about adverse drug 
reactions.   
49 Art.61(1), Regulation 726/2004. 
50 Art.22, Regulation 726/200; Section 2A of Volume 9A (‘The Rules Governing Medicinal Products in 
the European Union - Guidelines on Pharmacovigilance for Medicinal Products for Human Use, 2008). 
51 Art.5(2), Art.10, Regulation 726/2004. 
52 Art. 61a(1)(c) and (d), Regulation 1235/2010. 
53 The meeting of the two committees were streamlined in 2003 in order to faciltate exchange 
between the two bodies (EMA Annual Report, 2003).  
54 Section 2A Section 3.3.3. and Appendix 1.A of Volume 9A. 
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forming coordinated opinions on how this information should be evaluated. 
Such a task can be expected to provide an incentive to the involved 
regulators to supply the best possible expertise to the transnational process: 
This provides them with an opportunity to avoid the cost of adjustment to 
the data gathering and evaluation tools of other regulators that might be 
seen to supply ‘better’ knowledge. Strategic coordinative behaviour of 
national regulators in such a case can hence be expected to equate to a 
competitive coordination pattern, in which national authorities attempt to 
be seen to supply the best data and assessment tools to the transnational 
process. 
 
 
 
3.2 Identifying the Coordination Pattern among Drug Safety 
Monitoring Authorities 
Officials from national authorities come together in the expert bodies of 
EMA to take decisions on the safety of pharmaceutical products that are 
already on the market. This requires coordinated standards of how data on 
adverse drug reactions should be collected and evaluated. The EU regime 
and EMA, however, do not prescribe how national regulators should collect 
and assess data (see Section 3.2.1). Potential agreement between national 
regulators on which forms of data gathering and assessment should be 
striven towards must hence be reached on informal level, rather than being 
orchestrated by an EU body. In line with the argument of this thesis, we can 
expect that UK and German authorities only engage proactively with 
transnational coordination processes if they perceive this to add value to 
their own work. In this regard, they assess the value of the coordination 
pattern that is shaped by EMA’s one-off decision-making task (see Section 
3.2.2). 
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3.2.1 Potential Impediments to Coordination 
The requirements of the EU regime concerning how data collection and 
evaluation systems of national regulators should look like are very limited. 
If coordinative behaviour was only driven by such authoritative rules, then, 
we would expect national regulators to engage in the coordination of their 
data collection and assessment models to a very limited degree. Largely, the 
EU-level regime merely requires national regulators’ to run a functioning 
spontaneous reporting system.55 It is not specified how these systems 
should operate. Reporting by healthcare professionals is not mandatory 
under the EU-level regime and is largely left to  national authorities, as is the 
running of the system in general.56 Moreover, the EU regime extends rules 
towards the industry concerning how companies should handle information 
about adverse drug reaction that come to their attention. In this respect, 
each company needs to operate an internal pharmacovigilance system, 
which is a company-internal data collection and evaluation unit for adverse 
drug reactions.57 A specifically trained person (the ‘Qualified Person’) needs 
to be in charge of this system.58 This ‘Qualified Person’ is also responsible 
for ensuring that any serious adverse drug reaction that comes to the 
attention of the manufacturer is notified to the authorities within 15 days.59 
Also, the industry is required to submit safety documents about each of 
their drugs on a regular basis.60 It is the task of national regulators to 
enforce these standards in their territory.61  
Such procedural requirements do not specify safety targets or 
standards of scientific quality to be met. Rather, they lay down which kind of 
system needs to be present, when certain issues need to be notified etc. As 
such, then, the emergence of coordinated standards relating to the 
substance of pharmacovigilance –such as how data should be collected and 
which scientific approach to use to evaluate this data– remains entirely in 
the hands of national regulators. These, in turn, arguably must have a good 
                                                 
55 Art.102, Directive 2001/83. 
56 Ibid., Art.101, Art.102. 
57 Art.23(a), Regulation 729/2004. 
58 Art.103, Directive 2001/83. 
59 Ibid., Art.103(b), Art.104(1),(2),(3),(4). 
60 Ibid., Art.104(6). 
61 Ibid., Art.105(1),(2); Art.25, Regulation 729/2004. 
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reason to engage in such coordination despite the absence of an 
authoritative imperative to do so. This is especially so since national 
authorities such as the UK and German regulators are largely sceptical about 
the contribution of EU rules to the enhancement of drug safety. For example, 
a German regulator noted that it would be preferable to receive a report on 
an adverse drug reaction which is of high informational quality on the 16th 
day after it came to the attention of the manufacturer, rather than receiving 
it 15 days after the company was informed (as required by the EU regime) 
with lower informational content and quality.  
 
I mean, to receive a report after exactly 15 days, yes, of course, that 
needs to happen. But on the other hand, if we receive a very 
detailed report about an adverse drug reaction, including a very 
good assessment, on day 16; then I find that downright positive and 
acceptable.62 
 
In this regard, it was expressed that the presence of the EU regime limits the 
scope for flexibility in this matter, hence potentially affecting substance for 
the sake of procedure. Thereby, an interplay between the proceduralising 
nature of EU rules and the approach taken by industry reinforces this logic: 
Industry compliance with regulatory standards is most easily shown by 
adhering to specific requirements (such as reporting an adverse effect after 
15 days), rather than bending the rules in order to deliver a qualitatively 
better report. 
 
It’s not ideal that industry is so focused on process requirements. 
The fact that a report is submitted from A to B in a certain 
timescale, according to the letter of the law or the guidelines, 
doesn’t actually stop a patient getting a serious adverse drug 
reaction. So 90% of what industry does tend to focus on having a 
compliant pharmacovigilance system. That does not mean you have 
safe drugs.63 
 
EMA, on the other hand, is insistent on compliance with reporting timelines 
and has expressed concern about instances of non-compliance (European 
Commission, 2010, p. 145).64 This might negatively impact national 
                                                 
62 Interviewee D2. 
63 Interviewee D1. 
64 Also see Volume 9A, Chapter I.4, Section 2, and Chapter III.8. 
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regulators’ assessment of the value EMA can add to their work, and thus 
their commitment to engage proactively with its activities. This is especially 
so since UK and German authorities associate the EU regime and EMA with 
procedural requirements to a considerable extent. Pharmacovigilance 
inspections, for example, are carried out at the site of pharmaceutical 
companies in order to verify whether they comply with the regime’s rule 
(i.e. whether they have an internal pharmacovigilance system and ‘Qualified 
Person’ in place). These inspections are carried out by national regulators 
(sometimes at request of EMA). The inspection regime is procedural in that 
it is mainly concerned with checking whether a system to collate and 
analyse information is present,65 rather than scrutinising the quality of the 
results this system can provide in terms information on adverse drug 
reactions and patient safety. This essentially renders inspections into a ‘box-
ticking’ exercise, rather than providing for contemplation whether a specific 
company internal system is able to collate information of high quality in 
terms of providing detailed and accurate knowledge about an adverse drug 
reaction. National regulators are under the impression that there is a 
potential trade-off between compliance with procedural EU regulations and 
the enhancement of safety, which a German regulator commented upon as 
follows: 
 
That is one of my worries, that due to the EU, since there are so 
many guidelines etc. it will go more into this direction, where 
things get formalised. […] You might see a signal-detection in a 
company that has an amazing data-base, and then you realise that it 
has very grave shortcomings substantively. I think these things also 
need to be captured, not only that signal-detection exists. I think 
that we really had this in Germany, that we focused on substantive 
aspects. And now we need to be careful – despite the importance of 
QM – that this is preserved.66  
  
Whereas each company’s internal pharmacovigilance system is regularly 
inspected by regulators in line with procedures established under EU 
                                                 
65 See Art.111, Directive 2001/83; Art.19(1), Regulation 726/2004; Volume 9A, Chapter I.2.4. For 
example, Volume 9A states that “the focus of these inspections is to determine that the Market 
Authorisation Holder has personnel, systems and facilities in place to meet their regulatory 
obligations” (p.31). Also, see the EMA standard operating procedures (SOP) for pharmacovigilance 
inspections, and the MHRA guide for industry (MHRA, 2008).  
66 Interviewee D2. 
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requirements, the national pharmacovigilance systems are not regularly 
monitored by EMA or the European Commission. The European Commission 
once contracted an independent party to assess the pharmacovigilance 
systems of the Member States (see Fraunhofer Institute, 2006). This 
assessment, however, focused mostly on the problem of weak 
pharmacovigilance structures in the new Member States, and does not 
attempt an analysis of substantive aspects, such as variation in scientific 
approaches to pharmacovigilance or data collection tools. National 
authorities are hence under no formal pressure to coordinate their practices 
in relation to such aspects.   
 
This part of the chapter has demonstrated that national pharmaceuticals 
regulators are under no formal pressure from the EU regime and EMA to 
coordinate their data collection tools and their approaches to data 
evaluation. Moreover, UK and German authorities associate their 
participation in the EU regime with the proceduralising nature of EU 
requirements, which has the potential to undermine safety in their view. If 
UK and German authorities are to proactively engage with EMA’s one-off 
decision-making task despite this negative perception and the absence of 
formal pressure, they must arguably perceive it to be ‘worth it’ for their 
regulatory work.  
 
 
3.2.2 Transnational Coordination: Adding Value through Epistemic 
Competition 
If national authorities are to coordinate their substantive pharmacovigilance 
practices in the absence of formal requirements to do so, they must perceive 
themselves to be ‘getting something out of it’. Indeed, this case study finds 
that both UK and German authorities engage proactively with the 
transnational process and actively participate in the coordination of their 
practices –albeit on an informal basis– since they both perceive it to add 
value to their pharmacovigilance work at home. What they perceive to be 
getting out of the transnational process differs, however, since it is informed 
by the different social relations they are embedded in domestically: 
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Proactive engagement with transnational decision-making about the safety 
of drugs has enabled the UK to become the informal ‘gold standard’ of how 
data should best be collected and evaluated. Engagement with the 
transnational process hence provides the British MHRA with the advantage 
of not having to adjust its own practices to a different model, which in its 
perception would be inferior to its own model. German authorities, on the 
other hand, gain an insight into the exceptional data sources of the UK 
through its engagement with transnational processes in EMA, which they 
cannot obtain in the context of the social relations they are embedded in. At 
the same time, the German regime has followed the incentive to improve its 
own data sources in order to remain competitive vis-à-vis the ‘gold 
standard’ of the UK model.  
 When discussions about the ‘substantive standard’ of drug safety are 
concerned, the UK MHRA has been able to establish its own practices as 
‘informal gold standard’. The ‘substantive standard’ of drug safety is the so-
called benefit-risk balance, i.e. an evaluation whether the potential risks of a 
medicinal product are outweighed by its potential benefits. Spontaneous 
reports about adverse drug reactions and other available data are evaluated 
in this light to analyse whether the benefit-risk balance of a given product 
has shifted or not. In the transnational coordination process, the CHMP of 
EMA (comprised of national experts) undertakes this analysis when 
centrally authorised products are concerned, whilst being advised by the 
PhVWP/PRAC.67 There are no EU requirements, however, as to how the 
benefit-risk balance should be evaluated. In carrying out such form of 
analyses in EMA, it hence depends on national regulators to coordinate their 
approaches in order to make the transnational process feasible. In this 
regard, the British model has established itself as ‘gold standard’ in a 
competitive coordinative process. 
 
I think we have seen ourselves, rightly or wrongly, as having one of 
the strongest –if not the strongest- system of pharmacovigilance. 
But we have basically seen ourselves as this big team player.68  
                                                 
67 Art.21-29, Regulation 729/2004; Art.101-108, Directive 2001/83. 
68 Interviewee D1. In this respect, the interviewee also stressed that the MHRA as a clear financial 
interest to do so, as national authorities will obtain more resources from EMA the more 
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One manifestation of this clout of the UK is its possession of the chair of the 
Pharmacovigilance Working Party. Out of sixteen years of operation (1995-
2010), its chair was held by British experts for twelve years.69 Largely, it has 
been able to establish itself as ‘gold standard’ as it has a greater wealth and 
quality of pharmacovigilance data available than other countries, and it has 
a scientific research tradition that claims to be superior to the scientific 
traditions present in other countries. Arguably, it is the combination of 
these aspects that has mattered as other national authorities possess some 
of these qualities but not all. Hereby, the existence of the General Practice 
Research Database (GPRD) and Prescription-Event-Monitoring (PEM) in the 
UK have been decisive. Especially the GPRD allows for a unique possibility 
to study ‘signals’ (i.e. hypotheses) that emanate from spontaneous reporting 
data further (Parkinson, Davis and Van Staa, 2007), which the data available 
to German –and other authorities– simply does not permit. Overall, both 
data-bases represent a distinctive opportunity for linking given medicinal 
products with specific symptoms as both data sources hold a 
comprehensive record of a patient’s history, rather than individual, out-of-
context entries about a symptom in a given patient (ibid.; Shakir, 2007). 
It is questionable, however, whether the UK would have been able to 
establish and maintain itself as the informal standard without its claim to a 
superior scientific research tradition in this field as some national 
authorities have not been lacking far behind in the commitment of resources 
and the availability of data (the Nordic countries, for example, also have 
sophisticated databases in this respect).70 Rather, its influence in essentially 
setting the coordinated standard of substantive pharmacovigilance 
practices also emanates from the perceived superiority of its research 
tradition in this field: The research approaches of evidence-based medicine 
(and thus epidemiology and pharmacoepidemiology) are rooted in Anglo-
                                                                                                                                    
rapporteurships (i.e. main responsibility for the authorisation of a new drug in the centralised 
procedure) it takes. 
69 See EMA Annual reports 1995-2010. 1995-1998, chaired by Dr.Susan Wood; 1999-2000, chaired by 
Dr.Patrick Waller; 2005-2010, chaired by Dr.June Raine. (The three years in-between were chaired by 
a French expert, and one year was chaired by a Spanish representative.) 
70 Please note in this respect that the populations of these countries are too small to carry equal 
weight as the UK in terms of data quantity.  
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Saxon tradition, and as one German regulator said “epidemiology is en-
vogue”. In other words, its research methods are currently widely seen as 
resulting in research of higher quality than, for example, the German 
tradition of ‘Grundlagenforschung’ (pure research or basic research) and 
casuistics.  Whereas the former methods rely on controlled experiments and 
the observation of the distribution of health-events in a population, the 
latter focuses on the discussion of the underlying principles of medical 
research and the generalisation of findings from single cases.  
As the UK MHRA owes its ability to represent the coordinated 
standard that other authorities need to strive towards to its availability of 
data sources, other national authorities have an incentive to develop more 
elaborate forms of information-gathering as well. In the case of Germany, 
the need to dispose of better data to assess adverse reactions (specifically 
with regard to testing ‘signals’ that emerge from spontaneous reports) has 
resulted in the establishment of ‘national pharmacovigilance centres’ as part 
of an amendment to the Medicines Act in 2004.71 These are dedicated 
research institutes in hospitals, which focus on research of adverse drug 
reactions in specific patient groups, such as pregnant women or children, or 
in relation to specific diseases. Currently, six of these centres exist (with the 
aim of widening this network to more centres), each possessing a distinct 
research focus.72 All of them, however, specifically study whether non-
elective admissions to hospitals are due to an adverse drug reaction in the 
population of patients admitted to the hospital they form part of. This 
approach was inspired by the French pharmacovigilance system (Vogel, 
2007, p. 38f), which is composed of 31 ‘Centres régionaux de 
pharmacovigilance’. These collect reports about adverse reactions from 
healthcare professionals and conduct independent pharmacovigilance 
research.73  
                                                 
71 See change to §62 of the Arzneimittelgesetz in 2004 ( ‘12.AMG-Novelle‘). 
72 Hospitals in the cities of Wuppertal, Jena, Rostock, Greifswald, Weimar and Munich currently 
operate such pharmacovigilance centres. Please note that these centres were not necessarily 
established after 2004; rather, they existed beforehand as independent research institutes. The 
change in the 2004 legislation, however, envisages using these systematically as part of the German 
pharmacovigilance system. As a consequence of the 2004 legislation, the further development of such 
a network of national pharmacovigilance is still ongoing. For an up-to-date overview of the work of 
the centres, see http://www.pharmacoepi.de. 
73 Art. 5144-14 and Art. 5144-15, Code de la Santé Publique. 
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Germany, then, attempts to compete with the British model by 
learning from the French system, rather, than the ‘gold standard’ of the 
British GPRD and Prescription-Event-Monitoring. Such systems would be 
difficult to implement in Germany due to the nature of data protection laws 
and its decentralised health care system, as opposed to the UK’s National 
Health Service, which has greatly facilitated the emergence and existence of 
the GPRD and PEM (see Parkinson, Davis and Van Staa, 2007; and Shakir, 
2007). The UK, on the other hand, having established itself as ‘informal 
standard’ in the transnational coordination process is not necessarily of the 
view that there is a lot to learn from other national authorities or that it 
needs to compete with these: 
 
Clearly we have gone there [to meet at the transnational level] in a 
collaborative spirit, but I don’t think we got an awful lot out of 
Europe in a sense, specifically in the area of pharmacovigilance. I 
can’t think of an example where we thought, hey, that’s a good idea, 
let’s bring this to the UK.74 
 
The informal standard set by the UK affects how scientific arguments need 
to be brought forward by national officials when they come together at the 
transnational level in the forum of EMA. Scientific argumentation based on 
evidence-based medicine and (pharmaco-)epidemiology is dominant in the 
coordination process, in which the UK experts are practically ‘at home’. This 
is not necessarily the case for other national officials, as other research 
traditions might play a more crucial role in their country, such as basic 
research and casuistics in Germany.  
 
‘We have problems with data protection here in Germany, and I 
think it is necessary to be careful in this regard, but that does limit 
the possibilities for conducting epidemiological studies, and thus 
the assessment of risk [...]. In that respect the Nordic countries and 
the Brits have an advantage and they are better in this field than we 
are. Well, currently in pharmacovigilance we go from the 
assessment of an individual case of a spontaneous report to ‘which 
evidence do we have?’, and hence to epidemiology. Epidemiology is 
thus what is meant to provide us with information about the critical 
value of the risk stemming from a medicinal product. Evidence-
based medicine [from which epidemiology derives] has Anglo-
                                                 
74 Interviewee D1.  
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Saxon roots. [...] So the British just have more practice in thinking in 
these terms.’75 
 
Since this dynamic is even observable when German authorities are 
concerned –which are also ‘big players’ in this field with a qualitatively high 
research base– this competitive coordination pattern can arguably be 
expected to be present in other national authorities as well.76 
Since the MHRA sees itself as having access to the best data and the 
best approach to assessing this data, its officials can at times perceive the 
coordination process in EMA to ‘lower standards’: 
 
People do bring different perspectives to the table. Obviously you 
are working together with these people and there is a very friendly 
collaboration. Pharmacovigilance in Europe has done a good 
service in terms of getting people together. But of course if we are 
talking about making a specific decision... You know that idea that 
the best decision will be the one that is reached through 
compromise, rather than by the best arguments winning the day is -
I think- potentially a problem.’77 
 
 A German expert, on the other hand, said that the deliberation among 
European experts provided the opportunity to discuss differing viewpoints, 
whereby the strongest arguments tended to come out on top (rather than 
compromise).  
 
Then we have to discuss with our colleagues from across the EU, 
and that is of course sometimes overly bureaucratic. However, it 
does bear the advantage that one gets to hear the opinion of others 
and has to justify, so you have to be very precise in expressing your 
view and you might really have to justify it, which might be quite a 
good form of control.’78 
 
The discrepancy between these two perceptions is not surprising if one 
considers that the UK has established itself as informal gold standard in the 
field of pharmacovigilance in Europe: As UK regulators perceive their 
expertise in assessing the benefit-risk balance to be superior to other 
                                                 
75 Interviewee D2. 
76 Especially in Member States which lack expertise in this field, this form of knowledge sharing of 
course bears great potential to be beneficiary. At the same time, however, it is likely to affect national 
experts from countries that are active players in the regime more than national experts from Member 
States that stay relatively passive in expert deliberation (European Commission, 2010, for example, p. 
120). 
77 Interviewee D1. 
78 Interviewee D2. 
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national regulators’ expertise, they are likely to have the impression that 
deliberation in the forum of the Pharmacovigilance Working Party and the 
CHMP result in ‘compromise’. At the same time, in this context it is not 
surprising that a German official is of the view that there is something to be 
learned from deliberation among colleagues in the forum of the EMA’s 
expert committees. In this regard, then, the social relations the MHRA is 
embedded in at home frame these perceptions: It can add value to its own 
regulatory work at home by ensuring that coordinated decisions are based 
on its own way of doing things to the greatest degree possible. This, in turn, 
requires active engagement with the transnational process. German 
authorities, on the other hand, perceive the added value of engagement with 
EMA’s one-off decision-making task to be the access to such potentially 
‘superior’ forms of data and data analysis that they lack as a result of the 
social relations they are embedded in at home. This form of access has 
hence the potential to improve the work they carry out ‘at home’.  
 In this regard the engagement with EMA provides German 
authorities –and others– access to data collected from across all national 
authorities.  All data on adverse drug reactions collected by the national 
authorities needs to be passed on to EMA. In order facilitate this 
information-gathering exercise, EMA set up the online database 
EudraVigilance in 2001 in which all reports on adverse reactions are 
compiled (EMEA, 2001, especially p.11, 13 and 35). This enables all national 
regulators to access reports gathered on an EU-wide basis (ibid.). The 2010 
reform centralised the system further in that industry will have to pass all 
reports on adverse reactions directly to EudraVigilance.79 Data-mining 
techniques are used by the experts (in their capacity as national and EMA 
regulator) in order to extract ‘signals’ from this data (Waller, 2010, p. 44ff). 
These serve the purpose of verifying any potential shifts in the benefit-risk 
balance, i.e. determining whether the risk of a given drug is still acceptable 
in the light of newly emerged information on adverse reactions related to 
this drug. The detected signals hereby serve as hypotheses, which then have 
to be further tested (for example, by making use of existing databases, such 
                                                 
79 Art.107(3), Directive 2010/84. 
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as the GPRD, or the conduct of novel studies) (ibid.). Engagement with the 
transnational process hence also bears the advantage that it provides direct 
access to the expertise of British officials, for example in relation to the 
testing of ‘signals’ with GPRD data.  
 Engagement with the transnational coordination process also 
provides access to spontaneous reporting data that might have been created 
in starkly different ways. In this respect, the route a report has taken before 
it reaches EudraVigilance can differ significantly: Whereas around half of the 
reports received by the British MHRA originate from doctors, the German 
BfArM receives the vast majority of these reports from the industry (Davis, 
King and Raine, 2007, p. 202; Hagemann and Paeschke, 2007, p. 231; 
Hasford, Göttler, Munter, Müller-Oerlinghausen, 2002; Waller, 2010, p. 
36).80 While this gives the impression that German doctors are less involved 
in spontaneous reporting, research has shown that both countries have 
roughly similar rates of reporting by doctors (Belton, 1997; Hasford, Göttler, 
Munter, Müller-Oerlinghausen, 2002). What the figures thus show is that 
German doctors hardly ever report to authorities directly. Rather, a few of 
them report to their professional association and most of them report to the 
relevant pharmaceutical company, which then passes the information on to 
the authorities.81 In this regard, it is likely that German doctors pass on the 
information about adverse drug reactions to the industry in informal 
personal exchanges (Hasford, Göttler, Munter, Müller-Oerlinghausen, 2002, 
p. 948).82 In the UK, the opposite is the case where doctors (and other 
actors) report directly to the authorities, using the so-called Yellow Card 
form.83 German regulators regret that doctors will not report to them 
                                                 
80 This pattern was also confirmed by all interviewees. Moreover, in the German case confirmation of 
this can be found in the Annual Reports of BfArM and PEI. The MHRA does not publish reporting 
numbers in detailed breakdown; however, a Freedom of Information Request for reporting data for 
the years 2004-2007 confirmed the above reporting route. 
Please note that it is professional duty under the respective professional codes of conduct for doctors 
to report adverse drug reactions in both countries. 
81 Germany is an outlier in comparison to other European countries in this respect, in most European 
countries doctors tend to report directly to public authorities as is the case in the UK (Belton, 1997). 
In the US, however, reporting is very similar to the German pattern. 
82 German regulators that were interviewed shared the view that this is the case. 
83 This is arguably the case since it is the most time-efficient way for doctors to report adverse drug 
reactions to the sales representative of the relevant pharmaceutical company when he or she is 
visiting the practice. The sales representative then passes on the information to the company’s 
pharmacovigilance unit, which in turn has to report to the authorities.  This is, however, theoretically 
the case for German and British doctors since they receive similarly frequent visits from sales 
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directly as this would enable German experts to get in touch with the 
reporting doctor directly, thereby giving them the opportunity to ask more 
detailed information.84 Reports which are entered into EudraVigilance might 
hence have passed through very different channels and might be of different 
informational content, depending on the practices of the country they 
originate in. The engagement with EMA hence provides national authorities 
with an opportunity to access data with these different qualities.  
The dynamic coordination process that entails the gathering of 
information about each other’s practices, the setting of an informal 
behavioural standard (i.e. the UK model), and the modification of behaviour 
hence takes place through a competitive coordination pattern. UK and 
German authorities assess the value of this process as a whole through the 
specific lens provided by the social relations they are embedded in. This 
competitive coordination pattern is characterised by direct horizontal 
exchanges between the involved national authorities without the direct 
intervention of staff of EMA, which national authorities also take into 
account in their implicit ‘cost-benefit-analyses’. In this regard, the 
permanent body of pharmacovigilance staff at EMA does not express an 
‘appetite’ to extend its own role in terms of ‘adding value’ to the practices of 
                                                                                                                                    
representatives in both countries (Lieb and Brandtönies, 2010; Prosser and Walley, 2003). Hence, the 
reason for this is most likely to be rooted historically, where British authorities were very actively 
engaged in encouraging doctors to use the Yellow Card soon after the Thalidomide crisis (Inman, 
1999). This process was not present in Germany to a similar extent where an authority to collect ADR 
reports was only established in 1978 (Hagemann and Paeschke, 2007, p. 228). Given the stability of 
these reporting patterns over the past decades, it is also likely that doctors in both countries today 
consider their behaviour as appropriate as it ‘has always been done this way’. Theoretically speaking, 
the industry in Germany could filter the information before only passing on selected data to the 
authorities. Consequently, if one assumes that German doctors value the health of their patients and 
would like to prevent future adverse drug reactions, German doctors must instil a certain degree of 
trust in the pharmaceutical industry by only reporting to companies, rather than authorities. At the 
same time, it is vital to point out that doctors (and other healthcare professionals) do not necessarily 
consider themselves as part of a ‘pharmacovigilance regime’ (as pointed out by a British regulator 
during an interview). As their priorities are naturally more focused at the immediate task of 
diagnosing and curing patients, they might choose the well-established route in their country without 
lengthy contemplation.  
84 In general, however, regulators are glad about each report that is filed, even if it is communicated to 
the industry, rather than the regulator. ‘Under-reporting’ on part of healthcare professionals is a 
widely discussed issue among experts in the field (for example, Bateman et. al., 1992; Hasford et. al., 
2002; Martin et. al., 1998), and studies show that time-constraints are a major source of this problem. 
Reporting is a legal obligation for healthcare professionals in some countries, such as Sweden; 
however, observers usually note that this is not significant for the practice of reporting since such an 
obligation is not enforceable (ibid.).  Medicines regulators do not regulate the healthcare professions 
and hence have to rely on the methods of persuasion, such as providing information about the 
importance of reporting.  
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national authorities in an explicit manner, by, for example, engaging in 
research of how to further patient safety:  
 
How important is it [the national differences]? I think it probably 
does have an impact on, for example, the quality of the data that is 
collected. [...] If you then take that to the European level, 
considering that we have 30 Member countries (EU plus European 
Economic Area countries) it probably does not make a big 
difference to the end result, which is detecting new safety issues 
and taking action to protect public health.85  
 
Whereas EMA arguably does not possess the resources to engage in such 
activities at the moment, it is also arguable that the agency is in a unique 
position to ‘add value’ to questions of conceptual innovation in the 
management of adverse drug reactions in Europe in a more overt manner. 
The agency, however, has been keen to assert itself as ‘mere’ hub of a 
network, which values national diversity in expertise and practices (see 
discourse of EMA in its Annual Reports, for example, EMEA, 1995, p. 6; 
EMEA, 1996, p. 7; EMA, 2004, p. 6). The 2010 reform, however, adds an 
element of monitoring of national regimes. This happens through ‘self-audit’ 
of national regimes by national authorities, the results of have to be 
communicated to the Commission.86 As of yet, the impact this has had on the 
assessment of the value of EMA’s tasks by national authorities remains to be 
uncovered. The usage of the term ‘audit’ in this respect, however, gives 
reason to suspect that this furthers the proceduralisation of national 
regimes, rather than contribute to studying what each of these national 
regimes can achieve in a substantive sense (i.e. enhancement of patient 
safety). Such a process of self-audit and peer review has already developed 
outside the official framework of the EU regime over the years (BEMA, 2006, 
2012).87  It is likely that the new legal provision mainly formalises this 
existing practice and hence does not alter the assessment of the 
transnational coordination process on part of the UK and German 
authorities that was observed here.  
                                                 
85 Interviewee D5. 
86 Art.101(2), Directive 2010/84.  
87 The ‘Benchmarking of European Medicines Agencies’ (‘BEMA’) is a process that the Member States 
authorities began autonomously in 2003 in the framework of the Heads of European Medicines 
Agencies forum. It is a benchmarking exercise in which the regulators assess themselves and each 
other (peer review). 
3. Drug Safety Monitoring  
 
85 
 
 
 
This part of the chapter shows that the one-off decision-making task of EMA 
in relation to drug safety monitoring shapes a coordination pattern of 
epistemic competition. In this process the UK authority has established itself 
as ‘gold standard’ of data gathering and evaluation techniques as a result of 
the particular social relations it is embedded in at home. The German 
authorities perceive the access to this ostensibly ‘superior’ expertise to add 
value to their own work, whilst also attempting to compete with the British 
model by improving the quality of their own data sources. 
 
 
 
3.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that the one-off decision-making task of 
EMA shapes a coordination pattern that is based on epistemic competition. 
UK and German pharmaceutical regulators perceive this task to add value to 
their own work in the context of the social relations they are embedded in. 
Although EU rules and EMA do not require national authorities to 
coordinate their substantive pharmacovigilance practices and despite their 
negative view of the proceduralising tendencies of EMA’s insistence on EU 
rules, UK and German authorities proactively engage with the coordination 
of their drug safety monitoring practices in the forum of EMA. They do so 
because they perceive themselves to be getting something out of it in the 
specific frame of the social relations they are embedded in: The competitive 
coordination pattern unleashed by EMA’s one-off decision-making task has 
provided the UK authority with an opportunity to establish its own data 
gathering and evaluation model as ‘gold standard’ of the regime. As a result 
of the specific social relations the UK MHRA is embedded in, it possesses 
access to an extraordinary wealth and quality of data on adverse drug 
reactions, as well as a highly regarded scientific approach to evaluate this 
data. The proactive engagement with coordination, then, adds value to the 
work of the UK regulator by ensuring that it does not have to conform to a 
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model of a different national authority, which it would perceive to be 
inferior. The German authorities, in turn, gain an added value through active 
engagement with transnational coordination since it provides them with 
access to the data and expertise of the perceived ‘gold standard’ (i.e. the UK 
model), which German authorities would not be able to attain within the 
context of the social relations they are embedded in (such as a different 
approach to data protection found in Germany in comparison to the UK). At 
the same time, this competitive coordination process provides them with an 
incentive to improve their own expertise in order to avoid the perpetual 
costs of adjustment to the ‘gold standard’ supplied by the model of a 
different regulator. As a result, the quality of data available in the German 
drug safety monitoring regime has improved through reforms that have 
established new pharmacovigilance research centres in hospitals. 
 The positive assessment of EMA’s one-off decision-making task is 
hence largely a result of the evaluation of the informal coordination 
processes of gathering information about each other’s practices, which 
provide a perceived motor for positive change, rather than the role played 
by EMA staff in the coordination process. Indeed, EMA staff has not 
attempted to intervene in these informal coordination processes as such, for 
example, by surveying the practices of national authorities or promulgating 
a ‘best practice’ model. Arguably, this lack of interference has contributed to 
the positive assessment of the added value of the engagement with EMA’s 
tasks since it has allowed national authorities to render transnational 
coordination feasible –and beneficial– for the very specific sets of social 
relations in which they carry out their regulatory work at home.  
 Overall, then, this chapter shows that EMA’s one-off decision-making 
task leads to a competitive coordination pattern, which is sustained by the 
positive assessment of its value by national authorities. This finding will 
serve as a vital point of comparison with the coordination pattern observed 
in the case of food risk assessors in Chapter 5: The regulatory officials in 
both cases form part of scientific communities that can be argued to possess 
relatively similar professional norms. The constructivist EU literature has 
argued that coordinative behaviour is mainly determined by such 
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professional norms, resulting in a coordination pattern based on mutual 
exchange and learning across very different policy areas. This chapter, 
however, indicates that coordination patterns are more complex: The 
pattern observed here goes beyond mutual exchange and learning in its 
competitive nature. According to the argument advanced in this thesis, then, 
we would expect coordination among food risk assessors to function 
differently than what was observed in this case study since they carry out a 
different task in the body of the European Food Safety Authority and since 
they are embedded in different social relations. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Maritime Safety 
 
 
The maritime safety case allows us to study the effect of an inspection task 
on the coordinative behaviour of the involved regulatory actors. The 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) has been entrusted with 
monitoring and the facilitation the implementation of the European 
maritime safety regime by national authorities.  It has two main tools at its 
disposal to do so, namely the active monitoring of member state practices 
through inspections of national authorities, and through training provided 
for national officials at its premises in Lisbon. This case study hence also 
provides us with a chance to study how coordinative behaviour is affected 
by two different tasks, which structure the relations between the involved 
actors in different ways.  
Moreover, the case presents an excellent opportunity to compare the 
coordinative behaviour of regulatory actors in cases where the EU body has 
an inspection task, but the social relations that national authorities are 
embedded in differ (see food control authorities in Chapter 5). In the case of 
food control authorities, the social relations that UK and German officials 
are embedded in are characterised by the extraordinary decentralisation of 
the industry and the administrative structure that they need to oversee.  In 
maritime safety, in contrast, national authorities are embedded in an 
international regulatory framework as a result of the highly international 
character of the shipping industry.  
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To exemplify the international character of the issues surrounding 
maritime safety, a look at the history of the Prestige is enlightening:88  The 
Prestige was built by a Japanese shipyard and was completed in 1976. When 
it shipwrecked in 2002, it was flying the flag of the Bahamas. It was owned 
by a Greek, who himself was registered in Liberia. For its fateful journey it 
was chartered by a Russian company, which had its offices in Switzerland. 
On this trip, the Prestige was transporting oil from Latvia to Singapore. Its 
classification society –the expert body certifying the safety of a ship– was 
the American Bureau of Shipping. Before shipwrecking, port state control 
inspections of the tanker had been carried out in Saint Petersburg, Dubai 
and Guangzhou (Traisbach, 2005, p.169). A vessel such as the Prestige hence 
operates in a sector in which virtually no barriers to entry exist: Ship-
owners can re-flag their vessels within a day and can register in different 
jurisdiction to evade liability. Due to this highly global context, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has played a crucial role in the 
regulation of this industry.89  
The UK and German maritime safety authorities have been dominant 
players in the IMO and continue to regard it as the most crucial regulatory 
body in the field. The European Union, in turn, only became active in 
maritime safety in the mid-1990s. In doing so, the EU added another level of 
regulatory activity to a field that had since been governed through the 
interaction of national, regional and international actors. In the maritime 
case, then, UK and German authorities are embedded in social relations that 
are focused on the extensive transnational regulatory structures built to 
govern a highly global industry that precede the coordination efforts of the 
EU.  
 
   
 
 
                                                 
88 The Prestige was an oil tanker which sank off the Galician Coast of Spain in November 2002, 
thereby polluting thousands of kilometres of the coasts of Spain, Portugal and France. 
89 It does so largely by way of setting the overall framework of standards to be applied in the field as 
expressed in the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 
73/78).  
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4.1 Social Relations and Tasks in Maritime Safety 
The EU maritime safety regime only came into being in the 1990s and 
started operating in a web of international and regional arrangements. In 
light of the argument of this thesis, it can be expected that the embedding of 
UK and German authorities in social relations that are characterised by 
transnational ties beyond the EU are vital for how they evaluate their 
engagement with EMSA (see Section 4.1.1). In this regard, we can expect 
these social relations to act as interpretative filters for national authorities’ 
of EMSA’s inspection and training tasks (see Section 4.1.2 for an overview of 
EMSA’s tasks). The existence of two tasks –which set the involved 
regulatory actors into different relations with each other– provides an 
opportunity to study how coordinative behaviour is affected by such 
differing tasks.  
 
 
4.1.1 Social Relations in the Maritime Safety Regimes of UK and the 
Germany 
The social relations that UK and German maritime safety authorities are 
embedded in are characterised by the importance of transnational links that 
precede coordination efforts in the EU: The International Maritime 
Organization (headquartered in London) was established in 1948, and 
became operational in 1959.90 International regulation of the shipping 
industry had already existed in 19th century and the foundation of the IMO 
was an attempt to make such international arrangements more effective by 
way of establishing a permanent international body. In the field of oil 
pollution, the Torrey Canyon disaster was the decisive trigger to bring about 
an international agreement aimed at preventing environmental damage 
from this source, which came into being in the form of MARPOL 73/78. This 
                                                 
90 Please note that it was called Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, IMCO at the 
time. It is a specialised agency of the United Nations, which has 170 members at the time of writing. 
The European Commission has an agreement of cooperation with the IMO. (For an overview of the 
history of IMO, see, for example, Mankabady, 1984; and Srivastava, 1990.) 
To this day, negotiations and policy at the IMO are mostly influenced by the dominant developed 
countries, including the UK and Germany (Tan, 2006, p.98ff). Some emerging countries, such as Brazil 
and India, have also started to wield power in the IMO setting. Overall, it is largely the developed 
countries pushing for stringent environmental protection, whereby developing countries are more 
likely to defend the interest of the maritime industry, which has gradually became located in these 
countries over the past decades (ibid.). 
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framework was henceforth complemented by regional agreements aimed at 
vessel-source oil pollution prevention (for example, see Boehmer-
Christiansen, 1984). One of the earliest in this respect was the 1969 Bonn 
Agreement for Co-operating in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by 
Oil, which was a reaction of the North Sea states to the Torrey Canyon 
disaster. The first agreement to tackle the problem of marine pollution 
generally (rather than focusing on oil) was the Helsinki Convention on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (HELCOM). 
Hereby, ship safety measures have traditionally been aimed at protecting 
human life at sea, which have become complemented by international 
standards for seafarer training to further this objective.91 In order to enforce 
such measures more effectively, port state control (which renders it 
possible to verify the safety of foreign flagged vessels in one’s own ports) 
became a transnational effort in the 1980s. The Paris Memorandum of 
Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU) has traditionally fulfilled 
this task in Europe.92 When the EU entered the scene in the 1990s, 
cooperation was hence already firmly transnational in character. 
Information on oil spills and ships calling at European ports had been 
shared through regional bodies for several decades, such as HELCOM, the 
Bonn Agreement and the Paris MoU. Especially in the field of oil pollution 
these efforts (specifically port state control) have shown great success in 
modifying the behaviour of the industry, whereby oil pollution and 
accidents have been declining.93 The UK and German authorities have been 
fundamentally involved in these transnational regulatory efforts from the 
beginning. As a result, we can expect that their assessment of the value of 
engagement with EMSA processes is informed by this history of 
coordination efforts beyond the EU.  
Historically, the UK has been very influential in the globalisation of 
the maritime safety regime, dating back to the crucial developments in the 
                                                 
91 Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers of 1978 
(STCW), implemented in Directive 2008/106/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 
December 2008 on the minimum level of training of seafarers. 
92 The Paris MoU is an administrative agreement which maritime authorities of participating states 
forged in 1982 (as set out in MARPOL 73/78 and other relevant international treaties) (for a 
discussion of the Paris MoU, see König, 2002). 
93 For an overview of studies of pollution from oil and other sources, see GESAMP, 2009. 
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19th century when its fleet accounted for half the world’s tonnage 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, p. 425). To this day, it strongly favours 
regulation at the IMO level over EU rules if the latter ‘gold-plate’ 
international standards. The UK has remained highly influential in IMO 
negotiations, not least due to its large number of staff and representatives 
there as a result of being the host nation (Tan, 2006, p.98ff).94 Germany’s 
role has been somewhat less prominent but nevertheless the country holds 
a relatively large degree of influence due to its expertise (ibid.), whereby it 
also emphasises that the IMO, rather than the EU, is its favoured level of 
regulating the maritime industry.95 The UK and Germany used to belong to 
the ‘traditional’ maritime states, which in the past defended the freedoms of 
the maritime industry. Today (and for the past decades), however, both 
countries can be categorised as defending the interests of ‘coastal states’, 
such as environmental issues. This has developed due to increasing internal 
political pressure but also the changed nature of the global regime, whereby 
a small but persistent number of sub-standard ships register in ‘flags of 
convenience’, which is of great concern to them in relation to the 
environment and the levelling of the playing field (i.e. their competitiveness 
as flag states). Both countries continue to host a shipping industry to this 
day and remain important flag states. Whilst the number of ships registered 
under the German flag has generally fallen, the registered tonnage has 
actually increased due to the increasing size of ships.96 The UK, in turn, has 
recently witnessed an increase in number of ships and registered tonnage 
(MCA, 2009, p. 21).97 This reflects deliberate efforts of the UK to attract 
                                                 
94 Interviewees also regularly referred to the UK’s influence as experienced host nation. 
95 The industry and national officials usually argue in favour of IMO rules -as opposed to European 
rules going further than the international ones- arguing that a global industry needs global regulation. 
For a counter view to this, see Ringbom, 2008, pp.7-14. 
96 In 2008, for example, 618 merchant vessels were registered in Germany, equalling a tonnage of 13 
250 181 (representing an increase in registered tonnage from the year before) (Dienststelle 
Schiffssicherheit, 2008, p.61). The number of registered merchant vessels was at 530 in 2011, having 
fallen by 7.2% from 2010, whereby the tonnage increased by 0.2% to 15 550 829 (Dienststelle 
Schiffssicherheit, 2011, p. 39). 
97 1550 ships were registered in 2008, representing a tonnage of 15 888, 843 (MCA, 2009, p. 21.). In 
2011 this had increased to 17 490 000, distributed over and 1 489 vessels (MCA, 2011, p. 15). All ship 
numbers presented refer to ships of over 100 Gross Tonnage (GT). All tonnage numbers are provided 
in GT. 
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ships to its flag,98 but Germany has also devised investment and cooperation 
schemes with industry to retain ships on its register.99 
Although the UK and Germany are embedded in similar social 
relations with regard to their engagement with the IMO in which they both 
defend coastal and maritime state interests, each country also has a specific 
national context of social relations they are embedded in: As island state the 
UK requires large capacities to monitor its coasts and the ships calling at its 
ports. Germany, on the other hand, has a much shorter coastline but an 
accident has the potential to have grave consequences due to the delicate 
and specific nature of the Wadden Sea and a lack of connection between 
German coastal waters and the oceans (Pallas Report, 2000, p. 44; 
Tomuschat, 2005, p. 16ff; also see Lagoni, 2001). Neither British nor German 
waters were directly affected by grave accidents in recent years (such as the 
Erika and Prestige) but incidents in the 1990s shaped the regimes of both 
countries. In the UK the Braer accident in 1993 caused pollution of the 
coasts of the Shetland Islands and subsequently heavily influenced the UK 
regime (Anderson, 2001, p. 349; Tan, 2006, p. 96f).100 As a result of 
‘Donaldson Report’ on this accident, the UK took the lead at the EU level: For 
example, it pushed vehemently for the Classification Societies and Port State 
Control Directives (Plant, 1995, p. 466). Indeed, the UK pioneered crucial 
aspects of the European port state control regime, most notably operational 
inspections and the principle of discriminating against ships with poor 
safety record (Bell, 1993, p. 368). Germany, on the other hand, experienced 
an accident of the MS Pallas in 1998, which resulted in an oil spill near the 
island of Amrum, causing considerable discussion about possible reform of 
                                                 
98 The UK has devised a ‘Quality Shipping initiative’ in this regard, which aims to attract high quality 
ships to its flag, which is reflected in the above numbers. As part of this a ‘tonnage tax’ was introduced 
in 2000. This is a method of calculating corporation tax using the net tonnage of the ship. It is linked 
to an obligation on shipping companies to provide training or to make payments instead.  
99 This initiative is called ‘Maritimes Bündnis’, whereby the German shipping is supported by public 
money for training activities in exchange for a pledge to register ships under the German flag (see, for 
example, Dienststelle Schiffssicherheit, 2008, p. 60). However, in a re-formulation of this initiative, 
this pledge has not been renewed (Dienststelle Schiffssicherheit, 2011, p. 38). The German approach 
has hence been more passive, especially with regard to the attraction of foreign vessels. It has mostly 
focused on stopping ships from leaving the German flag, whereas the UK has aimed to get especially 
new ships to register under UK flag, whilst not necessarily aiming to stop other ships from leaving its 
flag.  
100 The recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry chaired by Lord Donaldson that was 
subsequently set up (see ‘Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas’ Report, 1994) were all adopted by the 
government (Plant, 1995). 
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the German regime (Lagoni, 2001, p.267). The immediate consequence was 
the setting-up of an accident response authority shared by the federal and 
the Länder level. However, the official inquiry that followed also urged 
Germany to get more involved in EU and IMO discussions (Pallas Report, 
2000, p. 89).  
Although Germany remains less involved than the UK, it is reported 
to belong to the group of most interested states, thereby carrying 
considerable weight, also in EMSA’s Administrative Board.101 In this forum, 
ministry officials from the UK and Germany have not only stressed the 
importance of IMO in their view,102 but have also continuously emphasised 
the need to keep resources devoted to EMSA in check: Hereby, the decisive 
issue in the view of these countries has been whether tasks given to EMSA 
have the potential to ‘add value’ to national practices in the field in order to 
ensure that resources are not devoted twice for the same purpose.103 
The regulatory authorities that are in charge of negotiating IMO rules 
and implementing international and European rules in the UK and Germany 
differ with regard to the degree of their centralisation: Whereas tasks are 
centralised within the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) in the UK, 
various governmental agencies are involved in Germany, whereby some are 
found at the federal level and some on the Länder level. The German 
authority concerned with the assurance of ship safety is the Dienststelle 
Schiffssicherheit (Ship Safety Division).104 Overall, the UK has a larger 
administrative capacity, for example, since it has around 130 ship 
inspectors, where Germany has around 35 (MCA, 2011, p.11, and 
Dienststelle Schiffssichherheit, 2011, p. 52f). Considering the length of the 
British coast and the number of its ports, however, this is not surprising.105 
Generally speaking, variation in practices and compliance with international 
                                                 
101 As pointed out by interviewees. 
102 EMSA, 2011c, p. 7; EMSA, 2012, p.6. 
103 This is generally visible in the discourse of ‘Northern’ countries in the notes of Administrative 
Board meetings, for example, see EMSA, 2006b, p.5. This was also confirmed by interviewees.  
104 Overall, one of the major issues in Germany is coordination between authorities in its federal 
structure, not only between federal authorities but also between federal and Länder authorities (and 
between Länder and Länder authorities) (e.g. Douvier, 2005, p. 124). 
105 The UK has around three times as many ports as Germany. However, it is difficult to provide 
numbers which are accurate for the purpose of comparison because of the inclusion of different types 
of ports (i.e. seaports, inland ports, various sizes of ports etc.) across statistics in this area.  
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and EU legislation is often related to capacity and expertise in the field,106 
and both countries are seen to fare well in this regard. Nevertheless, 
maritime safety is a field in which the Commission has often initiated 
infringement proceedings, and the UK and Germany are not exception in 
this regard.107 
General distinctions between national practices of regulatory 
philosophies are difficult to draw in maritime safety. This is not to say that 
these do not exist, but due to the international history of the regime, laws 
and practices were becoming streamlined before the EU started operating in 
the field. Practices tend to differ from port to port, and even from ship 
inspector to ship inspector: For example, the way ports are run is crucial for 
how ship waste reception facilities are organised and how port authorities 
communicate with governmental authorities in terms of how long a certain 
ship will remain in this port (this is crucial to know for port state control 
officers since these inspections are unannounced). This, on the other hand, 
can be different from port to port depending on whether they are privately 
or publicly owned and –in the latter case– under the jurisdiction of which 
Länder or local authority they fall.108 It is hence difficult to unambiguously 
identify differences in national practices or philosophies that could 
contribute to coordination problems, and which might act as interpretative 
filter for evaluating the activities of EMSA. However, it is often stated that 
there are different ‘cultures’ across the different countries that lead to 
                                                 
106 This was explicitly pointed out by interviewees: For example, without sufficiently experienced port 
state control officers it is difficult to comply with the port state control regime. However, the number 
of experienced staff is related to whether a country has an active maritime sector (and hence 
experienced seafarers) or not. Also, often compliance with EU legislation in this field equates the need 
to provide sophisticated information-technology (such as the national implementation of vessel-
traffic-monitoring via SafeSeaNet), which is not a straightforward task for national administrations in 
general.  
107 European Commission, 2002; 2003; 2003b; 2003c; 2004; 2006; 2008b; 2008c; 2008d; 2008e; 
2008f; 2009; 2009b; 2009c; 2010b; 2010c; 2011; 2011b; 2011c.  
108 In Germany, Länder have jurisdiction over ports, whereby organisation of port authorities and 
oversight varies not only across Länder, but also within them (some ports are being serviced by 
private or public organisations, or a mix of the two). In the UK, authority over ports is devolved in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. In Wales and England we see municipal, company and trust ports 
(thus private and public ones), which are all organised along commercial principles (for an overview, 
see Department of Transport, 2012). Over the past years, the busiest UK port in terms of tonnage has 
been Grimsby and Immingham with 57 200 000 tonnes, followed by 48 800 000 tonnes in London 
and 48 700 000 in Milford Haven in 2011 (Department of Transport, 2012b). According to Eurostat, 
in 2010 in total all German ports handled 276 000 000 tonnage of freight, whereas all UK ports 
processed 511 900 000 tonnes of freight (including inwards and outwards freight). Germany’s largest 
port Hamburg handled 104 520 000 tonnes in 2010, followed by Bremen and Bremerhaven with 59 
107 000 tonnes, and Wilhelmshaven with 24 728 000 tonnes (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011). 
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different practices. One interviewee, for example, stated that “Finnish, 
Italian and British practices in port state control differ and will always 
differ”.109 Yet, interviewees generally were unable to produce concrete 
examples in this regard, which might also be due to a certain reluctance to 
do so as a result of possible worries about reports of non-compliant 
practices reaching the Commission. In general, it is seen as crucial which 
type of training, experience and expertise ship inspectors have, which, in 
turn, can differ across Member States. British and German inspectors 
usually were at sea as technical (e.g. ship engineer) or nautical crew 
members (e.g. captains), and then undergo an apprenticeship before 
becoming ship inspectors. Since ever fewer young people from each country 
go to sea, however, this picture could change dramatically in the future, and 
in Germany staff which has no experience at sea is already being trained to 
become port state control officials.110 Especially in port state control the 
principle of ‘professional judgement’ (as opposed to procedural checklists) 
on the basis of the professional experience their staff possess is defended by 
the MCA and the Dienststelle Schiffssicherheit. As a result of the principle of 
‘professional judgement’, differences in practices and philosophies are likely 
to exist from inspector to inspector, rather than merely from one country to 
another. Overall, then, it is likely that social relations marked by differences 
in national practices and regulatory philosophies are less crucial in the 
framing of coordinative behaviour than the perception of the overriding 
importance of the IMO on part of British and German officials.  
 
 
4.1.2 The Inspection and Training Tasks of EMSA 
The first wave of EU legislation in the field of maritime safety was an 
attempt to harmonise the implementation of international standards across 
                                                 
109 Interviewee M8. 
110 Both countries are investing in training of seafarers, Germany via the ‘Maritime Bündnis’, 
established 2001, which invested around €90 million in 2011 (close to €60 million hereby being 
provided by the government and €30 million being funded by the industry) (Dienststelle 
Schiffssicherheit, 2011, p.38). The UK runs the Support for Maritime Training (SMarT) Scheme, 
established in 1998. According to the MCA, “in 2011-12 SMarT provided funding for a total of 1,903 
officer trainees, including: 903 new officer trainees who started their training; and 629 officer 
trainees who completed their training” (MCA, 2012, p. 17). The UK’s scheme hereby far surpasses the 
German efforts.  
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Member States, while also being aimed at the creation of a level-playing field 
for the shipping industry in the framework of the Single European Market 
(European Commission, 1993, also see, Blonk, 1994). Part of this early 
involvement was the establishment of a port state control regime in 1995, 
thereby directly building on the Paris MoU, and creating close cooperation 
between the two regimes (König, 2002, p. 44).111 The maritime policy of the 
EU was then fundamentally reformed as a direct response to the Erika 
disaster (for a detailed elaboration on the historical evolvement of EU 
engagement in the international context, see Jenisch, 2004; Pallis, 2006, 
2007; Ringbom, 2008, p. 31ff). As a consequence of the tragedy, the EU 
passed various measures which further strengthened existing legislation 
and established a European Maritime Safety Agency.112 EMSA was entrusted 
with the task of monitoring the application of the relevant legislation in the 
Member States with the aim of coordinating the practices of national 
authorities across Member States.113 The agency is governed by an 
Administrative Board that is comprised of one representative of each 
Member State, four representatives of the Commission, and four 
professionals from the concerned sector (who do not have the right to 
vote).114 The Member State representatives are often officials from the 
country’s Ministry of Transport, as is the case with the representatives of 
the UK and Germany. The board appoints an executive director who is in 
charge of managing the agency.115  
EMSA –which has around 200 members of staff- has the overarching 
objective to “help them [Member State authorities] to apply Community 
legislation properly”.116 Hereby, the agency also has the responsibility to 
                                                 
111 Originally established under Council Directive 95/21/EC of 19 June 1995 concerning the 
enforcement, in respect of shipping using Community ports and sailing in the waters under the 
jurisdiction of the Member States, of international standards for ship safety, pollution prevention and 
shipboard living and working conditions (port State control). This has been amended several times 
since. The current port state control regime is regulated under Directive 2009/16/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on port State control. 
It has to be noted that the Paris MoU still exists as separate entity in order to involve Russia and 
Canada in a shared port state control regime (Gulbrandsen, 2011, p. 1048). 
112 See Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002 
establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency.  
113 Recital (1), Art.1(1), Regulation 1406/2002. 
114 Ibid., Art.11(1). 
115 Ibid., Art.15, Art.16(1). 
116 Ibid., Art.1(2). 
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evaluate the “effectiveness of the measures in place”.117 Moreover, EMSA 
provides Member State authorities with very specific services: It delivers 
training programmes for national authority staff,118 and operates various 
data-bases for the exchange of information between Member State 
authorities.119 It also operates an emergency response vessel fleet and a 
satellite system to monitor oil spills.120 As part of its monitoring activities, 
EMSA officials carry out inspections of national inspectorates (i.e. 
‘inspecting the inspectors’).121 In this regard, EMSA plays a somewhat 
double-edged role: On the one hand, its task of delivering training sessions 
sets an institutional framework in place in which all involved regulatory 
actors are envisaged to meet at a horizontal level in order to facilitate the 
exchange of knowledge between national authorities. This requires EMSA to 
play the role of a partner authority of its national counterparts. At the same 
time, EMSA has to actively monitor the practices of national authorities and 
then inform the Commission about cases of non-compliance, which could 
bring an infringement proceeding against the country in question on the 
basis of this information. Its inspection task provides a institutional 
framework which provides for a vertical relationship between the EU 
regulatory body and its national authorities and can be expected to 
structure the coordination process in a hierarchical fashion (see Chapter 2). 
EMSA’s inspection task, then, also gives it the role of a supervisor of national 
authorities that has to be prepared to ‘tell on’ national colleagues (COWI, 
2008, p. 35, p.64). Whereas its training task ostensibly provides an arena for 
agreement between all involved actors, the latter is more prone to causing 
contention between EMSA and national authorities.  It is this tension 
between EMSA’s tasks –and the relations and roles associated with them– 
that renders this case into a particularly intriguing case of the study of the 
effect of tasks on coordinative behaviour. 
 
                                                 
117 Ibid., Art.1(2), Art.2(b). 
118 Ibid., Art.2(c)(i). 
119 Ibid., Art.2(d)(ii). 
120 Ibid., Art.2(c)(i). Currently the most vital data-bases in this regard are SafeSeaNet which is a vessel-
traffic tracking system (hence allowing national authorities to locate ships in EU waters) and Thetis, 
which is the port state control data-base. It allows national authorities to record and view all port 
state control inspection reports on a common data-base. 
121 Art.2(b)(i), Art.3, Regulation 1406/2002. 
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4.2 Examining the Coordinative Behaviour of Maritime 
Safety Authorities 
EMSA’s role in the European maritime safety regime is primarily one of 
monitoring and facilitating the implementation of EU maritime safety law. 
This, in turn, is aimed to be achieved through EMSA’s ‘visits’ to Member 
States (i.e. inspections) and its varied training programme for national 
officials. It is within these two forms of tasks related to the coordination of 
national practices that we find an inherent tension: EMSA has the task to 
observe whether Member States practices are compliant on behalf of the 
Commission, whilst also being required to take the role of a partner 
authority to national authorities by providing a forum for mutual exchange 
in its training sessions. The dialectic in EMSA’s tasks is also mirrored in 
differing visions as to how transnational coordination should function: A 
focus on compliance and harmonised practices in need of hierarchical 
enforcement co-exists uncomfortably with the idea of coordinating practices 
through mutual exchange (see Section 4.2.1). Since these two tasks provide 
different institutional frameworks and frames for action, it remains 
intriguing how these two differing frameworks affect the coordinative 
behaviour of the involved regulatory actors (for findings in this regard, see 
Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.2.3). 
 
 
4.2.1 Balancing Inspection and Training Tasks 
EMSA’s inspection tasks set up a vertical relation between its staff and 
national authorities, whilst its training task requires EMSA to set up a 
horizontal relation with national officials in order to act as a ‘partner’ 
authority. As a result, the two tasks of EMSA represent an inherent dialectic, 
in which this EU regulatory body is –in theory– required to play two 
fundamentally different roles. EMSA inspections of national authorities 
usually take the following form: The inspected national authority presents 
an overview of their inspection system and the related procedures. EMSA 
officials then collect written evidence, carry out interviews with officials at 
the headquarters of the relevant national authority and conduct analyses of 
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national statistics of inspections. They then observe actual inspection 
practices for several days.122 A team of EMSA inspection officials tends to be 
comprised of three assessors, who spend a few days at the headquarters of 
the national authorities and with the inspection teams in ports, whereby 
inspections on board of ships are witnessed. EMSA officials report back an 
overview of the findings while still on site. It then takes several weeks for 
the formal EMSA report to be written, and even longer for the final report 
(including the Commission’s assessment) to be drafted (EMSA, 2007c, p.5). 
These reports remain confidential (between EMSA, the Commission and the 
Member State in question).123 In case EMSA detects deficiencies when 
inspection national authorities’ work, the Commission tends to request that 
EMSA revisits such authorities in order to verify whether they are meeting 
their obligations (EMSA, 2010, p. 70). 
The EU maritime safety regime has several cornerstones with 
implications for EMSA’s inspections: Firstly, the organisations which set 
technical standards for ships, and survey whether ships registered in a 
particular country are of adequate standard are inspected by EMSA (these 
so-called classification societies are responsible for ‘flag-state control’).124 
Moreover, the inspection of foreign-flagged vessels in European ports (‘port 
state control’) is organised under the IMO, Paris MoU and the equivalent EU 
Directive.125 EMSA’s role in this regard is to inspect the practices of national 
inspectors: Hence, EMSA staff inspects whether MCA and Ship Safety 
Division officials carry out port state control inspections as envisaged in the 
relevant EU requirements. Also, the reception facilities for ship waste 
provided by ports are regulated, thereby aiming at ships to leave their waste 
in ports, rather than in coastal waters or the open sea (such as ballast water 
which is polluted by oil).126 The provision of these is inspected by EMSA as 
                                                 
122 The visits policy is laid down in Decision 25/06/2004 of EMSA’s Administrative Board (EMSA, 
2004b). Also see Administrative Board meeting notes from the 17th meeting on 20.03.2007 
concerning the involvement of Commission officials in accompanying inspections (EMSA, 2007b). The 
described inspection procedure was also explained as such by the interviewees from the MCA, Ship 
Safety Division, EMSA and the European Commission.  
123 Art.3(3), Regulation (EC), No 1406/2002. 
124 See Regulation (EC) No 391/2009 on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey 
organisations; and Directive 2009/15/EC on common rules and standards for ship inspection and 
survey organisations and for the relevant activities of maritime administrations. 
125 See Directive 2009/16/EC on port state control. 
126 See Directive 2000/59/EC on port reception facilities for ship-generated waste and cargo residues. 
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well.127 Of these measures, especially port state control is seen as an 
effective means to deal with the most feared source of pollution: Sub-
standard ships, which are registered in states that do not enforce 
international safety standards for ships, so-called ‘flags of convenience’.128  
 The rules for the above mentioned cornerstones are laid out in the 
international IMO instruments, which are mirrored in regional agreements 
and EU law. Hereby, the key principle is the inspection of ships by flag and 
port states. Next to EMSA’s operational capacities, its main task is to ensure 
that already existing standards and procedures are followed across all 
Member States. Thus, EMSA’s task is to ensure that practices across Member 
States are coordinated. This is regarded to have the potential to ensure that 
all ships passing through EU waters adhere to the same standards in 
practice; thereby closing loopholes which had previously enabled sub-
standard ships to go undetected due to (for example) inadequate 
implementation of internationally agreed inspection procedures in some 
countries.129  It is in this realm that the EU detected a gap to be filled by its 
involvement in a highly international regime, namely through the tough 
enforcement of international/EU standards that could be a more potent 
motor for the coordination of practices than the role of the IMO, Paris MoU 
etc. could allow for (Knudsen and Hassler, 2011; Koivurova, 2012). In this 
area, then, we find one of the major tasks of EMSA, which –in line with the 
argument of this thesis– sets up a vertical relationships between EMSA and 
national authorities. 
At the same time, EMSA also has the task to run an extensive training 
programme in order to facilitate the coordination of practices.130 Topics of 
training workshops are spread over the whole range of EU activities in the 
field. For example, there are workshops which teach the content and 
implications of EU maritime legislation and trainings focusing on ‘best 
                                                 
127 See EMSA Annual Reports. 
128 For example, Recital (6), Directive 2009/16/EC. 
‘Flags of convenience’ are seen as one of the major issues, if not the major problem, with regard to the 
continuing existence of sub-standard ships. The marine insurers and Protection and Indemnity (P and 
I) Clubs, however, also contribute to this problem: Due to fierce competition between insurers even 
unsafe ships can get insured against oil pollution claims (Tan, 2006, p.40ff). 
129 For example, Recital (3), Regulation 1406/2002. 
130 For example, the agency provided 27 training activities involving 543 officials in 2010. These are 
organised following consultations with representatives of the Member States in the forum of the 
Consultative Forum on Technical Assistance (CNTA). 
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practices’ in port state control. Equally, workshops on the implementation 
for specific legal instruments of the EU regime are available. The underlying 
idea hereby is that coordination between national officials can be facilitated 
if national officials come together to discuss how they are doing things 
within their home administration, hereby possible being able to learn from 
each other to reduce incompliant and ineffective practices.131 A coordination 
pattern shaped by this task of EMSA could hence be expected to be based on 
horizontal exchanges between the involved actors that provide an arena for 
finding agreement on shared practices. EMSA’s training programme 
represents a combination of distance learning courses and workshops. The 
agency attaches high hopes to the potential of these sessions: 
 
As much as the networks that EMSA has established through 
workshops, seminars, assessment visits and training sessions feed 
knowledge into the Agency, knowledge is also diffused across the 
European Union, promoting a common culture of maritime safety 
through the exchange of knowledge and know-how by the relevant 
experts  [emphasis added].132  
 
EMSA not only sees these trainings as service provision to national 
authorities but also reports to be using them to learn about national 
practices, formulate ‘best practices’ on the basis of this knowledge and as a 
means to disseminate these (see, for example, EMSA Annual Report, 2008, p. 
33). In this regard, the agency describes itself as active motor for the 
increased coordination of practices since it establishes and disseminates 
informal standards in form of ‘best practices’ amongst national authorities 
from assessments of all reports on the inspections of national 
administrations (the so-called ‘horizontal assessments’) (EMSA 2010b, p. 
33). 
 
 
EMSA’s tasks hence have the potential to shape coordinative patterns based 
on hierarchy and mutual exchange. As a result, maritime safety represents 
an interesting case to explore how coordination functions when it is shaped 
                                                 
131 For example, Recital 5, Regulation 1406/2002. Also, see, sections on training activities in EMSA 
Annual Reports. 
132 EMSA, 2005, p.7. 
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by such differing tasks. Since the role of EMSA in carrying out these two 
tasks –and the institutional framework for interaction provided by them– 
represent an inherent tension, it is particularly intriguing to examine their 
effect on coordinative behaviour. 
 
 
4.2.2 A Hierarchical Coordination Pattern 
Indeed, in practice the above described tension between inspection and 
training tasks of EMSA creates an environment in which the former 
diminishes the potential of the latter: Due to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
present in EMSA’s inspection tasks, Member State officials are less inclined 
to openly share experience and practices in the forum of the European 
agency. This is largely so since the Commission has been a zealous enforcer 
of EU norms on the basis of EMSA inspection reports.133 This dominance of 
EMSA’s inspection task over its task to further mutual exchange needs to be 
understood in the context of the social relations that regulatory actors are 
embedded in: The highly international character of maritime safety 
regulation renders the perceived ‘added value’ of the involvement of EU 
bodies in this field questionable, and many national authorities –including 
the British and German ones– question the role of the EU in this field 
altogether. The added value that EU bodies can provide in comparison to the 
IMO is the tough enforcement of supranational norms.134 This zealous 
approach, in turn, antagonises national authorities further, which has the 
potential to strengthen the contentious nature of their relationship with 
EMSA and the European Commission. UK and German authorities hence 
assess EMSA’s tasks from the context in which they are embedded, namely 
the highly international regulatory process which they perceive to the most 
crucial arena for transnational coordination in this field.  
 In this light, national authorities have often voiced their unease with 
the zealous approach to infringement proceedings of the Commission on the 
                                                 
133 See, for example, European Commission, 2009; 2009b; 2009c; 2010; 2010b. 
134 Overall, experts in the field are of the view that the main safety issue remaining is not the quality 
or quantity of existing regulatory standards, but rather their effective enforcement in a highly 
complex, global arena (Ringbom, 1997, p. 3; Tan, 2006, p. 4; also see Donaldson Report (Department 
of Transport, 1994, para. 4.26); and Pallas Report, 2000, p.44ff). 
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basis of EMSA’s inspection reports. For example, national officials have 
complained that they had usually already changed their system on the basis 
of EMSA preliminary findings that were reported to them immediately after 
the EMSA inspection.135 There have also been complaints by national 
officials that they do not get sufficient time to remedy negative inspection 
findings before an infringement procedure is started against them, and 
German officials have repeatedly questioned whether the level of intensity 
of inspections is necessary (EMSA, 2007c, p. 5; EMSA, 2011c, p. 6; EMSA 
2011d, p.10). The first time the Commission initiated an infringement 
procedure on the basis of a report, it failed to inform EMSA about this, which 
reportedly irritated the agency and the given authorities.136  After the first 
letters announcing the impending infringement procedures based on 
EMSA’s finding had gone out, Member State officials remarked that this 
potentially tainted the image of EMSA’s inspections and might result in a 
less open atmosphere between the involved actors (EMSA, 2006c, p. 8). 
National authorities are hence today acutely aware of the flow of 
information between EMSA and the Commission, and mainly worry about 
having to take corrective steps, even in cases where they think they are 
applying EU law correctly. This inhibits them to speak openly about their 
practices in the forum of EMSA’s trainings. Coordination in this case is hence 
dominated by EMSA’s inspection task, resulting predominantly in a 
hierarchical coordination pattern that overshadows EMSA’s training 
responsibility to further mutual exchange between national officials in its 
training sessions.  
This is amplified by the confidential nature of EMSA’s inspection 
reports, as a result of which possibilities of mutual learning through one 
another’s EMSA inspection reports is limited. In the forum of EMSA’s 
Administrative Board, officials from some Member States have voiced that it 
would be useful to be able to learn from inspection reports, which would 
                                                 
135 This was found interviews by Groenleer et al (2010). Administrative Board meetings show the 
constant worry of national officials about the Commission handling of EMSA inspection findings. 
Member States have asked the Commission to discuss inspection findings with them in the forum of 
the Administrative Board. The Commission, however, insists that these are discussed in more detail in 
the relevant Comitology Committee (COSS, the Committee on Safe Seas and the Prevention of 
pollution from ships) (see EMSA 2007b, p. 10; EMSA, 2010c, p. 6). 
136 Groenleer et al (2010) report this (p.1220), and the irritation of the given Member States clearly 
emerges from Administrative Board minutes (EMSA, 2006c, p. 7f).  
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require them to be of a transparent nature (EMSA, 2010d, p. 3 and 6). In this 
regard, the equivalent IMO inspections have more potential, whereby 
inspectors of national authorities form small teams and inspect another 
country’s practices.137 Officials are able to observe how things are done in 
other authorities first hand but the procedure lacks the enforcement 
possibilities of the Commission. Indeed, a Polish official brought forward the 
idea to establish a similar system in the EU regime to allow for mutual 
learning; however, the Commission is of the view that not all Member States 
would feel comfortable with this (EMSA, 2009b, p.9). Currently, the EMSA 
‘visit to Member States’ structure a hierarchical relationship between EMSA 
and inspected national authorities. Whereby relationships between EMSA 
and national authorities are reportedly of a very cooperative and friendly 
exchange, the hierarchical element remains present due to EMSA’s link to 
the Commission’s enforcement powers.138  MCA and Ship Safety Division 
staff reported that these inspections clearly matter to them in terms of 
avoiding an infringement procedure, thus resulting in a hierarchical 
coordination pattern. 
 
Well, in the end those [EMSA inspection teams] are the same people 
one meets in relation to various topics in different national and 
international organisations. We know each other, of course. So the 
whole thing does have a rather cooperative character. Of course 
they have a close look, and of course one does not want to be 
noticed in a negative way, and what you really, really don’t want is 
an infringement procedure.139  
 
To give you an example, we came very close to being infracted for 
our late transposition of the Vessel-Traffic Monitoring Directive 
and the Port State Control Directive, and so that was quite 
obviously one of the things, and we weren’t alone as a Member 
State.140  
 
                                                 
137 See IMO 2005 and 2005b for the resolutions establishing the voluntary audit scheme. Also see IMO 
website for an explanation and further documents related to the audit regime.  
138 It needs to be pointed out that the notion of hierarchy when EMSA visits to Member States are 
concerned is related to the possible consequences of such in form of enforcement action by the 
Commission, rather than the conduct of the inspections as such: It might be a nuisance for UK and 
German officials to accommodate these in terms of the extra work their create but the atmosphere is 
usually described as a friendly one. This also owes to the fact that EMSA officials are often former 
national officials and that the highly multi-national environment of regime provides for an 
environment where officials from different countries have frequently known each other for a 
considerable time. 
139 Interviewee M1, Germany. 
140 Interviewee M10, UK. 
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Both officials mentioned infringement procedures immediately when asked 
which significance EMSA inspections bear to them.  EMSA officials directly 
involved in carrying out ‘visits to Member States’ also emphasise the 
checking of compliance, as opposed to an enhancement of practices as the 
focus of these inspections, and the Commission is intent on ‘putting EMSA 
inspection reports to use’. 
 
 
EMSA’s input doesn’t create effects by itself. They come to us [the 
European Commission] to be able to follow up with the remit that is 
given to us by the treaties, whether it is to clarify subjects with 
Member States, whether it is to take them to the Court, so an 
infringement procedure, or even to impose fines, that is now the 
case under the new Class Regulation. So all these things have to be 
assessed here, by the Commission.141  
 
The inspection task of EMSA hence creates a hierarchical coordination 
pattern that is focused on the use infringement procedures.  EMSA’s role in 
this regard is hence to be seen rather as an enforcement agency of the 
Commission (which supplies the necessary information for enforcement), 
than a hub of national authorities in which mutual exchange happens. 
British and German officials also expressed a worry about the role that the 
flow of information between EMSA and the Commission poses to them in 
terms of revision of existing legislation and proposals of new legislative 
initiatives, which is generally shared by many other Member States (EMSA, 
2011e, p.11.). 
 
The Commission has difficulty accepting that [standards are set by 
the IMO]. They know it is the realpolitik of it to a certain extent. But 
the problem is that they are always pushing at competence, they 
are always trying to nibble away at competence... And I will be 
perfectly honest with you, we always need to be on our guard. Us 
and other EU Member States, we always need to be on our guard 
what is coming out of the Commission. Asking what’s there in the 
sub-text, what’s there in the fine print.142 
 
We hence observe an underlying impression of some national officials that 
even practices which are compliant with EU maritime safety law could 
result in an uncomfortable situation whereby currently ‘valid’ legislation 
                                                 
141 Interviewee, M6, European Commission. 
142 Interviewee M10, UK. 
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and practices at the national level are turned into incompliant ones. The 
Commission is also very explicit that it uses information from EMSA to 
revise and propose legislation (EMSA, 2011d, p. 9). For Member States 
which defend the IMO’s place as international rule-maker –like the UK and 
Germany– an added worry in this regard is to keep purely European rules in 
check since these undermine, rather than promote, maritime safety in their 
perception. The assessment of transnational coordination in EMSA on part 
of UK and German authorities is thus fundamentally characterised by the 
social relations they are embedded in, namely their perception of the 
importance of the international regulatory arena. The ensuing struggles for 
competence –and hence contention– between the international, the EU and 
the national level have a direct impact on how EU bodies carry out their 
tasks and how these are then evaluated by UK and German officials that are 
worried about a loss of importance of their coordinative work in the IMO.  
Currently, EU Member States often coordinate positions before IMO 
meetings and hence wield their influence in such crucial arenas like the 
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC) en bloc. The Commission acts as an observer at IMO, but 
has been aiming to become a fully voting member. This is controversial 
amongst UK and German officials, as is the potential role played by EMSA in 
coordinating positions, and the coordination of an EU-wide position in 
general. 
 
Sometimes it is good when EU interests are bundled somewhere, 
through the Commission or whomever. But not in this field. After 
all, international cooperation at the IMO is very well-rehearsed 
indeed. And if the EU wants to have a common position you can get 
together on a case-by-case basis. We always do this before IMO 
sessions, there is always a meeting, a coordination in the EU. That 
exists anyhow, we do not need to have EMSA for that.143 
 
I would say the biggest issue in that area [maritime safety] is the 
competence ambitions in trying to create and EU standard for 
maritime safety, an EU platform for maritime safety within an 
industry that is international. Now why do I say that is a problem? 
Well, it’s because the shipping industry is more than international, 
it’s global, and it appears to be, we have seen evidence of an EU-
centric approach going further than is necessary for approximated 
risk associated to safety and hence putting European flags at a 
                                                 
143 Interviewee M1, Germany. 
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comparative disadvantage. […] And to some extent there is within 
that the risk to undermine and to undo a lot of the good work that 
has come out of the Paris Memorandum, for example.144 
 
 
The role of the Commission and EMSA in transnational coordination is 
hence contentious in the perception of British and German officials (also see 
EMSA, 2011c, p.7 and EMSA, 2012, p.6). Whereas a coordination of a 
position to be defended internationally between some Member States is 
seen as desirable by them (the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
Nordic countries often coordinate their position, and often the Commission 
pushes for an EU-wide coordinated position), British and German officials 
think that a long-standing convention of doing so is sufficient, and are weary 
of the Commission’s ambitions to formalise these. Moreover, in their view 
there is a safety trade-off in appearing as a bloc in the IMO: Reportedly non-
European countries become less cooperative when faced with an already 
agreed European position: With the aim of having a global regime, rather 
than a European one, this has potential implications for safety as non-
European countries become less willing to agree to more stringent safety 
standards mainly supported by EU countries.  
Informal coordination (in parts orchestrated by the Commission) of 
positions of European administrations nonetheless remains a key feature 
when IMO standard-setting is concerned. In this regard, EMSA’s 
Administrative Board (attended by ministry officials in the case of Germany 
and the UK) provides an additional forum for coordinating on a 
transnational level, which British and German officials see as highly 
valuable. The Commission was only slow to accept the use of the 
Administrative Board as a platform for discussion of national positions, 
while at the same time profiting from being able to hear what happens on 
the national level.145 In the forum of EMSA national officials are hence 
involved in standard-setting in a highly informal manner. Whereas national 
officials represented on its Administrative Board formally only oversee the 
work of the agency and decide on its overall direction,146 national officials 
                                                 
144 Interviewee M10, UK. 
145 Interviews M5, M6 and M7. Also see, EMSA, 2012b, p. 6. 
146 Art.10, Regulation 1406/2002. 
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have become accustomed to use this as a forum to exchange positions and 
practices with colleagues from other administrations. Hereby, national 
officials do indeed exchange (views on) national practices and invite each 
other to observe work being done in their home administration: For 
example, a British official explained that officials from other administrations 
had attended a contingency exercise for the case of a vessel running into an 
off-shore wind farm. Equally, he reported that his team had observed Danish 
attempts to build an infrastructure for liquefied natural gas fuelled ships.147 
Sweden invited other Member States to view its scheme to measure ship 
emissions from planes (EMSA, 2011c, p.7), and Poland has suggested 
exchanges of port state control officers in the forum of the Administrative 
Board (EMSA, 2006b, p.8). The struggle over competences and the 
hierarchical nature of coordination do not necessarily exclude mutual 
exchange as form of coordination per se.  
Whilst, EMSA training sessions, however, are potentially the most 
likely place to find exchange of practices and mutual learning, the picture in 
practice is rather different. The majority of training sessions are lecture-
type trainings on the content of EU legislation, whereby EMSA staff explain 
these legal provisions to national officials from ministries or maritime safety 
authorities. Port state control training sessions are meant to provide more 
of a forum for exchange of practices but according to a German port state 
control officer time for these can usually only be found after the end of the 
training sessions in the evenings and whether they take place hence 
depends largely on the levels of motivation of the individual inspectors.148 
Whereas all interviewees agreed that the trainings are popular amongst 
officials (not least because attendance is fully paid for by EMSA), national 
officials are permanently aware of the potential flow of information 
between EMSA and the Commission, hence hampering their willingness to 
exchange worries candidly. An EMSA official, on the other hand, also noted 
that the difference in the level of expertise between national officials can 
make an effective exchange of practices difficult. 
 
                                                 
147 Interviewee M5. 
148 Interviewee M9. 
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But I think another issue here is since EMSA is an EU body, Member 
States that are not performing superbly are a bit reluctant to come 
to EMSA and very openly share their problems because they 
sometimes feel that that might be used against them. The EU 
Commission is then ultimately the body that may sue them for non-
compliance, so there is a little bit of that as well. But I think 
generally we create a relatively good atmosphere in the sense that 
we are of course not trying to cheat Member State representatives 
in the sense that they come here and discuss their problems and 
then we go and use the information obtained in that way by 
knocking on the Commission’s door. But it’s still on the back of the 
minds of the Member State officials that they cannot be too open 
about things that they are doing.149 
 
The training office of EMSA basically puts people together in the 
same room, and they listen, and there is not really an exchange of 
good practices. It is more a process of EMSA preaching the good 
word, on what a good practice should be. [...] Nobody will -in public 
like that when everybody is present- admit certain weaknesses in 
their system.150 
 
 
The hierarchical coordination pattern that emerges from EMSA’s inspection 
task hence dos not easily coincide with less defined tasks to promote mutual 
learning and a ‘common culture’ of managing risk.  
 
Although EMSA has an inspection task and the task to provide a forum for 
mutual exchange –for example through its training programme– 
coordination between regulatory actors in maritime safety is largely 
hierarchical: In the perception of national authorities EMSA’s inspection 
task is directly linked to the enforcement action on part of the European 
Commission. This close link between EMSA and the Commission results in a 
willingness to openly exchange practices in the forum of EMSA. That EMSA’s 
inspection task is more prominent in shaping coordination between officials 
can only be understood in the specific context of the social relations that 
regulatory actors are embedded in: The presence of the IMO -which 
authorities in countries like the UK and Germany continue to view as 
pinnacle of maritime safety regulatory efforts– affects how coordination 
functions in the EU setting. Due to the presence of international norms, the 
European Commission can ‘only’ add value in this regime if it enforces EU 
                                                 
149 Interviewee M4, EMSA. 
150 Interviewee M3, EMSA. 
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requirements zealously on the basis of EMSA inspection reports. This 
results in the strictly hierarchical nature of coordination that adversely 
affects coordination between national officials that is based in mutual 
exchange. 
 
 
 
4.2.3 The Perpetuation of Hierarchical Coordination despite 
Contestation 
A central question arising from the above analysis is why hierarchical 
coordination is perpetuated: UK and German officials continue to 
proactively engage with EMSA processes –not least in its Administrative 
Forum and in its training programme– despite the contentious relationship 
they have with EMSA and the European Commission. In this regard, EMSA’s 
inspection tasks need to be considered in the wider context of the services it 
provides to national authorities, which UK and German officials take into 
account when assessing which ‘added value’ EMSA’s tasks bring to them. 
Overall, authorities with small administrative capacities report to derive 
distinct advantages from EMSA services, whereby especially the provision of 
the vessel-traffic monitoring system, the port inspection data-base, and the 
satellite oil-spill monitoring scheme are seen to decrease cost at the national 
level whilst enhancing overall safety. Administrations with large capacities 
and expertise like the UK and Germany, however, remain to be convinced of 
the benefits of some of EMSA services. They are keen to avoid a duplication 
of effort in EMSA and ‘at home’. Nevertheless, in their perception they 
derive a crucial benefit from EMSA’s tasks that contributes to the 
effectiveness of their work: Under conditions of interdependence, they 
regard EMSA’s inspections as a vehicle to ensure that their colleagues in 
other countries are also carrying out effective port state controls, which is a 
prerequisite to the effectiveness of their work on the whole.  
In order to understand which added value national authorities can 
derive from the engagement with EMSA processes, it is vital to recognise 
that EMSA’s inspection task is not evaluated in isolation by national officials. 
Rather, the inspection of the practices of national authorities by EMSA only 
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represents a part of the work national officials connect with EMSA. National 
officials also associate EMSA with its operational tasks, whereby especially 
the provision of the vessel-traffic-monitoring system SafeSeaNet, the port 
inspection data-base Thetis and the oil-spill satellite-monitoring scheme 
CleanSeaNet are seen as effective service delivery on part of the agency.151  
In this respect, national authorities see these tools as ‘adding value’ to their 
operations by reducing costs whilst creating a greater capacity to reduce 
risk. CleanSeaNet, for example, is able to provide satellite pictures of all 
European seas to Member State authorities (EMSA, 2011b). These pictures 
monitor potential oil spills and can detect the polluting vessel.152 If a 
potential oil spill is detected in national waters the relevant national 
authorities are informed within 30 minutes of the satellite passing over the 
oil spill (EMSA, 2011, p. 4).153 The national authorities can then decide to 
check upon the possibility of a spill on site.154 This system is economically 
advantageous for all Member States as it is cheaper than aerial surveillance 
by plane (COWI, 2008). EMSA’s well-developed rhetoric of ‘adding value’ to 
the work of national administrations particularly emphasises the role of 
CleanSeaNet. 
 
In certain cases economies of scale can be achieved by transferring 
activities to the Community level. The establishment of EMSA will 
clearly benefit the Member States by providing services that would 
otherwise have meant additional expenditure at national level.155 
 
This ‘added value’ of CleanSeaNet is even recognised by Member States with 
large administrative capacities, such as the UK and Germany (for example, 
COWI, 2008, p. 54; EMSA, 2011c, p.5, p.12, p.14). Nevertheless, with regard 
                                                 
151 Art.10(2)(a), Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 
2005 on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements. 
152 See EMSA, 2011. A satellite of the European Space Agency and two satellites of the Canadian Space 
Agency are used for this purpose. 
153 CleanSeaNet supplements monitoring systems at the national and regional level, which were in 
place before its inception.  For example, members of HELCOM operate aerial surveillance in 
cooperation, thereby flying over heavy traffic routes at least twice per week and once per week in 
areas of sporadic traffic (see, for example, HELCOM, 2010, for an overview, including flight hours of 
individual countries). The Bonn Agreement operates a similar arrangement (for example, see Bonn 
Agreement, 2008). This service now cooperates with EMSA’s CleanSeaNet facility. 
154 In its first phase of operation (from April 2007 to January 2011) 8000 satellite pictures were 
taken, of which 2828 were checked on site. 745 of these were confirmed to be pollution in the form of 
oil or other substances. 
155 EMSA, 2004, p.8. 
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to the further development of EMSA’s operational tasks fault lines remain 
between Member States with large administrative capacity at home (like the 
UK and Germany), which would like to avoid duplication of efforts on the 
national and supranational level, and administrations with less capacities 
aiming to balance their potential shortcomings through EMSA.156  
This attitude is also reflected when the provision of training by EMSA 
is concerned. The exchange of practices in EMSA trainings might be 
hampered through their hierarchical nature and the fear of admitting to 
possibly non-compliant practices; nevertheless, national officials stress that 
EMSA trainings can be very helpful for them in certain regards, such as the 
possibility to get assistance from EMSA in securing correct implementation 
(see COWI, 2008, p.34f).157 German and UK authorities, however, do not 
perceive this as helpful assistance (ibid.), whilst recognising that it is helpful 
for authorities with smaller administrative capacities.158 Most Member 
States also state that they profit from EMSA’s inspection of the STCW 
Convention (i.e. training certification of seafarers) in third countries since 
this renders it unnecessary for each individual Member State to carry out 
such check-ups in order to verify whether seafarers from third-countries 
are qualified to be employed on vessels flying their flag (COWI, 2008, 
p.36).159 The UK, however, does not participate in this mechanism and 
continues to run its own inspection regime in this regard. 
Overall, then, the presence of EMSA’s operational services can far 
better explain which perceived ‘added value’ small capacity authorities 
derive from EMSA than what UK and German authorities get out of this 
transnational process. Authorities in the UK and Germany only perceive 
SafeSeaNet, Thetis and CleanSeaNet to ‘add value’ to their work, whilst 
remaining keen to avoid a duplication of effort in other areas. This is 
especially the case in the realm of port state control inspections, where the 
UK and German officials stress the importance of relying on the experience 
                                                 
156 This issue came up frequently in interviews and is also exhibited in the Administrative Board 
meetings of EMSA (see, for example, EMSA, 2006b, p. 5; EMSA, 2011c, p.5). 
157 EMSA officials stated that they generally receive this feedback from many Member States 
(however, they did not differentiate across national authorities in this respect).   
158 Interviews with German and British officials. 
159 Member States officials are especially content with the system since STCW inspection results are 
shared across all national authorities by a secure website (EMSA, 2009b, p.12). 
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and expertise of their port state control officers instead of introducing a 
proceduralised EU regime. The continued importance of ‘professional 
judgement’ of national inspectors contributes to the acceptance of the 
strictly hierarchical form of coordination on part of the MCA and the Ship 
Safety Division. The setting of social relations in which the necessary 
expertise for ship safety inspectors continues to exist in their national 
regimes thus informs their evaluation of EMSA’s work.  In this regard, in the 
Paris MoU it was decided from the outset that the use of checklist and highly 
proceduralised forms of port state inspections would be avoided 
(Kasoulides and Ringbom, 1997, especially p.132).160 The reliance on the 
expertise of highly experienced ship inspectors has been the cornerstone of 
this regime since, whereby the Paris MoU and the EU regime have set rather 
broad standards for the procedures to be used,161 whilst also specifying the 
level qualifications needed by national inspectors.162 As a result, the conduct 
of inspections remains largely based on ‘professional judgement’: It is set 
out which documents need to be checked on board for the most basic form 
of inspection (‘initial inspection’) but whether the inspector goes further 
and what he/she chooses to scrutinise more closely is not strictly regulated. 
Hereby, the principle of ‘professional judgement’ is vehemently defended by 
MCA and Ship Safety Division officials: “I have well qualified inspectors, it is 
not for nothing they are trained for 15 months”, a German official said. A 
German port state control officer remarked that it was his experience of 
having been at sea for 40 years that mattered for assessing risk, rather than 
checklists.163 At the same time, he contemplated whether the new 
generation of staff –which often lacks this form of experience at sea– might 
perhaps be better able to assess risks if they used checklists.  
The reliance on ‘professional judgement’, rather than proceduralised 
inspection norms, renders the hierarchical coordination acceptable to MCA 
and Ship Safety Division officials: Whilst EMSA inspections verify whether 
national officials are trained sufficiently, whether the port state control 
data-base Thetis is run correctly by national authorities etc., national 
                                                 
160 Also see Paris MoU, Code of Good Practice for Port State Control Officers, Annex I, Rule 1. 
161 See Paris MoU text, especially Section 3 and Annex I. 
162 Art.22(1) and Annex XI of Directive 2009/16. 
163 Interviewee M9. 
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officials retain autonomy in the realm of ‘professional judgement’.164 British 
and German officials might have to endure the inspections of their port state 
control systems, but the regime also provides them with a solution to its 
coordination problem by assuring them that other Member States 
administrations are carrying out their work ‘properly’, which is essential for 
the closing of loopholes used by unsafe ships (i.e. more lenient authorities). 
Continued maintenance of the acceptance of hierarchical coordination is 
hence likely to be contingent on the maintenance of professional judgement 
as core logic of control in the port state control regime.  
The continued existence of the hierarchical coordination is also likely 
to depend on the perception of the feasibility of compliance with the EU 
regime in future, whereby especially the meeting of inspection targets 
represents an increasing challenge. The main underlying principle of the 
port state control regime is that ships with good safety records will have to 
undergo fewer inspections, thus providing an increased incentive to 
maintain safe vessels. As a result, fewer ships which have a risk profile that 
permits them to be inspected are entering European ports. The risk profile 
of a given ship is created according to certain criteria, such as flag, age, 
number of past deficiencies etc.. Moreover, explicit sanctions are attached to 
non-favourable inspection findings, namely possible detention of the ship or 
refusal to let a ship enter a port in the first place, which are very costly 
consequences for ship-owners. Any ship that flies the flag of state which is 
on the black or grey list of the Paris MoU is refused access to ports.165 At the 
same time, the public display of results of inspections on public databases -
Thetis allows for a historical record to be kept and reviewed at a glance, 
whereby a record of deficiency is likely to render the inspector more careful 
and strict in his/her assessment of the ship- and the existence of the Paris 
MoU lists provide for behaviour-modification through a mechanism of 
naming-and-shaming.166  
                                                 
164 Also see Paris MoU Annual Reports in this regard, (Paris MoU 2006-2010). 
165 Art.16 and Annex VIII, Directive 2009/16/EC. 
166 Ibid., also see Recital (30).  
This is not to say that the findings of deficiencies are low in the Paris MoU area: Even diligently kept 
ships are not necessarily able to avoid deficiencies since the absence of the newest update on, for 
example, specific training manuals can be deemed as deficiency by an inspector (as observed by the 
author when accompanying a port state control officer in the port of Bremen in December 2012).  
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The effectiveness of these mechanisms coupled with the risk-based 
regime results in ever fewer numbers of ships with the necessary risk 
profile being available to be inspected by British and German officials. This 
is stretching MCA and Ship Safety Division capabilities to the limits: 
Whereas the former stated that it is a challenge to comply with the Port 
State Control Directive in terms of ensuring that each port state control 
officer carries out the required number of inspections per year due to the 
UK’s exceptionally large number of officers,167 the latter stressed that it was 
now necessary to employ a constant on-call policy for port state control 
officers to inspect ships day and night even in the absence of imminent 
danger to reach the required number of inspections per year.168 The new 
regime has also resulted in an increased ‘race’ between national authorities, 
whereby authorities attempt by all means to inspect ships that have the 
necessary risk profile before a different authority within the regime gets a 
chance to do so. Continued acceptance of national officials of EMSA’s 
inspection task will hence also depend on the feasibility of compliance with 
the EU regime in future, especially with regard to the meeting of inspection 
targets. 
 
 
This section of the chapter has shown that UK and maritime safety 
authorities continue to engage with transnational processes in EMSA 
despite the contention its inspection task causes because they perceive 
EMSA to add value to their work in certain respects: Some of EMSA’s 
operational capacities are evaluated as beneficial by UK and German 
authorities. Also, through the context of social relations in which they are 
embedded in at home, they appreciate the reliance of the EU regime on the 
‘professional judgement’ of ship inspectors, whilst valuing that EMSA’s 
inspections provide them with reassurance that other national authorities 
are carrying out their work adequately.  
 
 
                                                 
167 Interviewee M10. The UK has around 130-150 officers, for example, see MCA, 2011, p.11. 
168 Interviewees M1, M8 and M9. 
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4.3 Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates that the inspection task of EMSA indeed results 
in a hierarchical coordination pattern: The activities of EMSA and the 
European Commission are at the heart of the coordination process with 
regard to proclaiming what the practices of national maritime safety 
authorities should look like, as well as the gathering of information about 
the work of national authorities on the ground, and the modification of their 
behaviour through infringement proceedings. The UK and German maritime 
safety authorities contest the zealous interventionist approach of the 
European Commission as they perceive it to be potentially detrimental for 
furthering safety in this highly global regulatory regime, in which the IMO 
plays a crucial role. EMSA and the European Commission, in turn, arguably 
perceive a necessity to justify their added value in a field in which the role of 
yet another transnational bureaucracy is potentially questionable.   
 In this regard, the case study also shows that EMSA’s inspection task 
has a direct impact on its training task: The mutual exchange between 
national officials in the forum of EMSA is inhibited by the awareness of 
national officials that information is passed from EMSA to the European 
Commission and subsequently used in infringement proceedings. The 
contention that EMSA’s inspection task provokes among British and German 
authorities –as well as the effect of EMSA’s inspection task on its task to 
provide training to national officials– can only be understood in the context 
of the social relations in which regulatory actors operate in this field, 
namely a highly global regime in which British and German authorities 
question the value of an additional transnational coordination body (i.e. 
EMSA) and EMSA’s and the Commission’s perceived need to justify their 
raison d’être in relation to the IMO. As a result of this dynamic, coordination 
remains primarily hierarchical in nature despite EMSA’s task to further 
mutual exchange between national officials. 
 The maritime safety authorities of the UK and Germany are willing to 
engage with the EMSA process (for example in its training programme and 
in its Administrative Board) despite their contention of the hierarchical 
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coordination pattern since they also perceive EMSA’s work to add value to 
their own regulatory activities: Firstly, EMSA carries out operational 
activities, which even UK and German authorities assess to add value to 
their work. Secondly, officials from the British and German authorities find 
that EMSA’s inspections at least give them the reassurance that other 
national authorities are carrying out their work adequately, which ensures 
that their work is effective under conditions of interdependence. In this 
regard, the maritime safety authorities of the UK and Germany thus indeed 
not only contest, but also value EMSA’s and the European Commission’s 
efforts to enforce regulatory standards, which the IMO is unable to do. 
 The findings of this case study also serve as crucial comparison to the 
case of food controls (see Chapter 5): The EU regulatory body in this field 
(the Food and Veterinary Office) also has an inspection task. However, 
regulatory actors in the fields of maritime safety and food controls are 
embedded in very different sets of social relations. A comparison in this 
regard thus provides us with further insights into how the social 
organisation that regulatory actors are embedded in informs their 
perception of the value of transnational coordination. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Food Safety 
 
 
The case of food safety offers an opportunity to study the effects of a 
knowledge generation task, as well as an inspection task, on coordinative 
behaviour. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has to provide 
scientific advice on food safety issues, in which it is supported by national 
food risk assessors. Together, they have the task of generating knowledge 
about questions of risk and safety. For example, this entails the scientific 
assessment of the safety of foods deriving from new technologies under 
conditions of uncertainty about their long-term consequence, such as 
nanotechnology and genetically-modified organisms. The Food and 
Veterinary Office (FVO), in turn, has been tasked with the inspection of the 
practices of food control authorities in the Member States: Food controls are 
usually carried out by local authorities due to the heterogeneous nature of 
the food industry and the complexity of the food chain. Each stage of the 
production, processing and distribution of foods potentially bears hazards, 
which are hence verified for their safety by local authorities. Food control 
oversight authorities –which are the point of contact for FVO inspections– 
have the responsibility of ensuring that these decentralised activities add up 
to an effective control system in each Member State.  
  As argued in Chapter 2, a knowledge generation task provides a 
framework conducive to a coordination pattern that is based on mutual 
exchange and adjustment. An inspection task, in turn, is expected to set the
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 involved regulatory actors into a hierarchical framework that has the EU 
regulatory body at its apex. In line with the argument of this thesis, we can 
expect that national authorities accept and engage with these transnational 
coordination processes if they perceive themselves to be ‘getting something 
out of’ them. 
This case study also offers two excellent points of comparison in 
relation to the drug safety and the maritime safety case studies (see Chapter 
3 and 4 respectively): The scientific experts involved in food risk 
assessment can be deemed to have relatively similar professional norms to 
the scientific experts involved in drug safety monitoring. If professional 
norms were indeed the main determinant of coordinative behaviour we 
could expect coordination to function very similarly in these two cases. If, 
however, tasks and social relations drive coordinative behaviour, we can 
expect coordination patterns to vary across these cases. Moreover, we can 
compare the coordinative behaviour of food control and maritime safety 
authorities. In both cases the practices of national authorities are 
coordinated through an inspection task of an EU regulatory body, but 
regulatory actors operate in a context of very different social relations in the 
two cases. This allows us to study whether regulatory actors indeed 
evaluate the same task differently under these conditions. 
 
  
 
5.1 Social Relations and Tasks in Food Safety 
National risk assessors have the task to support EFSA in its scientific work 
(i.e. the formulation of scientific opinions) by generating knowledge at the 
transnational level. The effect of this task on coordinative behaviour is of 
particular interest since national risk assessors do not comprise EFSA’s 
scientific bodies, which instead consist of ‘independent’ experts. As a result, 
the extent of their engagement with the transnational process is highly 
conditional on their perception of the added value that supporting EFSA’s 
work has for them. This, in turn, is depended on the social relations they are 
embedded in. The FVO, in turn, has an inspection task. The expected 
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hierarchical nature of the coordination process has the potential to cause 
contention between food control authorities in the Member States and the 
FVO: After all, they are the operative arm of this transnational bureaucracy, 
which faces the day-to-day challenges of applying European norms. In order 
for authorities in the Member States to accept the FVO inspections despite 
contestation –or in order for contestation to not arise in the first place– they 
must perceive their engagement with the FVO audit process to add value to 
their work of overseeing highly complex control systems (see Section 5.1.1 
for an analysis of the social relations food safety actors are embedded in, 
and Section 5.2.1 for an overview of the tasks of EU regulatory bodies in this 
field).  
 
 
5.1.1 Social Relations in the UK and German Food Safety Regimes 
Authorities in both countries face similar social relations in which they need 
to carry out their tasks of risk assessment and the oversight of food controls, 
despite having different organisational structures in place in this regard. In 
food risk assessment, authorities in the UK and in Germany are embedded in 
social relations that are characterised by mistrust towards their scientific 
advice. In food controls, in turn, food control oversight authorities in both 
countries face the extraordinary challenge to oversee a heterogonous, 
decentralised administrative control apparatus.   
The UK and Germany fundamentally reformed the organisation of 
scientific advice in their risk assessment regimes in the aftermath of the BSE 
crisis. In this regard, this crisis can be seen as a veritable turning point in the 
approach to food safety in Europe: Public confidence in producers and 
public authorities was (in-)famously low as a result of the BSE crisis, in 
which it was often unclear whether public authorities were claiming beef to 
be safe or risky on scientific or political grounds (for example, Vincent, 
2004, also see the Medina Ortega Report, European Parliament, 1997). 
Whereas Germany institutionally separated ‘risk assessment’ (i.e. scientific 
expert advice) from ‘risk management’ (i.e. policy-making and food control 
activities) as a result of the crisis, the UK integrated these tasks in one 
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authority. In Germany, the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR)169 –
which was founded in 2002 under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of 
Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture (BMELV) – is responsible for  
the risk assessment of food stuffs.170 The BfR supplies risk assessments to 
the ‘risk managers’, namely the BMELV and the Federal Office for Consumer 
Protection and Food Safety (BVL).171 The latter was also founded in 2002 in 
conjunction with the BfR and henceforward started acting as coordinating 
authority in relation to food safety controls, which fall under the 
responsibility of the Bundesländer172. In the UK, the Food Standards Agency 
(FSA) – an independent non-ministerial government department– was 
established in 2000 in order to re-establish the confidence of consumers in 
the capacity of state to manage risk responsibly in the aftermath of the BSE 
crisis (James Report, 1997).173 The FSA combines risk assessment and risk 
management tasks. It is hence responsible for delivering scientific opinions, 
as well as for formulating (some) policy and being responsible for food 
controls.174 The FSA hence oversees the food controls carried out by local 
authorities.  
Next to differing in the separation of risk assessment and risk 
management, the FSA and BfR also differ in relation to the nature of the 
scientific basis for their decision-making. Whilst many FSA staff members 
have a background in relevant scientific research, no primary research is 
carried out in-house (in other words, no laboratories can be found on the 
FSA premises). Rather, the FSA relies on eight scientific committees 
composed of independent experts in the respective field and at least one lay 
member. Moreover, it can commission research from third parties. In 
                                                 
169 BfR stands for Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung.  
170 BMELV stands for Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz. 
171 BVL stands for Bundesamt für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit. 
172 For a critique of the pre-BSE system and a reform proposal, see Von Wedel, 2010. 
173 The legal foundations of the British food safety regime are the Food Safety Act 1990 and the 
General Food Regulations 2004. 
174 In this regard, it needs to be pointed out that nutrition and nutrition labelling was removed from 
the FSA’s responsibilities and transferred to the Department of Health in a reform in 2010 initiated by 
the coalition government which came to power that year (in Wales this remit was also moved to its 
health department, while it remained within the FSA in Scotland). In this regard, a large part of the 
FSA’s work (such as driving forward reductions in salt in food, and tackling the question of sugars and 
non-saturated fats in food) was removed from its remit. Moreover, non-safety related labelling was 
moved to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) (for example, see FSA, 
2010, p.7). However, its regulatory responsibilities pertaining to food safety per se were not curtailed 
in this reform.  
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contrast to EFSA and the FSA, the BfR carries out research in-house. In other 
words, a visitor will be able to find laboratories on its premises.175 The key 
rationale in this regard is that only active researchers are fully integrated in 
the scientific community.176  
Despite these differences in the formal organisation, authorities in 
both countries are embedded in similar social relations. In the case of risk 
assessment, this means that authorities in both countries perceive the need 
to foster trust in their capabilities in a context of (perceived) public mistrust 
towards the ability of science to answer food safety questions. For example, 
the task to work in the ‘interest of the consumer’ has been the key rationale 
in how the FSA underpins and justifies its actions: 
 
But I am always thinking ahead to what’s around the corner for 
consumers. What they are worried about. The Daily Mail has a lot to 
answer for! […] In our latest survey, 65% [of the public were] 
confident in FSA to protect health with regard to food safety. That 
trust is not a given. It has to be earned every day. It can be lost far 
more easily than won.177 
 
The central theme that “we must ensure that we maintain trust”178 or that in 
case of ineffective control systems “we risk damaging our most valuable 
commodity: that of consumer trust”179 thus runs through FSA thinking like a 
red line: “Putting the consumer first” is at the forefront of its strategic 
objectives (for example, see FSA, 2013, p.6).180 The UK regime was 
particularly affected by the BSE scandal of the 1990s due to the central role 
played by British beef in the outbreak of the crisis.  At the time, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) was responsible for food safety. It 
was widely regarded as having failed to handle the crisis adequately (for an 
overview, see Rothstein, 2006). Due to the widespread perception that 
                                                 
175 Additionally, in its scientific work the BfR is being advised by 15 expert panels (called ‘BfR-
Committees’), of which each comprises of at least ten external experts who contribute to the BfR’s 
work on a voluntary basis.   
176 Interviewee F3. 
177 Speech by Tim Smith, then Chief Executive of the FSA, entitled ‘What the Food Standards Agency 
does to ensure healthy food’, 19 November 2008. 
178 Speech by Tim Smith, then Chief Executive of the FSA, to the Association of Independent Meat 
Suppliers conference Saturday 18 October 2008. 
179 Speech by Tim Smith, then Chief Executive of the FSA, for a meat trades journal event, 13 February 
2009. 
180 For a review of the FSA’s degree of success in ‘putting the consumer first’, see the ‘Dean Review’ 
(Dean Review, 2005).  
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government had lied to and deceived the public, a central tenet in the 
reform of the regime was to regain public trust. 181  
Similarly to the FSA, the BfR’s approach to science is also shaped by 
considerations of the confidence of consumers placed in these processes: 
 
In its daily work the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment is 
confronted with a wide range of expectations all aimed at the same 
goal – reliable, sound knowledge for decisions [emphasis added by 
author].182 
 
Today, scientific statements are interpreted in the cross-fire of 
divergent interests. Science itself no longer speaks with one voice. 
Scientific statements are frequently challenged, and this is a 
popular pastime. […] Scientific progress and the fine-tuning of 
measurement methods and analytics have led to a feeling of 
growing uncertainty particularly in the food sector. One objective of 
our Institute and its staff is, therefore, to win back the confidence of 
the general public [emphasis added by the author].183 
 
The BfR hence does not only perceive its responsibility to be the provision 
of high quality expertise, but also the maintenance of public confidence in its 
work. Food risk assessors are hence embedded in a context of the historical 
legacy of the BSE crisis and contested forms of expertise. Extensive 
engagement with the transnational coordination process despite a lack of 
formal rules requiring proactive participation is hence potentially 
explainable if the BfR and the FSA both see this to be of value to them in the 
context of these social relations they are embedded in. 
In food controls, in turn, we also observe differing formal 
organisational set-ups in the two countries: In Germany food safety controls 
are mostly carried out by local authorities, which, however, come under the 
responsibility of the relevant ministries of the Bundesländer, rather than the 
BVL (for a detailed overview of the German control system, see FVO, 2008, 
2011; BVL, 2011).184 The BVL, in turn, is the national contact point of the 
FVO in relation to the organisation of FVO audits, without, however, 
possessing the authority to oversee the work of the Bundesländer. During an 
audit in Germany, the FVO usually visits two Bundesländer that were 
                                                 
181 BSE Inquiry Report (2000), p.1, paragraph 2-3.  
182 BfR, 2005, p.4. 
183 BfR, 2007, p.4. 
184 Also see the so-called Multi-Annual National Control Plans (MANCPs) that each Bundesland 
prepares for the European Commission.  
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selected by the BVL. The audit report produced by the FVO, on the other 
hand, is about Germany, rather than the specific states that were visited. In 
contrast, in the UK the FSA is responsible for the delivery of food safety 
controls: The FSA monitors, audits and liaises with local authorities in their 
delivery of food safety controls. In this regard, it is also the contact point of 
the FVO, for which it organises audits in the UK.185  
The work of the FVO in Germany is thus situated in a setting of many 
potential fields of tension, such as among the Länder, and between the 
Länder and the BVL, which might be feared to be intervening into the 
responsibilities of the Länder. On the contrary to the BVL, the FSA has legal 
authority to be well-informed about what happens at the local level and to 
attempt to effect changes when practices are not satisfactory. The 
coordinating function of the FVO in the UK is thus potentially less likely to 
cause tensions between control authorities if one considers the formal 
organisational set-up of food controls in the two countries. At the same time, 
however, authorities in both countries operate in the context of the 
complexity of overseeing a system that is faced with a highly decentralised 
industry and administrative control structures. If they are to accept the 
FVO’s role in orchestrating the coordination of their practices, they need to 
perceive this to add value in the context of these social relations they are 
embedded in.  
  
 
5.1.2 Tasks of EU Regulatory Bodies in Food Safety 
In the EU –just as in the UK and in Germany– a large part of the legislation, 
institutions and processes in place we currently find in regard of food safety 
were established as a response to the BSE crisis of the 1990s. In an attempt 
to avoid conflicts between political and scientific arguments in future and to 
restore consumer confidence (European Commission, 2000), the EU 
embarked on a reform process which culminated in the establishment of the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in 2002186 This authority has the 
                                                 
185 For a detailed overview, see FVO, 2012. 
186 For an overview of its creation, see Buonanno, 2006; Vogel, 2010. For the initial reform proposal 
for a ‘European Food and Public Health Authority’, see James, Kemper and Pascal, 1999. 
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task to provide scientific advice to the European Commission, thereby also 
being tasked to liaise with risk assessors in the Member States.187 In this 
respect, national risk assessors and EFSA have the task to generate 
knowledge about questions of risk and safety in food related issues. 
EFSA’s overarching task is the provision of scientific advice and 
support for food safety policy-making in the EU,188 especially in regard to 
supplying scientific opinions which form the basis of relevant legislation.189 
In this regard, it has the responsibility to act in close cooperation with 
national authorities,190 and Member States have the duty to cooperate with 
EFSA to pool expertise and hence generate knowledge in conjunction with 
each other.191 However, the precise role of national risk assessors in the 
European system is peculiar since national experts neither play a formally 
institutionalised role in EFSA’s expert panels, nor in its Management Board. 
EFSA has around 450 members of staff that mainly organise the scientific 
panels and working groups; it also has some scientific experts that help to 
prepare the scientific work of the panels. The core of its scientific work, 
however, is carried out by ‘independent experts’, rather than expert 
representatives from national risk assessors.192 The peculiar nature of 
national authorities in the EFSA context is amplified since –contrary to 
many other EU agencies– the board presiding over EFSA’s actions is not 
composed of national representatives either. Rather, it consists of 14 
members chosen for their competence and relevant expertise, whereby the 
aim is to achieve a broad “geographic distribution”.193  Four of these 
members should either represent consumers or “other interest” in the 
sector and an additional member is representing the Commission.194 The 
                                                 
187 EFSA is responsible for ‘risk assessment’, which is institutionally separated from ‘risk 
management’ in the EU. This distinction originated at the US National Research Council (see NRC, 
1983). This principle was then incorporated in to Codex Alimentarius principles (for example, see 
FAO, 2010).  
188 Art.22(2), also see Art.29, and Art.31, Art.33 and Art.34, Regulation 178/2002 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and 
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety. 
189 Ibid., Art.22(6), Art.23(a). 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid., Art.22(8). 
192 Ibid., Art.28(4). 
193 Ibid., Art.25(1), Recital 41. 
194 Ibid., Art.25(1). 
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Management Board is responsible for the overall steering of the 
organisation in conjunction with the agency’s Executive Director.195  
Rather than being directly involved in the steering of the agency or 
its scientific work, representatives from national authorities come together 
in the so-called ‘Advisory Forum’, where they have the task to generate 
knowledge that can support EFSA in its scientific work.196 Other than 
advising the Executive Director of the agency, its main purpose is to support 
EFSA in its formulation of scientific advice by establishing a forum of 
exchange between national risk assessors that pools expertise.197 In this 
regard, then, EFSA is peculiar in its set-up in comparison to other EU 
regulatory bodies: National representatives do not directly comprise its 
scientific panels, as a result of which they could keep their engagement with 
the transnational process to a minimum. This renders this case an excellent 
opportunity to study why national authorities engage with coordination 
since their formal responsibility to do so is limited. If, however, they are 
found to engage extensively in order to support EFSA in its scientific work, 
we can expect that they perceive the coordination process ensuing from a 
knowledge generation task to add value to their own work. As put forward 
in Chapters 1 and 2, the institutional framework provided by a knowledge 
generation task sets up horizontal relationships between national 
authorities –as well as between EFSA and national authorities– that are 
focused on finding agreement, rather than causing contention: None of the 
involved regulatory actors have to worry about locking in their practices by 
engaging in the transnational generation of knowledge. In this regard, we 
can expect that information about each other’s practices and the modifying 
of behaviour functions through mutual exchange and adjustment in the case 
of a knowledge generation task.  
  In turn, the EU body responsible for the inspections and control of 
food safety legislation (i.e. ‘risk management’) –the Food and Veterinary 
Office (FVO) – did not become ‘agencified’ as a result of the BSE crisis. 
Instead, its mandate was extended considerably. The Commission’s White 
                                                 
195 Ibid., Art.25 and 26. 
196 Ibid., Art.27(1). 
197 Ibid., Art.27(3) and (4), Recital 44. 
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Paper stressed the view that there was a “lack of [a] harmonised Community 
approach to the design and development of national control systems” 
(European Commission, 2000, p.29f). Hence, the FVO’s mandate became 
more far-reaching, thus being entrusted with carrying out detailed audits of 
Member State authorities’ control practices. The office remained part of the 
Commission but was moved to Grange (County Meath, Ireland) in 2002 in 
order to emphasise its special status within the Commission. Overall, then, 
the FVO’s task is to inspect whether EU food safety law is adhered to on the 
ground in EU countries and in Third Countries exporting food to the EU.198 
Whereas this was initially carried out by inspecting food businesses, there 
has been a gradual shift towards inspecting and auditing control practices of 
national control authorities instead. The emphasis shifted to verifying 
whether national control authorities carry out their tasks in line with EU 
requirements in the late 1990s (FVO, 1999, p.3f), when the FVO was 
restructured in the aftermath of the BSE crisis (FVO, 1999b). With the 
adoption of Regulation 882/2004, in turn, this trend has been reinforced 
towards audits of national control systems (also see FVO, 2004).199 FVO 
audits in Member States now assess whether their control system adheres 
to EU norms, whereby food businesses are only visited in order to observe 
control officials during their work, rather than inspecting the businesses as 
such. In this vein, it is seen to be the responsibility of Member States to 
ascertain themselves through internal audits that their control system 
meets EU requirements, which they need to present to the Commission is 
so-called Multi-Annual National Control Plans (MANCP).200 The FVO’s 
                                                 
198 Art.45 and Art.46, Regulation No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food 
law, animal health and animal welfare rules. 
199 Please note that at the time of writing (February 2014), a reform proposal of Regulation 882/2004 
is being discussed (see Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council on official controls and other official activities performed to ensure the application of food 
and feed law, rules on animal health and welfare, plant health, plant reproductive material, plant 
protection products and amending Regulations (EC) No 999/2001, 1829/2003, 1831/2003, 1/2005, 
396/2005, 834/2007, 1099/2009, 1069/2009, 1107/2009, Regulations (EU) No 1151/2012, [….], 
and Directives 98/58/EC, 1999/74/EC, 2007/43/EC, 2008/119/EC, 2008/120/EC and 
2009/128/EC)). By tying various sectoral Regulations and Directives and Regulation 882/2004 into 
one piece of legislation, it is primarily concerned with a change to the manner in which official 
controls are financed, which has so far been under discretion of Member States. The proposal foresees 
that Member States should fully recover these costs. It also foresees the harmonisation of import 
controls across the plant, animal, feed and food areas.   
200 Art.46, Regulation 882/2004. 
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inspection task provides an institutional framework that structures a 
vertical relationship between the FVO and national authorities. The role of 
the FVO in the coordination process is to act as overseer, whilst authorities 
in the Member States play a role of potential wrong-doers who bear the 
burden of proof of presenting their compliance to the FVO. This bears the 
potential for contention to arise between the FVO and national authorities, 
for example, in cases of disagreement whether particular practices are 
compliant or not. In such a hierarchical form of coordination, the FVO is the 
main vehicle of information-gathering and behaviour-modification in the 
coordination process. In order to accept this hierarchical coordination 
process despite the potentially contentious nature of the relationship 
established between the FVO and national authorities, the latter must 
perceive the FVO audit process to add value to their own work in the 
context of the social relations they are embedded in. 
 
 
 
5.2 Uncovering the Coordinative Behaviour of Food Risk 
Assessors 
Formally, EFSA does not have wide-ranging structures to coordinate the 
work of national risk assessors. We might thus expect that in practice risk 
assessors do not engage in extensive coordination of their scientific work. If 
they are to engage proactively in EFSA’s work, we can expect that they 
perceive the knowledge generation task they hold in EFSA to add value to 
their own work in the specific context of social relations they are embedded 
in (Section 5.2.1). In turn, if national risk assessors indeed engage heavily in 
the coordination of their work in EFSA although they are not formally 
required to do so, this holds potential for contention on part of national risk 
assessors if they feel that their contribution to EFSA’s work is not formally 
recognised (see Section 5.2.2).  
 
  
                                                                                                                                    
Based on its experience of practices ‘on the ground’ in Member States, the FVO was charged with the 
development of the guidelines for the MANCP (FVO, 2006, p.24), whilst, however, the Commission is 
now in charge of evaluating these reports. 
5. Food Safety   
 
130 
 
5.2.1 Coordination based on Mutual Exchange as a Mechanism for 
Maintaining Reputation  
EFSA has a legal mandate to develop network and cooperation structures 
with national authorities and scientific organisations that work within its 
remit: 
  
The Authority should cooperate closely with competent bodies in 
the Member States if it is to operate effectively. An Advisory Forum 
should be created in order to advise the Executive Director, to 
constitute a mechanism of exchange of information, and to ensure 
close cooperation in particular with regard to the networking 
system. Cooperation and appropriate exchange of information 
should also minimise the potential for diverging scientific 
opinions.201 
 
In this regard, coordination between EFSA and national authorities was 
institutionalised through the Advisory Forum.202 Whilst national authorities 
do not have an official role in carrying out EFSA’s work through expert 
representatives as found in other EU agencies (such as in drug safety 
monitoring, see Chapter 3), EFSA and its Advisory Forum were envisaged as 
coordinative bodies that bring national authorities together to generate 
knowledge.203 However, the Advisory Forum consists of high level officials 
(usually the directors of national risk assessors and EFSA) and merely meets 
four to six times a year, which does not allow for the generation of 
knowledge in fields of highly specialised expertise. The organisational 
structures of developing a network of risk assessors at the operational level 
that would indeed be able to generate knowledge were left largely 
undefined in the formal set-up of the regime. To what extent such structures 
were to be developed was thus highly dependent on EFSA’s and national 
risk assessors’ initiative and willingness to engage in the transnational 
generation of knowledge. 
Indeed, in practice extensive structures through which national risk 
assessors and EFSA coordinate their scientific output and pool their 
                                                 
201 Recital (44), Regulation 178/2002. Also see Recitals (40) and (51). For legal mandate see 
Art.22(7), Art.27(4) (on the Advisory Forum’s role), Art.32(1), Art.36, and Art.40(4).   
202 Ibid., Art.27. 
203 Other than merely being expressed in EFSA’s founding regulation, the Commission also clearly had 
this expectation of EFSA. This is, for example, very clearly expressed in a speech by then European 
Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection David Byrne in 2006 (see speech entitled ‘EFSA: 
Excellence, integrity and openness’, Brussels, 18.September 2002). 
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expertise have developed. This process was formally initiated by EFSA and 
national risk assessors through the Strategy for Cooperation and 
Networking, which was formulated by the Advisory Forum and then adopted 
by EFSA’s Management Board in 2006. It is based on the premise that EFSA 
and national authorities have the task to develop scientific opinions “which 
are recognized as truly authoritative both within the EU and in the wider 
international arena” under resource constraints which can be counteracted 
through transnational cooperation (EFSA, 2006d, p.2).  
Intricate tools for networking and cooperation have thus developed: 
National authorities have started to establish new links and institutional 
relations in order to share resources and expertise. Whilst they continue to 
do so on an ad hoc basis in the Advisory Forum, the more formalised ESCO 
projects (‘scientific cooperation projects’) are carried out by national 
experts as chosen by the Advisory Board, members of EFSA’s scientific 
panels and EFSA’s scientific staff in order to generate new knowledge. 
Moreover, ‘scientific networks’ –which are chaired by EFSA– enable EFSA 
and national risk assessors to make use of expertise available in relevant 
specialist bodies in other Member States (and beyond since networks can 
invite experts from outside the EU to participate). They act to collect and 
exchange scientific data and information, share risk assessment practices, 
and to contribute to the coordination of risk assessment practices.204 
Another tool to exchange information on a wider range of issues is the 
Information Exchange Platform, which started operating in 2008: EFSA and 
national risk assessors can upload notifications that they have started 
working on a particular risk assessment, final risk assessments, national 
work plans and country profiles onto this platform in order to make sure 
that they all have easy access to each other’s work (see EFSA, 2012b).  
Overall, then, EFSA and national risk assessors have developed extensive 
structures to coordinate their work and to generate knowledge on a 
transnational basis on the basis of a relatively loose formal framework 
envisaging them to do so (also see Ernst and Young, 2012). 
                                                 
204 See EFSA’s Decision concerning the establishment and operation of European Networks of 
scientific organisations operating in the fields within the Authority’s mission.  
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In order to manage these manifold coordination activities  ‘Focal 
Points’ were introduced in 2008: These are individuals or units in national 
authorities which ensure the practical implementation of the above 
described activities. The Focal Point network is also used for disseminating 
requests for assistance, which can, for example, be requests for data on a 
specific issue, such as animal cloning (155 such request were made by EFSA 
and national risk assessors in 2012,), and the dissemination information 
(for example, about scientific conferences) (EFSA, 2012c, p.6).205 Whilst 
these mechanisms are particularly useful for counter acting resource 
restraints (such as information deficits) and for avoiding duplication of 
work, the Focal Point network was also created in order to prevent public 
disagreement over scientific output. 
 
Experience shows that scientific advice can vary occasionally. In 
order to address divergences, actions need to be taken at an early 
stage. To support the efforts made by the Advisory Forum in the 
past, the identification of divergences were included in the Focal 
Point Agreements. […] Being vigilant is a precondition for 
identifying diverging views between and among Member States and 
EFSA. Parties involved will discuss any divergences, looking for a 
possible solution in good time (EFSA, 2008f, p. 10). 
 
In this regard, circulation of information via the Focal Point Network –and 
the other identified coordination mechanisms– can be used for the 
identification of potential scientific divergences whereby all authorities can 
screen each other’s scientific outputs for potential divergences.  
An additional strategy to mitigating the occurrence of divergent 
opinions is avoiding these altogether as much as possible by harmonising 
risk assessment methods “to establish a common approach of risk 
assessments throughout Europe in order to reinforce both the credibility and 
coherence of scientific opinions […]. This strategy will help build greater 
confidence in the advice available to the European Commission, Member 
States and food businesses […]” (EFSA, 2006d, p.4, emphasis added). 
Credibility and the absence of diverging scientific opinions thus seem to be 
intimately linked in the view of risk assessors. This, in turn, is linked to the 
                                                 
205 Details on all requests for information and assistance (etc.) can be found in the annual Focal Point 
Activities Reports. 
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(perceived) need to build confidence in the output produced by risk 
assessors. Since risk assessors would like to avoid countering individual 
scientific opinions, there might be a perceived need to raise standards to an 
all-around high level in order to avoid disagreements (ESCO, 2008, p.32). 
Knowledge generation is thus used as tool to prevent diverging 
scientific opinions, which might be detrimental to the maintenance of public 
trust in the science provided by risk assessors. Risk assessors, in turn, 
perceive their support of EFSA in its responsibility provides scientific advice 
to add value to their work by helping them to maintain trust in the 
authoritative nature of their scientific outputs. This can explain the puzzle 
why high capacity authorities like the FSA and the BfR engage so actively in 
‘volunteering’ their expertise to another research body, thus potentially 
loosing credit for their work: The standing of their organisations in the 
social relations they are embedded in depends on the recognition that they 
are able to produce ‘sound science’. In the context of the social relations 
they are embedded in, risk assessors perceive it to be  mutually beneficial to 
act as united ‘scientific front’ since frequent disagreements between them 
could be interpreted as the inability of science (and hence risk assessors) to 
provide risk managers with the authoritative answers to questions of risk 
and safety. 
The underlying idea to prevent scientific disagreement is present in 
EFSA’s founding regulation, which states that the agency “shall exercise 
vigilance” in order to identify diverging scientific opinions at an early 
stage.206 It then needs to seek direct contact and deliberation with the body 
that is in disagreement.207 The product of this process should be a joint 
statement to be delivered to the Commission –and made public– that 
clarifies the scientific uncertainties underlying the disagreement.208 This 
formal procedure, however, is rarely used (for an example of its usage, see 
EFSA, 2012c). Usually, EFSA and national authorities prefer to make use of 
the manifold coordination structures developed in the aftermath of the 
adoption of the Strategy for Cooperation and Networking  to solve 
                                                 
206 Art.30(1), Regulation 178/2002. 
207 Ibid., Art.30(2). 
208 Ibid., Art.30(4). 
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divergences –if possible– at an early stage and at a more informal level than 
the formal procedure allows for in order to then communicate a clear 
scientific message to risk managers.  
At least on an informal level, then, a key aim of engaging proactively 
in the coordination of their scientific work is not only to counteract resource 
constraints, but also to resolve scientific divergences across national 
authorities and/or EFSA before scientific opinions (or other advice) are 
adopted  in order to maintain the scientific credibility of risk assessors 
(EFSA, 2012d, p.6f): Although diverging interpretations of scientific data are 
to be expected under conditions of uncertainty, risk assessors aim to resolve 
these –if possible– before publication of scientific opinions in order to 
maintain the confidence in risk assessors’ ability to assess risk accurately. 
National authorities are hence keen to share  their projects and results with 
each other not only to make efficient use of resources and to exchange 
information per se, but also to ensure that everyone is ‘on-board’ with their 
opinion in order to prevent public disagreement about their scientific 
output. The aim to prevent divergences could, for example, clearly be seen 
in the BfR’s opinion of isoflavones,209 which it send to EFSA in order to 
achieve Europe-wide agreement on the issue as quickly as possible (EFSA, 
2008d, p.11).  
In this regard, risk assessors are aware that divergences might be 
picked up and miscommunicated by the media: Divergences were present in 
cases of Bisphenol A and ethyl lauroyl arginate (ELA) as pointed out by the 
Norwegian risk assessor in the Advisory Forum.210 The BfR commented on 
this by way of confirming that these are common results of scientific 
uncertainty but that risk assessors needed to be aware that they can 
                                                 
209 Isoflavones are a class of plant substances, which often occur naturally in foodstuffs. For example, 
they occur in high concentrations in soybeans. Some scientific studies point out beneficial effects of 
these substances (such as a reduction in breast cancer). At the same time, there is evidence that they 
can have detrimental effects for people with particular conditions, such as a thyroid dysfunction. 
210 ELA is used as a food preservative. Bisphenol A –a chemical used in food packaging- continues to 
be one of the most contentious issue surrounding food safety, thus frequently being picked up in 
media reports: After decades of use of Bisphenol A in baby bottles (etc.) concerns were raised about 
its neural and behavioural effects, as a result of which it is now banned for use in infant feeding 
bottles due to the remaining uncertainties of the effects of Bisphenol A on human health and the fact 
that young infants had the greatest exposure to this chemical present in their feeding bottles (see 
Commission Directive 2011/8/EU of 28 January 2011 amending Directive 2002/72/EC as regards the 
restriction of use of Bisphenol A in plastic infant feeding bottles). 
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provoke criticism in the media (EFSA, 2009b, p.8). EFSA thus attempts to 
communicate with national risk assessors during the process of writing 
scientific opinions in order to avoid divergences after publication (ibid.), 
especially in cases where such a divergence could have been avoided with 
ease: Cooperation provides the opportunity to “make effective use of 
synergies, benefit from the European pool of expertise and avoid duplication 
of work and unnecessary divergence of opinion”.211 Moreover, bilateral 
meetings between EFSA and a given national risk assessor take place before 
publication in areas were opinions might be diverging (EFSA, 2008e, p.20). 
In this regard, then, risk assessors are acutely aware of the perception of 
their work in the public sphere: Criticism by the media or other public and 
political actors has the potential of undermining the credibility of risk 
assessors by questioning the extent to which they are indeed able to 
produce ‘sound science’. In this vein, the maintenance of the scientific 
reputation is also seen as question of how to communicate uncertainties to 
risk managers and the public by risk assessors (EFSA, 2009b, p.8).212  
In order to understand this coordination pattern of mutual exchange 
and adjustment, it is crucial to consider that EFSA and national risk 
assessors are embedded in social relations in which they have been under 
enormous pressure –from NGOs, the media and the European Parliament– 
in relation to the value of their scientific output: It is often criticised of being 
influenced by industry interests. In this context, diverging scientific opinions 
can potentially fuel controversies as to whether they differ as a result of 
influence by particular interests.  
 
No matter if it is about the chemical Bisphenol A (BPA), meat from 
cloned animals or the authorisation of GMOs, the Parma-based 
EFSA rarely has concerns. So far it has regularly decided in favour 
of the industry, for example when it increased the safety limit for 
BPA whilst other countries prohibited it.213 
 
                                                 
211 Speech by Catherine Geslain-Lanéelle, then Executive Director of EFSA, entitled ‘Food Safety in 
Europe: Progress through Cooperation’, Oslo, 12.June 2008.  
212 Also pointed out by interviewee F1. 
213 Rögener, W. (2010, 2 December 2010). EU-Lebensmittelsicherheit: Der lange Arm des Geldes. 
Süddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved on 23 March 2014, from http://sz.de/1.1030889. 
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‘Inconsistencies’ or frequent changes of scientific opinions are thus picked 
up in the media, such as in this example from the German press: “Safety 
limit up, safety limit down: The manner in which regulatory authorities are 
handling the controversial chemical Bisphenol A is unlikely to increase 
consumer confidence”.214 EFSA and national risk assessors view it as crucial 
to prevent such undermining of their scientific authority through their 
coordinative efforts.  
 
To build a bridge between science and consumers it is important to 
know the consumer and to be aware of and to understand the 
public perception of risk […]. We know how important it is to speak 
with one voice, as a result of which we go to great lengths to ensure 
that statements about risk assessment are commonly agreed upon 
and harmonised.215   
 
Unless the scientific basis for EU food law is trusted, from an 
untainted and reliable source, free from undue sectoral or political 
interests, it cannot help risk managers build confidence.216  
 
NGOs and the European Parliament have been particularly forceful in their 
sustained critique of EFSA in relation to its independence from the industry 
(for example, see CEO, 2013; Friends of the Earth, 2004; also see Chalmers, 
2005).217 As national experts play a crucial role in EFSA’s scientific work, 
this critique in essence touches upon the practices of risk assessors at large, 
whilst also amplifying EFSA’s attempts to ensure confidence in its scientific 
authority through scientific coordination. Moreover, the relationship 
between the Commission has been fraught with tensions as a result of 
EFSA’s wish to establish its scientific authority as clear dividing line to the 
Commission’s sphere of authority, whilst also acting as partner of the 
Commission (Groenleer, 2009, p.183ff). The maintenance of scientific 
                                                 
214 Rögener, W. (2014, 21 February). Grenzwerte von Bisphenol A: Schwenk mit Symbolwert. 
Süddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved on 23 March 2014, from http://sz.de/1.1894674. 
215 Statement by Catherine Geslain-Lanéelle, then Executive Director of EFSA (BfR, 2012, p.7). 
Translated by the author, original in German: “Um eine Brücke zwischen Wissenschaft und 
Verbraucher zu schlagen, ist es wichtig, den Verbraucher und die öffentliche Risikowahrnehmung zu 
kennen und zu verstehen […]. Wir wissen, wie wichtig es ist, mit einer Stimme zu sprechen; deshalb 
werden alle Anstrengungen unternommen, Aussagen zur Risikobewertung abzustimmen und zu 
vereinheitlichen.” 
216 Speech by Catherine Geslain-Lanéelle, then Executive Director of EFSA, entitled ‘Joining forces for 
safer food in Europe: the food safety system in the EU’, Lisbon, 19.September 2007. 
217 As a result of this concern, the European Parliament delayed its approval of EFSA’s past 
expenditure for the year 2010. The European Medicines Agency and the European Environment 
Agency was also subjected to this process by the Parliament. Similarly, the Court of Auditors has 
criticised the presence of conflicts-of-interest of experts in four EU agencies, including EFSA (see 
European Court of Auditors, 2012). 
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authority which EFSA and national risk assessors wish to achieve thus 
needs to be understood in the context of their existence in social relations 
that represent an antagonistic environment. In order to fulfil the (perceived) 
need to maintain public trust –and their scientific reputation– mutual 
exchange and adjustment of scientific output is strategically important for 
EFSA and national authorities as this can mitigate the occurrence of public 
disagreement over scientific outputs.218  
 
This part of the chapter shows that the knowledge generation task of 
national authorities and EFSA shapes a coordination pattern of mutual 
exchange and adjustment: National authorities and EFSA exchange 
information about their scientific work and adjust their output in order to 
avoid the public voicing of diverging scientific opinions wherever possible. 
The British and German authorities engage heavily with this transnational 
task, despite a fairly limited formal responsibility to do so. They do so 
because they perceive the transnational knowledge generation task to add 
value to their own work in the context of the social relations they are 
embedded in: They carry out their work in an antagonistic environment, in 
which the authority of their scientific outputs is frequently questioned. In 
this context they perceive their engagement with the transnational 
coordination process to help them to maintain confidence in their work 
through the avoidance of diverging scientific opinions.  
 
 
5.2.2 Contestation despite Mutual Exchange and Adjustment 
In order to maintain public trust in their work –and thus their scientific 
reputation– national risk assessors engage in transnational knowledge 
generation in EFSA. By their very nature, however, group processes tend to 
undermine the recognition of individual contributions. This might be 
perceived as particularly grave by members of the group that contribute 
most. Indeed, the BfR and its French counterpart –which both carry out in-
house research– contest the formal organisational set-up of scientific 
                                                 
218 See, for example, EFSA, 2003, p.2, 2006c. 
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coordination in EFSA since the contributions of national risk assessors are 
not formally recognised. The mismatch between EFSA’s formal ‘light-weight’ 
incorporation of national risk assessors in its work and the realities of the 
active engagement of national risk assessors in these processes has an 
impact on the acceptance of the EFSA system among national risk assessors 
that contribute most in terms of primary research. Whilst coordination is 
necessary for maintaining their reputation, they would prefer a system 
which provides formal recognition for the immense input of their 
authorities to the transnational system. Coordination in EFSA thus results in 
a paradox for high-capacity research intensive authorities since in their 
perception they need to coordinate to maintain public trust, whilst also 
needing to maintain the reputation of their own scientific output.  
The BfR has questioned which benefits national authorities derive 
from sharing their expertise with EFSA (EFSA, 2008b, p.7; 2008c, p.8 and 
10). This has gone hand-in-hand with the complaint that national experts 
are taken away from their daily work to do EFSA’s work instead, whilst also 
reporting a lack of resources provided to Focal Points by EFSA (EFSA 2008b; 
2008d, p.9). The German risk assessor has also noted that EFSA is too busy 
with fulfilling Commission requests to take into account the priorities of 
national authorities in its work (EFSA, 2008d, p.4f). Similarly, the French 
authority has argued that EFSA should not just “take advantage of national 
competencies” (EFSA, 2008d, p.4) and thus wants networked cooperation to 
be more formalised in order to provide for adequate recognition of the work 
of national officials.  
In this regard, the BfR has suggested reforming EFSA into a 
rapporteur system akin to the institutional set-up of the European 
Medicines Agency, especially since in practice more than half of EFSA’s 
panel scientists are staff of national authorities (EFSA, 2009a; 2009b, p.9; 
also see EFSA, 2004a, p.4).  In the eyes of the French and German authorities 
this would avoid duplication of work, whilst also providing for a recognised 
contribution of national officials.  Other authorities –such as Ireland, 
Belgium and Sweden– on the other hand have disagreed vehemently with 
this view as a rapporteur system would be too resource intensive for small 
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authorities (ibid.). Arguably, smaller authorities fear the dominance of 
larger countries in a rapporteur system.  
The mismatch between the formally limited contribution of national 
risk assessors and their large-scale involvement in practice is hence not 
easily accepted by authorities with the highest scientific capacities: EFSA’s 
scientific work is not formally carried out by national representatives, but 
by ‘independent experts’. In practice, however, the majority of ‘independent 
experts’ are officials from national risk assessors. Moreover, EFSA’s work 
would not be possible without the extensive input national risk assessors 
provide through their knowledge generation in the forum of EFSA. 
Yet, the contestation on part of the French and German authorities is 
merely an articulation of dissent: The organisational set-up of EFSA cannot 
be changed by national risk assessors and even if risk assessors views were 
equivalent to national governments views on the matter, it is doubtful that 
France and Germany could rally enough support for such a radical reform of 
the system, which was designed to avoid the ‘biases’ of national officials. 
Their dissent demonstrates, however, that formal organisational solutions 
for coordination (i.e. the lack of national representatives in EFSA’s expert 
bodies) can be at odds with the form of coordination that has been shaped 
by a particular task (i.e. knowledge generation), and social relations (i.e. the 
antagonistic environment risk assessors are embedded in).  
 
This part of the chapter points out that coordinative behaviour of regulatory 
actors that is primarily characterised by the seeking of agreement can still 
bear contestation if national authorities feel that their input into the work of 
an EU body (that is shaped by their task and informed by their social 
relations) is not recognised in formal coordination structures. 
 
 
 
5.3 The Coordinative Behaviour of Food Control Authorities 
The FVO audit process was established to coordinate food control practices 
across Member States. The formal organisational set-up of this audit process 
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–which has the Commission’s enforcement actions attached to it– leads us to 
expect a hierarchical form of coordination in practice.219 If national 
authorities are to accept such a hierarchical form of coordination, they 
arguably need to perceive to be ‘getting something out of it’ (for findings in 
this regard, see Section 5.3.1).  At the same time, the FVO inspection process 
is increasingly being complemented by horizontal coordination processes 
that provide national authorities with access to the expertise of their 
colleagues across all Member States. We can hence expect that that national 
authorities also take these processes into account when assessing the 
‘added value’ of the work of the FVO for their own work (see Section 5.3.2).  
 
 
5.3.1 A Hierarchical Coordination Pattern 
The FVO has the task to inspect national authorities and the Commission can 
make use of FVO reports when significant deficiencies are noted to enforce 
EU legislation in the Court of Justice. Moreover, the Commission evaluates 
national control systems in relation to EU law.220 In this regard, it makes use 
of a wide array of sources to portray the functioning of national control 
activities, including the so-called Multi-Annual National Control Plans 
(MANCP reports) that national authorities have to submit to the 
Commission, FVO inspection reports and discussions in the Standing 
Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health (SCFCAH) (European 
Commission, 2012). In comparison to many other EU policy areas, then, the 
Commission possesses an extraordinarily detailed picture of application of 
EU law on the ground. It can use this knowledge not only to initiate 
infringement proceedings, but also to impose trade restrictions when the 
FVO finds grave shortcomings in the application of EU standards in third 
countries.221 In light of the task of the FVO, then, we could expect to find a 
form of coordination that is heavily dominated by the FVO’s and the 
Commission’s conception of ‘how things should be done’.  
                                                 
219 ‘Hierarchy‘ is here not used in the sense of strict command-and-control. Rather, it refers to a 
process in which the Commission can make use of detailed knowledge of national practices to enforce 
EU legislation in court. Please refer to Chapter1 1 for further discussion of this issue. 
220 Art.44, Regulation 882/2004. 
221 Ibid., Art.56. Also see Art.53 of Regulation 178/2002. 
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We could expect inspections which are tightly linked to enforcement 
action by the Commission to provoke resistance amongst national officials. 
Instead, however, national authorities use FVO audits to increase control 
over their own territory. Despite the differing formal set-up of control 
systems in Germany and the UK, authorities use FVO audits in a similar 
manner in the context of the social relations of a decentralised 
administrative system which they have the responsibility to oversee. 
Whereas FVO inspections were reportedly dreaded by control authorities in 
the Member States in the past, this has become much less pronounced in 
recent years: Largely, authorities in the UK and Germany find FVO 
recommendations helpful as a means to improve the functioning of their 
control systems since it provides them with an expertise they do not have, 
thereby enabling them to increase control over their own territory. The 
emphasis placed on control systems –rather than the inspection of food 
businesses– has rendered this change possible.222 National authorities 
hence continuously re-evaluate the engagement with transnational 
processes while being involved in them. 
In comparison to the other EU regulatory bodies studied in this 
thesis, the FVO does not formally act as a hub of a transgovernmental 
network of national officials. Whilst it interacts directly with control 
authorities in all Member States, it is not designed to provide a forum for 
direct interaction between these national authorities. In this regard, then, 
the FVO’s and the Commission’s interpretation (and enforcement) of EU 
legislation –rather than group processes involving national officials– can be 
expected to be used as main motor for the coordination of regulatory 
practices: FVO missions are clearly targeted at the assessment of 
compliance, rather than the provision of advice to national officials (Lodge 
and Wegrich, 2011, p.96).223 A FVO official expressed this by saying that 
“after all, we are not a consulting body”.224  
The rather hierarchically structured audit process is organized as 
follows. Member States are informed about the upcoming inspections of the 
                                                 
222 As introduced in Regualtion 882/2004. 
223 Also see wording of Art.45(1), Regulation 882/2004. 
224 Interviewee F10.  
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next year in November of each year. Two to three months before the audit, 
the FVO then sends the FVO contact point (the FSA in the UK and the BVL in 
Germany) in the given Member State a pre-audit questionnaire on the 
implementation of certain pieces of legislation and also provides them with 
contact details of the lead auditor and their audit plan. Based on the 
information received in this questionnaire, the FVO informs the contact 
point which type of competent authorities they would like to visit (usually 
two; for example, in relation to the UK, the FVO might want to visit on 
authority in Wales and one in England). The FSA or the BVL then decide 
which local authorities or Länder to visit (unless the audit is due to an alert 
having been raised about a particular premise or authority). The local 
authorities or the Länder usually devise a list of premises that could be 
visited and on the day it is decided which businesses are going to be visited 
(for example, often inspections in a small and a large business will be 
accompanied by the FVO).   
The audit begins by an introductory meeting at the FSA or the BMEL, 
which the other authorities to be visited also attend. Then the audit 
continues in a specific local authority or Land with another introductory 
meeting in which this authority presents its control system to the FVO team. 
After this, several businesses are visited, whereby the FVO team observe the 
officials of the competent authorities carrying out a control.  After having 
visited the foreseen local authorities or Länder a closing meeting is held at 
the premises of the FSA or the BMEL respectively. These final meetings have 
a formal character in which the FVO presents its findings, rather than 
engaging in deliberative exchange of views with the visited control 
authorities. In large countries like the UK or Germany, this FVO audit 
process in general takes 10 days to two weeks. The FVO then submits a draft 
report of the visit on which the competent authorities can comment, whilst 
also needing to submit an action plan on how to remedy the identified 
shortcomings. The draft report has been put together after potential 
consultation with the Commission’s legal service if necessary and is hence 
not as such ‘up for discussion’. Overall, then, FVO missions serve to assess 
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and to achieve compliance with EU legislations, thus formally being of a 
hierarchical nature.  
Despite the formally hierarchical nature of coordination in this field, 
UK and German authorities do not contest FVO audits. Rather, they perceive 
them to be helpful to their own work by enabling them to increase the 
control over their own territory. In Germany, the role of FVO audits has 
helped to create a role for the BVL which the Länder perceive to be helpful 
in comparison to having been ‘left alone’ to cope with FVO audits in the past. 
Moreover, in recent years Länder authorities have also started to coordinate 
their actions extensively as a response to the work of the FVO, which the 
federal level and the Länder see as beneficial in identifying and remedying 
shortcomings in official controls. After the BVL’s inception, German Länder 
authorities were at first “suspicious”225 about the role played by this new 
body in coordinating FVO audits. Since the implementation of food controls 
rests firmly in the hands of the Länder it remained to be seen whether this 
federal institution would be able to carve out a role for itself in this realm 
without causing struggles over competence between the federal and the 
Länder level. By now, the Länder find the BVL’s assistance in the 
organisation of FVO audits very helpful, not least since they arrange the 
administration of these visits (such as providing a car for the FVO team and 
booking their hotels). 
 
The BVL is like a bundling body. [...] It reduces our workload, I 
would say. [...] We perceive this to be a supporting hand. They 
gather all the relevant information from the Länder and compare 
them against each other, that is especially important when the 
action plan for the implementation of the recommendations is 
concerned.226  
 
 
FVO audits have thus ‘interfered’ in the relationships between federal and 
Länder level actors in a positive manner, which can partly account for the 
change from ‘dreading’ FVO audits to appreciating these as helpful on part 
                                                 
225 As expressed by interviewees. 
226 Interviewee F8. Original in German: ”Das BVL is wie ein Bündler. [...] Das BVL nimmt uns Arbeit ab, 
sag ich mich mal. [...] Wir empfinden das BVL als Hilfestellung. Sie führen für uns die Informationen 
von den Bundesländern zusammen und gleichen sie untereinander ab; das ist ganz besonders 
bedeutsam wenn es nachher um den Maßnahmeplan zur Umstezung der Empfehlungen geht.” 
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of the Länder. In this sense Germany’s federal system is now seen to be 
working extremely well in relation to FVO audits, which was not the case 
before the BVL was established and built a working coordinating role for 
itself.227 In this sense, coordination between Länder has also intensified as a 
means to follow-up on FVO recommendations. These are addressed to 
Germany as a country, although they are based on observations in (usually) 
two Länder. In the relevant working groups of the consortium of the Länder 
for consumer protection (‘Länderarbeitsgemeinschaft Verbraucherschutz’, 
LAV), Länder now discuss how to change practices across the whole country 
to bring them into line with FVO recommendations.   
           
That has really improved, the coordinating working groups of the 
Länder are very good, they really disperse the results of an audit in 
the whole country, so that everyone knows what’s going well or 
what isn’t going so well.228 
 
In this regard, the FVO process has also started to pull the Länder together 
in areas in which no agreement on practices could be found amongst them 
before, for example, in the case of mechanically separated meat: Clearly set 
out recommendations of the FVO audit report prompted agreement on 
shared guidelines on practices.229 
In case of the UK, FVO audits do not interfere in similarly complex 
federal structures. However, they also provide an opportunity for the FSA to 
increase control over its territory since they have an impact on the 
relationship between the FSA and local authorities: FVO audits give the FSA 
an additional tool to coax local authorities into compliance. For example, the 
FSA communicates to local authorities that any severe shortcomings found 
in a given Council during an FVO audit could adversely affect the entire UK 
as they could undermine consumer confidence in UK products.230 The FSA 
has also used negative FVO audit reports to justify the need for action to the 
industry. For example, as the then Chief Executive of the FSA Tim Smith put 
it to the UK dairy industry: 
                                                 
227 Interviewee F10. 
228 Ibid.. 
229 Interviewees F8 and F10. This happened in the working group on meat and poultry hygiene 
(’Fleisch- und Geflügelfleischhygiene und fachspezifische Fragen von Lebensmitteln tierischer 
Herkunft, AFFL’). 
230 Interviewee F13. 
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Although the last FVO mission in September 2007 found no serious 
shortcomings, they will be coming back in 2009. Our house needs to be in 
order. We need to impress them and secure a clean bill of health. I think it’s 
fair to say that having been caught out once none of us wants a repeat. So 
let’s continue to work together to ensure we get it right.231 
 
Moreover, the FSA sees the FVO’s work as critical to maintain the reputation 
of food safety authorities in the context of interdependence: It has 
emphasised that it welcomes the ‘tough’ approach taken by the FVO, 
especially in order to safeguard the effectiveness of food controls in the new 
EU Member States (FSA, 2003, p.8). 
Overall, authorities in the UK and Germany have come to value FVO 
audits in a similar manner since they have induced better coordination 
within their country and can be used as a justification for action vis-à-vis the 
industry: Since the FVO provides them with additional expertise on how to 
run their control systems, the FVO audit processes provides overseeing 
control authorities to be in more effective command over their own 
territory. More crucially, UK and German authorities explicitly value the 
input provided by the FVO as a means to improve their practices. In other 
words, they do not perceive the FVO as a body that is mainly contributing to 
the enforcement of EU law. Rather, they view its recommendations to 
further safety by enhancing their practices. As one interviewee put it “it is as 
if you were getting management consultants in for free”.232 Another 
interviewee stated in this regard that “it is a bitter pill to swallow, but it 
needs to happen”.233 This, however, was not always the case: When the FVO 
was inspecting businesses –instead of national control systems– its 
recommendations were easily dismissed as being an unfair evaluation (i.e. 
what was found in individual businesses was not seen to evaluate the 
overall practices in place by other businesses and control authorities). After 
the shift to auditing control systems as a result of Regulation 882/2004 –
and several rounds of audits in each topic area– authorities in the Member 
States have come to see FVO recommendations as highlighting problems in 
                                                 
231 Speech by Tim Smith, then Chief Executive of the FSA, entitled ‘Is dairy fit for the 21st century 
diet?’ Delivered at the Dairy UK Conference, 16. September 2008. 
232 Interviewee F12. 
233 Interviewee F13. 
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their overall control system.234 They thus continuously re-assess the added 
value of these coordination processes whilst being engaged in them. As 
noted by a FVO official, “we often get the feedback that our comments are 
helpful. Because we see things with different eyes”.235 National officials 
share this view. 
 
In my experience, if something was criticised [by the FVO] it was 
usually justified. Even if one then normally tries to defend the 
system and to find excuses because usually it will have something 
to do with the complexity of the task and staffing issues... But one 
does know that they have struck a nerve.236  
 
Improving practices and demonstrating satisfactory results in FVO audits 
hereby also bears an external dimension: Third countries might ban imports 
of EU products on basis of FVO reports. As a result, all Member States have 
an interest in ‘looking good on paper’. 
In order to understand why national authorities are able to view the 
FVO’s recommendations in this manner, we need to consider that the 
European Commission is not a zealous enforcer in the field: This means that 
although the FVO provides ‘tough’ criticisms of national control systems it is 
the exception –rather than the rule– that the Commission makes use of this 
information to initiate infringement proceedings.  Usually, the Commission 
only makes use of this option in case of severe and lasting incompliance (i.e. 
which are not found to have been remedied by the FVO after successive 
rounds of audits in a particular field).237 In this regard, the FVO sees 
infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission as failure of its 
work.238 Moreover, national officials are also aware that the FVO’s work not 
only assesses their compliance but also highlights to the Commission where 
legislation needs to be clarified or is unfeasible for national authorities to 
                                                 
234 Interviewee F8. 
235 Interviewee F10. 
236 Interviewee F8. Original in German: “Wenn dann etwas kritisiert wurde, dann war das schon 
berechtigt. Auch wenn man dann nicht gleich in Sack und Asche geht und immer noch versucht sein 
System zu verteidigen und Ausreden zu finden, ist ja logisch…Weil meistens hängt es einfach mit der 
Komplexität der Aufgabe zusammen und personellen Dingen und Ähnlichem. Aber es ist dann schon 
so, dass man merkt, sie legen den Finger in die Wunde.“ This view was also expressed by interviewees 
F5, F6, F10, F11 and F12. 
237 See the Commission’s annual reports on national implementation of EU law in this regard. Largely, 
they show that only long-lasting cases of incompliance (often found in Greece in this policy area) 
result in infringement proceedings. 
238 Interviewee F6. 
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implement. Overall, the Commission is willing to consider simplifications in 
legislation if Member States display great difficulties to comply, for example, 
with reporting requirements (i.e. the MANCP) (European Commission, 
2009d, p.9). The character of the FVO’s work in being helpful for national 
authorities and the Commission alike is also demonstrated in its use of so-
called fact finding missions: These serve to, for example, observe and 
analyse problems that Member States are facing in their work without being 
linked to an audit and FVO recommendations, whereby the results are not 
published publicly.  
 
This section of the chapter has demonstrated that the inspection task of the 
FVO leads to a hierarchical form of coordination. British and German 
officials are willing to accept –and to engage with– the FVO audit process 
since they perceive it to add value to their work: FVO audits provide them 
with a tool to increase the oversight over the decentralised control systems 
in their countries. 
 
 
5.3.2 Horizontal Forms of Coordination in a Hierarchical System 
The formal set-up of FVO audits leads us to expect that the coordination 
process in food controls is only based on vertical exchanges between the 
FVO and national officials. However, in practice the control arm of the 
regime has developed a more transgovernmental nature which tries to 
promote mutual exchange and learning as a form of coordination in recent 
years. In this respect, the FVO has increasingly put an emphasis on 
mediating the horizontal exchange of practices between national authorities 
through the increased use of tools such as ‘Overview Reports’ and fact 
finding missions. Moreover, this is especially visible in the manner in which 
the Commission (and subsequently the Executive Agency for Health and 
Consumers) has structured the ‘Better Training for Safer Food’ programme, 
which results from the Commission’s responsibility to establish a training 
programme for national control officers under Regulation 882/2004. Whilst 
the Commission hereby essentially continues to mediate the establishment 
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of transgovernmental ties and the identification and dissemination of best 
practices, it is not focused on hierarchical enforcement as only mechanism 
to coordinate practices across Member States. As a result, the system has 
started to foster a hitherto non-existent professional community of food 
control officials. This, in turn, is seen as an added value for the improvement 
of their own practices by British and German. This adds to their positive 
perception of the value of coordination activities that are orchestrated by 
EU bodies (i.e. the FVO and the European Commission).  
Hierarchical coordination in the control arm of the regime is 
becoming gradually more interwoven with horizontal forms of coordination 
as resource pressure renders intensive FVO audits in all sectors and 
countries more difficult. The FVO summarises its observations in the so-
called ‘Overview’ or ‘General’ reports. The main aim of these reports is to 
pull together the main findings of several audits in a relevant issue area as 
observed across different Member States. They thus highlight where 
problems with compliances are widespread and where implementation 
works well across countries ( for an example, see FVO, 2010, p.2.). At the 
same time, they also point out ‘good practices’ observed during their audit 
(for example, see FVO, 2013c, p.13).  
This aims at making practices across countries more accessible to 
competent authorities. Also, the overview reports try to establish whether 
legislation is working as intended and whether implementation is feasible 
for control authorities in the Member States. In this regard, these reports 
also provide recommendations to the Commission, for example, about the 
need for clarification of a particular legal provision. After EU legislation is 
passed, Member States are usually “left to their own devices”239 and the 
overview reports attempt to counteract this by bringing together officials 
from the Member States at the FVO premises to discuss the overall state of 
control systems in a given issue area. The FVO is hereby establishing 
transgovernmental ties at these events, whereby national officials can hear 
the points of view of their counterparts in other countries. These reports 
have existed since 2001, but FVO officials state that they have grown in 
                                                 
239 Interviewee M10. 
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importance, especially in relation to bringing together national officials to 
discuss them and explicitly pointing out ‘good practices’ (which became an 
explicit feature of the reports in 2013).  
The underlying idea is hereby that competent authorities can more 
easily identify practices of authorities in other Member States as a source of 
learning, which is indeed used by national authorities (albeit in relatively 
rare cases).240 We thus observe elements of mutual exchange in this part of 
the regime, which, however, is mediated by the FVO as it remains the body 
that identifies ‘good practices’. Such horizontal forms of coordination can 
also be found in the FVO’s training and use of ‘national experts’ which acts 
as FVO team members during audits (see, for example,  FVO, 1999, p. 3; 
1999b, p.4; FVO, 2007, p.30): These officials get to know other countries’ 
practices and can use this knowledge in relation within their home 
administrations. They receive FVO training since in their role as FVO 
national experts they are expected to act as EU official, thus transcending 
their national perspective, whilst also giving national officials the 
opportunity to develop transgovernmental links and additional expertise.241 
Similarly to the FVO’s approach to ‘Overview Reports’, the 
Commission also singles out ‘good reporting practice’ in relation to 
reporting practices in the Multi-Annual National Control Plans (MANCPs): 
For example, the Commission has pointed out that substantive indicators of 
performance and tracking of costs of control activities –which are found in 
France, Finland, Sweden and Slovenia– should be seen as ‘best practice’ 
(European Commission, 2012, p.4). Similarly, it has put forward that the 
process of risk categorisation of food businesses in the Netherlands, Finland 
and Slovenia should be used as examples by other authorities (ibid., p.5). It 
also finds the publication of business inspection results (as found in 
Denmark, the UK, Belgium and the Czech Republic) noteworthy (ibid. p.10). 
Another ‘good practice’ in the view of the Commission are quality 
management systems which are measured against external standards (i.e. 
ISO 9001), which we find in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia, and 
                                                 
240 Interviewee F5, F6, F10. 
241 Interviewees emphasised the importance of this. Hereby, FVO officials value the specific expertise 
of national experts and an interviewee who has acted as national expert explained the value of 
acquainting oneself with other administrative systems and control practices.  
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Germany. As in the case of the FVO’s identification of ‘good practices’, this is 
a novel development. In this vein, the Commission has also started to run a 
forum of exchange about how to run national audit systems (European 
Commission, 2013, p.6).  Although the Commission hereby remains at the 
centre of proclaiming what works well, this provides a platform for 
competent authorities to learn from reporting practices and control systems 
of other countries.  
The increasing prevalence of transgovernmental ties and horizontal 
coordination is particularly visible in the ‘Better Training for Safer Food’ 
programme which was established under the auspices of the Commission in 
2006.242 The training programme was devised to ensure that control staff is 
kept “up to date with relevant EU standards. This should ensure that 
controls become more harmonised and effective” (European Commission, 
2006b, p.5). A key idea hereby is that the training should be cascaded by 
participants, i.e. they should present what their learned during the training 
in their home authorities (this indeed happens in the UK and Germany, see 
FSA, 2011, p.11, and the MANCPs of the Länder). The programme was 
introduced in the wake of a shift from rather prescriptive Directives to 
Regulations which allow for more freedom of interpretation of legal 
norms,243 (such as from provision prescribing that tiles in food businesses 
need to have a specific size to the legal norms that walls should be easy to 
clean). In the programme, national control officials attend training 
programmes on a specific topic which is run by national authorities or 
independent organisations. Although Commission staff is present in these 
trainings, tutors are not Commission staff. Rather, they are national officials 
or experts in the field (for a detailed overview of the programme see its 
Annual Reports which have been published since 2006). The Commission 
(and the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers that it has delegated 
the organisation of the programme to) are hereby only responsible for the 
organisation of the programme, whilst the content is delivered by experts in 
                                                 
242 The legal mandate for the programme derives from Art.51, Regulation 882/2004. 
243 As stated by Interviewee F9. An example is the so-called ‘hygiene package‘ (Regulation No 
853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific 
hygiene rules for on the hygiene of foodstuffs; and No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs. 
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a given field selected particularly for this purpose across different Member 
States.244 This, for example, may be officials from a national authority which 
excels in its control systems in a particular field, which is seen to 
disseminate ‘best practices’.245  
Hence, whilst the programme is hierarchically devised, it establishes 
mutual exchange and transgovernmental ties between national officials. 
 
But in addition what we saw with this training since 2006 was also 
that –and initially that was not foreseen- by bringing together 
people from different Member States, they start to get this network. 
One of the things that we see now is that the people which come in 
contact with each other during the training, afterwards they 
continue to be in contact because they think ‘now I know someone, 
for example, in Germany or someone from Poland etc., I will just 
call that colleague’. That’s gives them another point of contact if 
they have a problem, they call and ask ‘what do I have to do?’246  
 
Hereby, the programme is seen as success by all involved actors (see 
European Commission, 2009e, p.15),247 although language barriers remain a 
problem (ibid.). For example, especially older control officials might not 
speak English well enough to dare to attend such training.248 Nevertheless, 
the trainings are consistently over-subscribed, whereby the high quality of 
the substance delivered by tutors is seen as key to this success.249 It has 
hereby been noted that officials often would like to improve their know-how 
in a given area –rather than just being focused on compliance with EU 
standards– which is rendered possible through the high quality substance of 
the courses (which also include ‘hands-on’ training, such as practicing 
inspections by visiting food businesses). The programme is linked to the 
FVO audits since it is consulted in the selection of topics to be covered by 
the courses: The FVO can thus single out areas in which widespread 
shortcomings exist in control systems across countries. The BTSF team of 
the Commission then also asks the FVO to monitor whether the training 
courses are taking effect on the ground. The hierarchical audit mechanism 
                                                 
244 Although in some cases Commission officials act as tutors. 
245 Interviewee F12. 
246 Interviewee F9. 
247 This view was also unequivocally expressed by all interviewees.  
248 Also pointed out by interviewees. 
249 F6, F8, F11, F12. Also see European Commission, 2009e, p.15. 
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has thus become intertwined with a training programme through which 
expertise of national officials and experts is spread horizontally to other 
national officials to improve practices.  
Overall, then, coordination among food control authorities has 
developed elements of mutual exchange between national officials, although 
these exchanges to some extent remain mediated by the FVO and the 
Commission. Especially, the BTSF programme, however, is firmly built on 
the expertise of experts outside these EU bodies. These developments need 
to be seen not only in the light of increased use of Regulations, but also the 
effect of resource constraints on the FVO and Commission auditing process 
in an enlarging EU, combined with increasing amounts of EU food safety 
standards: The FVO, for example, is trying to move away from auditing all 
Member States for all issue areas as this has become increasingly difficult in 
an EU of 28 Member States. Rather, in future it will aim to audit a 
representative cross-sections of countries in each issue area; “Our aim is to 
help them improve their systems. If we can do this without going to see all 
of them [the Member States], we will do so.”250 Mutual exchange 
mechanisms contained in overview reports, Commission reports on 
Member States’ MANCPs and the Better Training for Safer Food programme 
–which are building a transgovernmental network of sorts between national 
control staff– are thus a pragmatic response to achieving similar practices 
and conformity with EU law in changed circumstances. In regard of the 
more horizontal forms of coordination, control officials in the Member 
States are being bound into a professional community, which does largely 
not engage in interactions outside this EU system. This is perceived as an 
added value by the involved regulatory actors. The rather novel mechanism 
complements the hierarchical FVO audits in relation to the gathering of 
information about practices across Member States as well as the 
modification of behaviour. British and German authorities take this form of 
coordination into account in their assessment of the value of the 
engagement with transnational processes in this field.  
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This part of the chapter demonstrated that national authorities regard the 
engagement with transnational processes to be beneficial since the newly 
emerging forms of horizontal coordination between food control authorities 
provide them with additional access to expertise that helps them to oversee 
the extraordinarily complex food control systems in their country, for 
example, through the creation of a hitherto non-existent professional 
community of food control officials. Authorities in the Member States take 
these novel processes into account when evaluating the added value of the 
inspection task of the FVO.  
 
 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates that the knowledge generation task of national 
authorities in the forum of EFSA results in a coordination pattern of mutual 
exchange, which the UK and German authorities proactively engage with 
despite the lack of formal provisions requiring them to do so.  Indeed, 
national risk assessors and EFSA have developed extensive structures for 
the coordination of their scientific output that surpass what is formally 
demanded of them. The case study demonstrates that they do so because 
the involved authorities perceive transnational coordination to add value to 
their work: They operate in a context in which the authoritative nature of 
the science they provide is persistently questioned by NGOS, political actors, 
and the media. The public voicing of diverging scientific opinions by 
national authorities and EFSA is seen to undermine confidence in their 
work, as a result of which they value the coordination of their scientific 
output in the forum of EFSA: In their view, this helps them to maintain the 
authority of the scientific advice they provide. This drives their proactive 
engagement with the coordination of scientific outputs, which, in turn, 
supports the scientific work of EFSA.   
This finding serves as a vital comparison to the case study on drug 
safety monitoring presented in Chapter 3: The coordination pattern 
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observed between food risk assessors differs from that found in the case of 
drug safety monitoring. Whilst the coordination pattern in the former is 
characterised by mutual exchange and adjustment, the latter is of a more 
competitive nature. In this regard, it seems that professional norms –which 
can be deemed to be similar in these two cases– are not the most pervasive 
determinant of coordinative behaviour. Rather, this thesis puts forward that 
professional norms form part of the social organisation regulatory actors 
are embedded in, and thus contribute to the framing of their perception of 
their own interests. These perceptions of what constitutes strategic 
behaviour inform their behaviour in the institutional frameworks provided 
by tasks, which shape coordinative behaviour. This explains why the 
coordination patterns observed in the case of food risk assessment and drug 
safety monitoring differ despite similar professional norms: The 
institutional frameworks and frames for action provided by a knowledge 
generation task differ from the ones provided by a one-off decision-making 
task (see Chapter 1, 2 and 3), hence setting the involved regulators into 
different relations with each other.  
 
 
The chapter also demonstrates that the inspection task of the FVO indeed 
results in a hierarchical coordination pattern.  The FVO audit process entails 
detailed inspections of national practices followed by strict reporting of 
non-compliances and practices which do not follow guidelines. In contrast 
to the maritime safety case (see Chapter 4), however, the inspections of an 
EU regulatory body do not result in contestation on part of regulatory actors 
in the UK and Germany. Rather, German and British authorities perceive the 
FVO visits to their countries to add value to their own work: They perceive 
FVO inspections to provide them with an expertise that they lack, thereby 
providing them with an opportunity for improved control over their own 
territory in the context of social relations that are characterised by a highly 
decentralised industry and administrative system. They hence think of the 
transnational coordination process to be helpful for them in the specific 
context of the social relations they are embedded.  
5. Food Safety   
 
155 
 
This provides us with an excellent point of comparison to 
coordinative behaviour in the case of maritime safety, where the UK and 
German authorities contest the hierarchical coordination pattern shaped by 
EMSA’s inspection task. This can be explained by the different social 
relations that regulatory actors are embedded in across these two fields, 
which inform national authorities’ perceptions of the value of the task 
carried out by an EU regulatory body: In the case of maritime safety, the 
authorities in the UK and Germany evaluate EMSA’s inspection task from the 
vantage point of the international regime that they are highly engaged with, 
and which presents the focal point of their work. In the case of food control 
authorities, on the other hand, authorities in the UK and Germany assess the 
value of FVO inspections from a context in which they face the challenging 
responsibility to oversee a very complex, decentralised industry and 
administrative apparatus. This demonstrates that social relations 
fundamentally inform national authorities’ evaluations of transnational 
coordination processes that are shaped by the specific task that is being 
carried out. Different sets of social relations hence represent different bases 
from which national authorities ‘calculate’ the perceived worth of their 
engagement with transnational processes. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Banking Regulation and Supervision 
 
 
The case study on transnational coordination in banking regulation and 
supervision provides as with an opportunity to study the effect of a 
standard-setting task on coordinative behaviour. The European Banking 
Authority (EBA)251 brings together national banking regulators in order to 
agree on common technical rules, and to facilitate the shared supervision of 
banks in order to mitigate cross-border risks: Whilst the majority of banks 
in the EU are only active at the national (or even local) level, around 40 of 
the approximately 8000 credit institutions operating in the EU have large-
scale cross-border operations (for example, see CEPR, 2011),252 which, in 
turn, account for more than two thirds of the assets of the European banking 
sector. With regard to the EBA’s standard-setting task, then, shared 
technical rules that guide the practices of banks and banking supervisors 
are seen not only as a driver towards the leveling of the playing field in an 
integrated market, but also as a means to achieve greater safety in a context 
                                                 
251 The EBA was predeeced by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) from 2004 
until 2011. 
252 Also, see the hearing with José María Roldán, then Chair of CEBS, European Parliament, Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Brussels, 10 October 2005; and speech by Andrea Enria, 
Chairperson of the EBA, ‘The crisis in Europe, the impact on banks and the authorities response‘, 
Università degli Studi di Trento, 20 February 2013. 
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in which banks can freely operate across borders without restrictions, 
whilst regulatory regimes remain fragmented along national lines. The EBA 
also has the task to facilitate the day-to-day supervision of cross-border 
banks: The banking supervisors of the original ‘home’ country and of the 
‘host’ countries of subsidiaries of cross-border banks (such as HSBC or 
Deutsche Bank) need to collaborate if they want to obtain a full picture of 
the health of a given financial institution.  
As laid out in Chapters 1 and 2, we can expect that a standard-setting 
task creates an arena of contention: Since the rules that are agreed upon 
bind all further actions of the involved regulatory actors, we can expect 
national authorities to attempt to influence the end result in their favour. In 
such a case, then, the main line of conflict runs between national regulators 
–rather than between national authorities and EU bodies–  which play the 
role of adversaries in the institutional framework provided by standard–
setting task. The extent to which national regulators perceive it to be 
valuable to influence proceedings, in turn, can be expected to be informed 
by the social relations they are embedded in.  
The case of banking regulation and supervision is an excellent means 
to investigate coordinative behaviour for two further reasons. Firstly, the 
case is particularly intriguing since the formal authority of the EU regulatory 
body under scrutiny increased significantly during the time period that was 
studied when the European Banking Authority succeeded the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors in 2011. According to the argument of this 
thesis, social relations and tasks fundamentally shape coordinative 
behaviour of national regulators –rather than the formal authority of the EU 
regulatory body they meet in. If this is indeed so, the coordinative behaviour 
of the involved national regulators should not have been affected by this 
change in formal status of the EU regulatory body. Secondly, it provides as 
with an opportunity to further scrutinise how coordinative behaviour is 
affected when an EU regulatory body has two differing regulatory tasks: 
Next to technical standard-setting, the European Banking Authority (and 
formerly the Committee of European Banking Supervisors) also has the task 
to facilitate the coordination of supervision of cross-border banks in so-
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called ‘supervisory colleges’. We can hence study whether the behaviour of 
the involved regulators indeed differs when they are carrying out different 
tasks as the argument of this thesis puts. 
 
 
  
6.1 Social Relations and Tasks in Banking Regulation and 
Supervision 
UK and German banking regulators are embedded in differing sets of social 
relations. Each of them has a specific regulatory philosophy about how risks 
from unsound banks should be managed. These philosophies, in turn, are 
tightly bound to the training their staff have –which is embedded in wider 
administrative traditions of each country– as well as the nature of their 
banking industries. In line with the argument of this thesis we can expect 
that these social relations inform which added value they perceive to gain 
from engagement with transnational coordination in CEBS/the EBA. British 
and German regulators are also tightly bound into social relations in their 
country with regard to the potential pressure that is exerted upon them by 
governments to avoid bank failures that would result in a taxpayer funded 
bailout of a given bank, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis 
(Section 6.1.1).  
CEBS/the EBA, in turn, have the key tasks to set technical regulatory 
standards and to facilitate the day-to-day supervision of cross-border banks. 
Technical standard-setting provides an institutional framework that creates 
an arena of contention, which needs to be resolved in the coordination 
process. The task to facilitate the day-to-day supervision of cross-border 
banks, in turn, is essentially an information-exchange task in which 
information about the soundness of a cross-border bank is exchanged to 
form a picture about the health of a banking group as a whole. At face value, 
this could be expected to lead to mutual exchange and provide an arena for 
the finding of agreement. In order for this coordination pattern to be 
observed, however, national banking supervisors need to proactively 
engage with this task, which –as this thesis argues– will only happen if they 
value the task for their own work (see Section 6.1.2). 
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6.1.1 Social Relations in the UK and German Banking Supervision 
Regimes 
The social relations that the UK and German authorities are embedded in 
differ markedly in many respects. The long-standing caricature of their two 
regulatory philosophies usually displays the British way of doing things as 
‘light-touch’ as opposed to a strictly rule-bound German regulatory style.253 
This picture is perhaps firmly rooted in the past; indeed, the regulatory and 
supervisory structures for the banking sector in the two countries have 
been argued to have become more similar as a result of international and EU 
harmonisation efforts (see, for example, Lütz, 2004) and due to some shared 
dominant ideas of what constitutes good practice: Both regimes introduced 
integrated financial regulators around the start of the new millennium, and 
both became keen defenders of principles-based regulation.254  
Nevertheless, implementation of international and supranational rules 
necessarily happened under adaptation to specific national circumstances 
(ibid.). The evolvement of both regimes has been very dynamic and escapes 
straight-forward classification into ‘light-touch’/interventionist or 
principles-based/rules-based labels. This is especially so due to the 
complexity of establishing a predominant regulatory approach or 
‘philosophy’ in each country: Views of national regulators about how best to 
manage risks have consistently interacted with and have been shaped by the 
ideas of other national regulators, especially in the forum of the Basel 
Committee. At the same time, political pressure on national regulators in 
this field is significant. This has been particularly visible in the aftermath of 
the crisis of 2008.  
The recent financial crisis has led to a starkly different response in 
the two countries: The British Financial Services Authority (FSA) engaged in 
extensive soul-searching after the crisis, leading to a reformulation of the 
philosophy underpinning financial regulation in the UK (FSA, 2009). 
Moreover, the FSA was disintegrated into the so-called ‘twin-peaks 
                                                 
253 For an overview of the development of the German and British regimes, see Moran, 1991, 1994; 
and Müller, 2002. 
254 Principles-based regulation uses broad principles -rather than detailed rules- to guide regulatory 
behaviour (for further discussion, see, for example, Black, 2008; and Black, Hopper, and Band, 2007. 
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model’,255 thereby giving the tasks of banking regulation and supervision to 
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) within the Bank of England, 
which started operating in April 2013 (Treasury, 2011).256 In Germany the 
aftermath of the crisis has largely been characterised by stability and to an 
extent the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)257 perceives the 
virtues of its own approach confirmed through the crisis.258  
In that regard, the discussion about the relative importance of capital 
adequacy requirements and calculable risk measures on the one hand, and 
‘softer’ qualitative risk management tools (i.e. the evaluation of the internal 
control system of banks, the qualifications of the people in charge etc.) on 
the other hand has been one of the main issues which exemplify the 
differing regulatory philosophies of national authorities: The so-called Basel 
II agreement represented a crucial juncture from its predecessor as it 
introduced ‘qualitative risk management’ measures (Tarullo, 2008; also see 
Lütz, 2004, for a brief explanation). A crucial underlying assumption hereby 
was that ultimately banks know how to manage their own risks and that 
                                                 
255 For an overview of the different organisational approaches to financial regulation see Goodhart, 
2000; and Llewellyn, 2006. 
256 The FSA was established after the election victory of New Labour in 1997 as an ‘integrated’ 
regulator, in which the organisational structure did not reflect the sectoral divisions of the financial 
industry (i.e. the banking, insurance and securities sectors) (for a discussion of the potential merits of 
this organisational approach, see Briault, 1999, 2002). As of April 2013, the FSA was disintegrated 
along a twin-peaks model, in which banking oversight is organisationally separated according to 
prudential and conduct of business oversight (for further discussion of the FSA’s disintegration, see 
Black and Hopper, 2012). 
257 When the BaFin was created in 2002, the three separate regulators for each financial sector were 
brought together under one roof. Although formally an ‘integrated’ regulator, BaFin remains divided 
along the lines of the three financial sectors as a result of this. BaFin is an independent agency, which 
operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance. BaFin and the Ministry of Finance (and the 
Bundesbank) thereby meet in ‘Forum for financial market supervision’. 
258 Notwithstanding the considerable changes introduced by Basel III/Capital Requirements Directive 
IV (CRD IV, Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
and investment forms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC).In relation to seeing its own approach confirmed, for example, consider the following 
excerpt of a speech by Jochen Sanio, then President on BaFin: “It would be an error to think that the 
deficits in the global regulatory regime were all a regrettable lapse – oops, we are sorry, we didn’t 
take this and that into account. Quite the opposite: Many gaps in the supervisory structure were 
deliberately created by stakeholders holding an interest in this – of course without the premonition of 
the terrible consequences that would result many years down the line. An especially unpleasant issue 
in this regard has been the effect of an intense competition among the financial centers, which has too 
often led to an intense competition over the most lenient national regulatory rules – a ‘race to the 
bottom’. It is not a coincidence that this term originates in the English language, which also provided 
the world with the notion of ‘light touch regulation’ […], which, however, is currently on the retreat” 
(translated by the Author, German original in speech ‘Die Fortentwicklung der Bankenaufsicht‘, 
28.05.2009, Frankfurt am Main.In relation to the stability of the German regime after the crisis, it is 
important to note that there was extensvie debate about giving the Bundesbank a more involved role 
in banking supervision (see Engelen, 2010), which, however, was not further pursued. 
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supervisors ‘merely’ need to verify the adequacy of their internal control 
systems. Basel III, on the other hand, has firmly re-established and 
expanded the usage of quantitative risk measurements, thereby especially 
establishing it in the area of liquidity risk measurement.259  
In a nutshell (and hence simplifying matters), in the recent past the 
British approach has been focused on capital adequacy and quantitative 
measures,260 whereas BaFin has emphasised the importance of non-
quantifiable risks and qualitative risk management approaches.261 Such 
crucial differences in philosophies about how best to manage risk frame the 
assessment about the value of the engagement with transnational 
coordination processes on part of UK and German regulators. The emphasis 
on new quantitative measures in Basel III (Brzenk, Cluse, Leonhardt, 2011) 
is thereby not necessarily aligned with the BaFin’s risk management 
paradigm (ibid.; also see BaFin, 2013, p.11f); whilst, however, these 
provisions where once again ‘watered’ down in favour of the German –
rather than the British approach– in the EU negotiations about the CRD IV 
(Howarth and Quaglia, 2013).262   
The framing of their engagement with the EBA’s (and previously CEBS’) 
tasks is also informed by their regulatory practices, which, in turn, are 
embedded in particular sets of social relations found at the domestic level. 
For example, the FSA and now the PRA create their own risk models to 
verify the results of banks’ internal risk management models. In this regard, 
they are also prepared to demand from a bank to hold more capital if its 
own model diverged from the results of the bank’s calculations (compare to 
FSA, 2012; PRA, 2013). This approach hence implicitly assumes that in some 
instances the supervisor is better able to assess the risks posed by the 
                                                 
259 See Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ration (NSFR) under Basel III. 
Interviewees have at least partly attributed this to the political level which has come to see banks as 
incapable of managing their own risks after the crisis. 
260 Interviewee B2, B5, and B6. Also see FSA speeches, such as Adair Turner’s Mansion House Speech 
on 20 October 2011, or Hector Sants’ speech at the Cityweek Conference on 7 February 2012. Also see 
Ferran, 2012, p. 18. In this regard, the UK’s approach (especially after the crisis) has been aligned 
with the US and Switzerland (which is also characterized by a financial ‘giants’ that are very large in 
relation to the economy of the country as a whole) (ibid.).  
261 As, for example expressed in BaFin’s tools in ‘MaRisk’ (‘Minimum requirements for risk 
management’) which assesses a bank’s risk management processes. See, for example, AK BA, 2010, 
p.6. 
262 In this interview, the head of BaFin’s banking supervisory division points out the merits of a 
qualitative approach.  
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particular business model of a financial institution than this financial 
institution itself (PRA, 2013, p.17).  
The BaFin approach differs in this regard: The philosophy behind its 
practices has been the idea that banks are generally better at assessing their 
own soundness than banking supervisors are. Regulator-led calculations to 
verify data provided by banks are only carried out in a focused and targeted 
way if concrete doubts about the bank’s internal control processes emerge. 
In this regard, BaFin has taken a very process-oriented approach, in which 
the evaluation of the competence of a bank’s staff has been key. This BaFin 
‘philosophy’ of how safety is best achieved (i.e. by verifying the internal 
control systems of banks in a qualitative manner) is embedded in wider the 
social organization of German administrative traditions: Many staff 
members have a background in legal training and do not have experience of 
working in the banking sector. Complex modeling and ‘judgment-based’ 
forms of supervision require technical expertise and intimate knowledge of 
business models, which is usually gained by working within the banking 
industry.  
In the UK, it is indeed common to gather experience within the regulator 
and the industry, and staff might be seconded for this purpose. This is seen 
as necessary for effective risk management by the industry and the 
regulator (Black, 2012, p. 1046), which is indeed quite different in Germany: 
The ‘revolving door’ principle is frowned upon in the German context; 
instead, a clear delineation between governmental authority and the 
industry is seen as vital (see Lütz, 2004).263 BaFin’s regulatory approach is 
also embedded in a very particular industry structure, in which a few 
privately owned ‘giants’ (especially Deutsche Bank) exist alongside many 
small and mid-sized private, savings and co-operative banks (see, for 
                                                 
263 Whereas transitions from senior BaFin and Bundesbank staff to the industry are not unheard of, 
the public debate generated by this should not be underestimated and the likelihood of a subsequent 
move back into the supervisory realm is much lower. For example, when the former head of BaFin’s 
banking unit (Helmut Bauer) left the authority to work for Deutsche Bank in regulatory affairs, the 
German media reported on this with a critical angle (see Spiegel Online, 19.01.2008, ‘Pikante 
Personalie: Banken-Aufseher wechselt zu Deutscher Bank’). Reportedly, this was also heavily 
criticised in the German industry as a former supervisor -who is familiar with business models etc. of 
banks- was going to work for one of their competitors.  
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example, IMF, 2011).264  These social relations are vital for framing the value 
of engagement with CEBS’ and the EBA’s tasks on part of British and German 
banking regulators: New technical standards can demand change that would 
require a transformation of practices that are deeply rooted in domestic 
social relations. 
Next to their domestic setting UK and German banking regulators are 
also embedded in social relations of international regulators efforts. Ever 
since the failure of Herstatt bank in 1974,265 the Basel process has provoked 
debates amongst national officials as to how cross-border risk is best 
managed (see Tarullo, 2008, p.1ff; and Goodhart, 2011, for historical 
overview). Debates on banking regulation thus have a distinct international 
character, whereby national regulators consider whether certain ideas and 
practices can work internationally and in their respective jurisdictions. In 
this respect, it is vital for the analysis presented here to consider that 
discussions about technical standards in CEBS/the EBA cannot be regarded 
in isolation as national officials (often the same individuals) flesh out 
international deals in Basel. In the European context the Basel rules are then 
(re-)negotiated in the Council (in conjunction with the European 
Parliament, after receiving a proposal from the Commission) in order to 
implement the Basel rules in the EU, as was the case with Basel III and the 
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRD) and Directive in spring 2013.266 
Technical rule-making in the EBA hence potentially presents the possibility 
for ‘reclaiming’ some ground that was lost at previous rounds of negotiation. 
                                                 
264 Demands of German small local savings and co-operative banks have become a key issue at the 
international and European level negotiations (Quaglia, 2010; Tarullo, 2008, especially p.69, p.115ff, 
Verdier, 2009, pp.130-143).   
265 The privately owned German bank Herstatt went bankrupt on 26 June 1974. On the same day, 
banks in other countries had released the payment of Deutsch Marks in exchange for US dollars (to be 
delivered in New York) to Herstatt. As the involved banks were operating in different time-zones, 
Herstatt ceased its operations between these payments. Consequently, the counterparty banks did not 
receive their US Dollars in exchange for their earlier payment. The G-10 countries formed a 
committee as part of the Bank of International Settlements as a consequence. This was the beginning 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. For a comprehensive overview of the development 
and substance of the international framework, see Tarullo, 2008. 
266 The CRD IV/CRR package was adopted in June 2013. See European Commission (2013b) for an 
overview to what extent the EU legal package differs from Basel III. (see Directive 2013/36/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions 
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment forms, amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC; and Regulation No 575/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation No 648/2012. 
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This needs to be taken into account for understanding how British and 
German regulators evaluate their engagement with the EBA’s technical rule-
making task. Hence, these social relations can be expected to inform the 
assessment of the value of engaging with CEBS/the EBA’s tasks on part of 
British and German regulators. 
 
 
6.1.2 Tasks of CEBS and the EBA 
EU cooperation in the field of banking started in the 1970s when the first 
principles agreed upon by what is now the Basel Committee were 
transferred into binding EC law.267 In order to “ensure the proper 
implementation” of this Directive a committee of representatives from the 
EC Member States and the Commission with advisory functions was set up 
(the Banking Advisory Committee), to which the Commission provided a 
secretariat.268 Transnational coordinative structures in banking regulation 
are hence far from novel. However, a major change in this transnational 
bureaucracy did not occur until the early 2000s, when one part of the 
Banking Advisory Committee became the European Banking Committee 
(EBC), the members of which were mostly drawn from national finance 
ministries (and central banks or supervisory authorities in some cases) (see 
Quaglia, 2008, p.565ff; 2010, p.48ff for a more comprehensive overview). 
The other half of the former Banking Advisory Committee convened to 
become the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS),269 which 
held its first meeting in London in 2004. The EBC was responsible for 
defining broader objectives on the basis of EU banking legislation, and CEBS 
was to fulfil the task of formulating technical guidelines on the basis of these 
broader standards. This institutional architecture derived from the so-called 
Lamfalussy process that had originally been adopted in order to drive 
forward halted integration in the securities sector (European Commission, 
1999; Lamfalussy Report, 2000; Quaglia, 2008, 2010). This structure was 
                                                 
267Directive 77/780/EEC (First Council Directive of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions). 
268 Ibid., Art.11. It had acted as comitology and advisory committee. 
269 Established by Commission Decision 2004/5/EC. 
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then also adopted in the field of banking (as well as the insurance sector) in 
order to increase the coordination of regulatory practices across 
persistently differing national regimes,270 in addition to providing the 
Commission with an expert advisory body.271 
Before long, however, the financial crisis of 2008 resulted in further 
organisational change in these transnational coordination structures. In 
November 2008 the Commission mandated a High-Level Group chaired by 
Jacques de Larosière to make recommendations on how to reform the 
system. The ‘de Larosière Report’ suggested establishing a ‘European 
System of Financial Supervisors’ (De Larosière, 2009), which indeed started 
operating in January 2011. It consists of the ‘European Supervisory 
Authorities’ (ESAs) and the ‘European Systemic Risk Board’ (ESRB).272 The 
ESAs are three supervisory authorities created for the supervision of each of 
the financial sectors, which in the case of banking regulation and 
supervision is the European Banking Authority (EBA), which based in 
London.273  The EBA represents a continuation of the work done by CEBS, 
albeit with more resources and authority at its disposal (whilst also being 
entrusted with some additional responsibilities). This renders the banking 
case an excellent opportunity to explore to what extent it is really social 
relations and tasks that inform and shape coordinative behaviour of 
national regulators in EU regulatory bodies, rather than the latters’ formal 
authority (as often asserted, for example, see Busuioc, 2013; and 
Wymeersch, 2012) . 
In order to carry out its tasks, CEBS largely relied on national officials 
to handle the substantive issues in working groups convened from national 
officials: Its major task in this regard was the setting of technical regulatory 
                                                 
270 Ibid., Recital 5. 
271 Ibid., Recital 4. 
272 Regulation No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24  November 2010 
on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European 
Systemic Risk Board. 
The ESRB is another body charged with analysing risk that transcends national and sectoral 
boundaries. It is under the responsibility of the ECB, and is entirely concentrated on the task of 
macro-prudential supervision (whereas the ESAs need to focus on macro-, and micro-prudential, and 
conduct of business supervision) (ibid., Art.3). In cooperation with the ESAs and national regulators 
the ESRB is meant to focus on the identification of systemic risk (ibid., Art.3, Art.15.). 
273 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending 
Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC. 
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guidelines, but also included the evaluation of national regulators’ practices 
in peer reviews and the creation of a mediation panel to solve coordination 
problems between national authorities.274  High-level officials from national 
supervisors represented the ‘members’ of CEBS and were responsible for 
taking decisions on the output of the committee (i.e. the technical 
guidelines), whereby consensus was the norm, despite the possibility to 
apply qualified majority voting to come to decisions (Quaglia, 2010, p.49). 
CEBS members met three to four times a year at the highest level, whilst the 
bulk of the extensive work on technical guidelines took place in working 
groups throughout the year. CEBS leadership was also drawn from national 
authorities on a non-full-time basis (the CEBS chair and vice chair), while 
the committee possessed a small number of its own dedicated staff: Its 
London secretariat consisted of a secretary-general, deputy secretary-
general, and three bureau members (all appointed from amongst and by the 
CEBS members, i.e. national authorities’ representatives).275   
The most essential task of CEBS was to issue guidelines and 
recommendations for the practical application of shared high level 
standards, especially with regard to the implementation of the Capital 
Requirements Directive (the ‘CRD’, the implementing text of what was then 
Basel II).276  It also needed to respond to ‘Calls of Advice’ from the 
Commission.277 While resources of CEBS and national authorities 
participating in it were put under strain by the intensity of output needed to 
be produced by CEBS, the structure reportedly  worked quite smoothly in 
term of ‘getting things done’ considering its small number of core staff 
(CEBS, 2007; 2007b; also see Ipsos Mori, 2007). Whereas CEBS guidelines 
took a non-binding voluntary role at first, a comply-or-explain mechanism 
was introduced in later years of its operations.278 CEBS also made use of its 
expertise to forge a pioneering task for a transnational body with regard to 
                                                 
274 See Protocol of the CEBS Mediation Mechanism, 25 September 2007. This mechanism then became 
more formalised in the 2009 reform of CEBS, see Art.19 and Art.21(4) in relation to supervisory 
colleges, Decision 2009/78/EC. 
275 Art.1,2 and 7 of CEBS Charter. 
276 Art.2, Decision 2004/5/EC; Art.3, Decision 2009/78/EC. 
277 Art.2, Decision 2004/5/EC; Art.2, Decision 2009/78/EC. 
278 Formally speaking the output of CEBS continued to be non-binding. However, Member States now 
had to be prepared to explain why they had chosen not to implement CEBS guidelines (or other 
measures). See Art.14, Decision 2009/78/EC. 
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day-to-day supervision of cross-border banks: The committee took up the 
task to facilitate the coordination of supervision of cross-border banks, for 
example, by carrying out peer reviews about the functioning of supervisory 
colleges (which bring together all banking supervisors involved in the 
supervision of a given cross-border bank) (CEBS, 2010).  
In turn, the administrative capacity of the EBA has increased 
distinctly in comparison to CEBS: As of May 2013 EBA had around 100 staff 
members. The role of the CEBS chair is now performed by a full-time 
Chairperson.279 A Management Board –responsible for steering the 
authority and its budgetary matters and consisting of the Chairperson and 
six members of the Board of Supervisors in rotating style–280 and a full-time 
Executive Director fulfil the responsibilities of the former CEBS secretariat 
and bureau.281 The EBA’s Board of Supervisors –that takes decisions on 
legally binding technical standards– consist of high-ranking leadership 
personnel of national authorities. It meets at least four times a year;282 
however, the degree of deliberation here is limited as many meetings are 
relatively short teleconferences.283 As was also the case in the CEBS system, 
the substantive work of the authority is carried out in working groups (and 
sub-working groups). Since the EBA has more staff to fulfil its task than 
CEBS did –and reportedly has a self-confident attitude as a ‘fully-blown’ 
authority–284  it has the potential to be an influential actor in its own right. 
However, the EBA’s workload far outstrips its capacities at the time of 
writing and national officials remain absolutely crucial for fulfilling its 
mandate (especially in regard of writing technical standards) (EBA, 2012b, 
p.9). As a UK official has noted “given the range of tasks that the EBA and the 
other European Supervisory Authorities have been asked to do, the only 
way they can possibly accomplish them is to continue to bind in the national 
                                                 
279 Art.5, CEBS Charter, Interviews. 
280 Art.45, 47, Regulation No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), 
amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/E. 
281 Ibid., Art.51. 
282 Art.1.1, Rules of Procedure of EBA Board of Supervisors.  
283 See Board of Supervisor meeting minutes. This was also pointed out by interviewees B12. 
284 As, for example, pointed out by interviewee B2 and B3. 
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supervisory authorities into their workings".285  Indeed, some authorities –
such as the German BaFin and British FSA/PRA– explicitly wish to limit the 
workforce of the EBA in order to remain closely involved in the drafting of a 
technical standard.286 This gives us reason to believe that in the context of 
the specific social relations that the BaFin and the FSA/PRA are embedded 
in, they value the engagement with transnational coordination since it 
provides them an opportunity to influence the EBA’s output in their favour. 
The key task of the EBA is the setting of technical standards as 
required in the Capital Requirements Directive.287 The nature of rule-
making has changed in relation to the CEBS process since the EBA agrees on 
legally binding technical standards. The role of the EBA in this respect is to 
formulate ‘regulatory technical standards’, which are meant to be more 
detailed versions of the rules contained in the relevant legislation, a 
pertinent example of which is the definition of capital on which 16 out of the 
23 draft technical standards opened for public consultation in 2012 focused 
(EBA, 2012, p.21).288 The EBA also needs to agree on ‘implementing 
technical standards’,289 which set out how secondary legislation should be 
implemented, a crucial example of which are standards of formats in which 
banks need to report various kinds of information to supervisory authorities 
(ibid.). These draft measures need to be endorsed by the Commission to 
become legally binding,290 whereby, the Commission can make amendments 
to the proposed measures in coordination with the agency. The technical 
standards the EBA produces are directly effective at the national level, 
whereas the guidelines of CEBS had to be implemented at the national level. 
In its entirety, the rules produced by the EBA are hence termed the ‘Single 
Rulebook’.291 Moreover, draft measures of the EBA now express the decision 
of a single body –the EBA– rather than of CEBS, in which measures and 
recommendations could express the diverging views of members.  
                                                 
285 This was expressed in a House of Lords Committee hearing by the then Deputy Chair of the EBA 
and Member of the Executive Committee of the FSA Thomas Huertas (see House of Lords, 2011, p. 
15). 
286 Interviewee B4. 
287 And more recently the Capital Requirements Regulation.  
288 Art.10, Regulation 1093/2010. 
289 Ibid., Art. 15. 
290 Ibid., Art.10, Art.15. 
291 Ibid., Recital 22. 
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As set out in Chapter 2, we can expect a standard-setting task to set 
up adversarial relations between the involved national authorities: The 
decision on a standard affects all further actions of a national authority and 
thus provides an incentive to influence the end results in one’s favour. As a 
result, contention between national authorities is likely to arise, which can 
be expected to be resolved through processes of bargaining and deliberative 
persuasion in which each authority attempts to influence the given 
standard. As set out in the argument of the thesis, we can hence expect the 
coordination pattern under CEBS and the EBA to be similar –despite the 
different level of formal authority they possess– as they both have (or had) a 
standard-setting task. In CEBS, the comply-or-explain mechanism rendered 
its task effectively into a formal rule-making task. However, contention and 
bargaining under the EBA system can be expected to have increased in 
intensity due to the higher formality of its output:  Having taken on a formal 
character, the stakes for national authorities are now higher than under the 
CEBS system, which is indeed reflected in the FSA/PRA’s and BaFin’s 
provision of additional staff for to the transnational process.292  
The EBA –as CEBS– also has the task to facilitate the coordination of 
the supervision of cross-border banking groups, whereby national 
supervisors have the task to exchange information on the soundness of the 
particular branch of a cross-border bank that operates in their country. The 
involvement of the EBA has accrued a more formal nature in comparison to 
CEBS. In order to facilitate an effective functioning of supervisory colleges, 
the EBA has now also been granted the right to participate in supervisory 
college meetings and related college activities, such as joint on-site 
inspections carried out by national authorities.293 At face value, this accrues 
to a simple information-gathering and exchange task that could be expected 
to lead to mutual exchange and provide an arena for the finding of 
agreement. However, this task is carried out in a very particular set of social 
relations –namely the pressure of governments on banking supervisors to 
                                                 
292 See AK BA, 2010b, p.8; AK BA, 2011, p.8 for Germany, and FSA, 2010, p.12 for the UK. 
293 Art.21(1), Regulation 1093/2010. Also, the former mediation mechanism of CEBS has now become 
formalised under the EBA (ibid., Art.19). Moreover, the authority can also ask a college for further 
deliberation if a “decision would result in an incorrect application of Union law or would not 
contribute to the objective of convergence of supervisory practices” (ibid., Art.21(2)(e)). 
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avoid a bank failure at all costs– which gives us reason to expect that the 
functioning of coordination is not straightforward in practice.  
 
 
 
6.2 Identifying the Coordination Pattern between Banking 
Regulators 
In line with the argument advanced by this thesis, we can expect a standard-
setting task to result in contention between national regulators that is 
solved through bargaining and persuasion. Since regulatory practices in 
banking are deeply embedded in the social relations at the domestic level, 
we can expect that the FSA/PRA and BaFin perceive the value of the 
engagement with this task to be a chance to influence the end result in their 
favour (see Section 6.2.1). The task of coordinating day-to-day supervision 
of cross-border banks in supervisory colleges, in turn, might be expected to 
provide an arena for finding agreement through the exchange of 
information. However, it is questionable to what extent national banking 
supervisors indeed value this task –and hence engage with it- given the 
social relations they are embedded in with regard to this task (i.e. the 
pressure on regulators to avoid a bank failure at all costs) (Section 6.2.2). 
 
 
6.2.1 Technical Standard-Setting: Facilitating Contention between 
National Regulators 
Indeed, we find that national authorities attempt to convince each other of 
the merit of their respective ideas and practices in a deliberative process in 
specialised CEBS/EBA working groups. Differences in views amongst 
national regulators which need to be mediated in this mechanism include 
such questions as whether to apply more quantitative risk management 
tools –as often favoured by the UK regulator– or more qualitative tools, as 
preferred by the German regulator. National authorities try to influence the 
end-result in their favour to align them to their existing ideas and practices. 
High capacity regulators –such as the UK and German ones– attempt to 
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exert this influence by supplying high numbers of staff with authoritative 
expertise on specific matters to CEBS/EBA working groups.  
The role of CEBS and EBA staff in this process is to facilitate the 
different views represented within this deliberative process in order to 
ensure that agreement is reached. In this regard, they have adopted an 
approach of strategic pragmatism to ensure timely and workable solutions, 
rather than intervening in deliberations as an additional actor with a 
specific view. Tools used in this regard include an early identification of 
contentious issues, re-phrasing issues in an uncontroversial manner or the 
proposition of interim solutions. CEBS/the EBA have hereby focused on 
creating consensus, rather than intervening into the on-going debate about 
the most effective risk management tools. CEBS and the EBA staff make use 
of the resources at their disposal in order to facilitate consensus, such as 
their better overview and information of positions across all national 
regulators.  
Technical standard-setting at the transnational level is an arena of 
contention since a common decision needs to be taken that restrains all 
further action of national regulators. These frame their engagement with 
this transnational process through the filter of their different national risk 
management paradigms and practices that are embedded in domestic social 
relations. In this light, British and German regulators have been adamant in 
securing influence on the technical rule-making process in CEBS and the 
EBA, especially under the raised circumstances of binding technical rules in 
the new system: 
 
In […] CEBS BaFin sings as part of the choir of European 
supervisors. However, when the accommodation of European 
harmonisation with German interests is concerned, BaFin 
sometimes sings an audible solo.294 
 
[The Capital Requirements Directice IV regulation package] is 
currently one of the most important topics in banking supervision. 
In the years ahead, the EBA will be having to draft technical 
standards for all the supervisory processes – for the Capital 
Requirements Regulation alone, there will be more than 100 of 
                                                 
294 Translated by the author. Original: “In […] CEBS singt die BaFin im Chor der europäischen 
Aufsichtsbehörden. Wenn es aber darum geht, europäische Harmonisierung und deutsche Interessen 
in Einklang zu bringen, stimmt sie bisweilen auch ein starkes Solo an” (Jochen Sanio, President of 
BaFin at the time, Bafin, 2003, p. 3). 
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these. We must ensure that legitimate German interests remain 
safeguarded here [emphasis added].295 
 
[…] I cannot stress enough the importance of the changes to the 
European regulatory architecture. The PRA [...] [is] now operating 
as an extension of a broader European policy-making framework. 
Therefore, the effective engagement with the European process is 
paramount to their success. Critically, we need to win the argument 
in Europe that supervisors need to have firm-specific discretion 
and that regulations need to be tailored towards local 
circumstance. If this does not happen, the European framework will 
become discredited.296 
 
In this regard, officials note that technical rule-making in CEBS/the EBA is 
an arena in which ‘lost ground’ at the Basel or Council level can be 
attempted to be redeemed, as expressed by a BaFin official: 
 
Even if you had to give in when a few broader issues are concerned, 
you can still make up for that when agreeing on the detailed 
questions.297 
 
Regulators such as BaFin and the FSA/PRA have differing views on how best 
to manage risk, which are attached to the social relations they are 
embedded in at home. They are hence intent on influencing the results in 
their favour.  In practice, national officials report that in order to convince 
other supervisors of their approach it is vital to present a well-argued, 
coherent, workable idea. This, in turn, is usually only possible if a national 
supervisor has particular expertise in an area, for example, due to working 
on an issue on a national basis before it becomes an issue the European 
level. In this regard for example, British regulators could convince others of 
the idea of using regulators’ own models to verify banks’ internal stress test 
in the Basel III negotiations because they were able to show a concrete 
model they had developed. “Once you present a coherent model, it will be 
                                                 
295
 BaFin, 2012, p. 28. 
296 Speech by Hector Sants, then Chief Executive of the PRA, to the BBA entitled ‘The Future of 
Banking Regulation in the UK’, BBA Annual Conference,Guildhall 2011. 
297 Interviewee B2, BaFin official. A concrete example in this respect was given as the following: ”Take 
the example of the leverage ratio [...]: Even if you could not prevent that a fixed capital add-on results 
from the leverage ratio, you can still make sure it is more like what you wanted –namely that it is a 
corrective device- [...] in the technical standard by setting the reporting requirement for this. Original 
in German: “Selbst wenn ich bei ein paar Grundsatzfragen nachgeben musste, kann ich durch das 
Festlegen von Detailfragen noch einige nationale Interessen festsetzen. Nehmen wir mal das Beispiel 
von der Leverage Ratio. […] Wenn ich schon nicht verhindern konnte, dass tatsächlich eine feste 
Kapitalanforderung aus der Leverage Ratio entsteht, kann ich aber dafür sorgen, dass das was ich in 
die Verhandlungen einbringen wollte, nämlich, dass es eine Korrekturgöße sein soll […] dann in den 
technischen Standard einbringe, wie die Berichtspflicht aussehen soll.  
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very difficult for anyone else to counter this unless you form an immediate 
counter coalition”.298  
In order to present such a coherent idea, interviewees agree that one 
needs to write a substantial part of the measure to be adopted: “Only he 
who writes stays in the process”.299 This, in turn, usually requires the need 
to chair a working and/or sub-working group on the matter. The FSA/PRA 
and BaFin have made their desire to occupy these positions explicit: 
 
Let us be clear: There is no alternative to the European System of 
Financial Supervisors. Europe is a common economic area for 
which we will need in due course a common rule book. This is also 
in the interest of the German financial industry. [...] In this 
connection it is important for us to bring our influence to bear in all 
ways and to contribute our expertise: for example in the Boards of 
Supervisors, through working together in working groups in which 
the technical standards are developed, by occupying top positions 
and by providing the best possible advice to the chief political 
negotiators in the Council. [...] BaFin will assist the work of the ESAs 
and the ESRB, but will also keep a critical eye on them.300 
 
(Sub-)working group chairmanships are distributed according to expertise 
of specific individuals or national authorities. In this regard, officials from 
the ‘Big Five’ (Spain, Italy, France, Germany and the UK) are frequent 
holders of such positions.301 This is as result of their large expertise (in turn 
related to their  substantial industries) and the related administrative 
capacities: The expertise expected to chair a working group usually requires 
the ability to evaluate an issue (such as the definition of capital or a common 
reporting framework) from various angles, which is often not feasible for an 
individual. In this regard, officials rely on work conducted by colleagues in 
their home authority for this purpose. As expressed by a UK official “those 
Member States […] that are willing and able to put capable staff on the 
working parties have a considerable opportunity to influence the results”.302 
                                                 
298 Interviewee B5 former BaFin official. 
299 Interviewee B2 (BaFin official), the German original was expressed as “wer schreibt, der bleibt”. 
300 BaFin, 2012, p.28. Also, see AK BA, 2010b, p.8; AK BA, 2011, p.8 for Germany, and FSA, 2010, p.12 
for the UK. 
301 However, officials from smaller authorities, such as the Dutch, Belgian , Finnish and Swedish 
authorities (and to a more limited extent the Irish regulator) have been in crucial positions over the 
years as well (see CEBS, 2004, p. 8ff; 2005, p.11, 13; 2006, p.32; 2007c, p.41; 2008, p. 32; 2009, p.55 
for an overview of the chairmanship of the highest level of working groups). 
302 This was expressed in a House of Lords Committee hearing by the then Deputy Chair of the EBA 
and Member of the Executive Committee of the FSA Thomas Huertas (see House of Lords, 2011, p. 
15). 
6. Banking Regulation and Supervision   
 
174 
 
This is usually not possible for smaller authorities. However, it is reported 
that deliberate attempts are made to give chairmanships to smaller 
authorities, especially from the ‘new’ Member States.303 
Issues of contention are hence identified and resolved through the 
working group process, whereby the text is passed back and forth between 
sub-groups and working groups. Usually an agreement has hence been 
struck once the text reaches the potential voting situation amongst CEBS 
members and now the EBA’s Board of Supervisors. If the Commission 
worries about the compatibility of a measure with EU law it will usually 
voice its view at this stage, rather than when the EBA submits a draft 
measure to be endorsed by the Commission to become legally binding.304 
CEBS/EBA staff, in turn, have not been active brokers in this process in the 
sense of advocating the value of some risk management tools; rather, they 
have taken a pragmatic approach to establishing agreement between 
national officials, especially due to the necessity to come to a decision under 
set timeframes: In this regard, areas of contention have, for example, been 
“re-phrased until the problem disappears”.305 Alternatively, the lowest 
common denominator has been found or principles broad enough to allow 
discretion in the tools to be used to reach an end have been formulated. For 
example, in its Guidelines of Hybrid Capital Instruments (which refers to 
instruments which have features of equity and debt, hence requiring clear 
definitions of when they are deemed to be capital by regulators) broader 
principles were agreed upon instead of clearly delineated rules with regard 
to the ability of hybrids to absorb losses.306 This decision was justified by a 
cost-benefit analysis of principles as opposed to ‘rules’, thereby showing a 
                                                 
303 See for example the Chairmanships held by Poland (CEBS, 2007c, p. 41), Hungary and Malta (CEBS, 
2008, p. 32). Interviewees report, however, that this has been a challenge due to a lack of staff and 
expertise in the ‘new’ Member States.  
304 At the time of writing, only one draft standard had been passed to the Commission, which 
endorsed it without changes. This was the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 152/2013 of 19 
December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on capital requirements for central 
counterparties. 
305 Interviewee B2, BaFin official. German original “das Problem wegformuliert”. 
306 CEBS Implementation Guidelines Hybrid Capital Instruments, 10 December 2010 (see p.8 –
especially para.40 for summary intelligible for non-experts). However, this is not to argue that 
CEBS/EBA rules always favour principles-based regulation, see for example para.41 of the same 
Guidelines. Rather, this seems to be highly issue depended (i.e. whether there is support for and 
agreement about more detailed rules and whether the issue at stake is not too complex to be covered 
in a  prescriptive form). 
6. Banking Regulation and Supervision   
 
175 
 
crucial role for CEBS staff and working group chairs (and now the EBA staff) 
to prompt a reasoned weighting of different options available when 
controversial issues are concerned without taking an explicit stance rooted 
in a particular regulatory philosophy.  
CEBS/the EBA thus make use of the resources available to them to 
foster agreement in a pragmatic fashion. A key activity hereby on part of 
CEBS and EBA staff has also been to identify contentious issues at the very 
beginning of the process of devising an output in order to avoid any last 
minute difficulties in adopting a text, as done in the drafting of the CEBS’s 
technical advice to the European Commission on options and national 
discretions, which aimed to identify possible areas in which the granting of 
national discretions in the CRD could be reduced: The working group here 
started with a thorough investigation of the national discretions in place in 
all countries in order to identify precisely what the key issues of contentions 
were from the very beginning.307 This, however, did not succeed in relation 
to BaFin’s demands with regard to the supposed specificities of the German 
banking sector and the political economy attached to it: The need to keep a 
special status for German (and Austrian) co-operative banks was a central 
point of disagreement when CEBS was drafting this technical advice, 
whereby no agreement could be reached and the German position remained 
isolated without resolving the issue.308 Indeed, as in the CRD IV as well, the 
specific needs of co-operative banks remain to be taken into account in an 
EBA draft Regulatory Standard on Own Funds Requirements, which is 
specifically crucial for BaFin, which has been vocal in advocating a definition 
of capital which does not disadvantage the specific business model of its 
cooperative banks in all regulatory fora.309 Extensive engagement with the 
transnational process hence provides value to BaFin by allowing it to 
maintain practices that are embedded in very specific social relations in the 
domestic setting.  
                                                 
307 See text of the Advice, especially with regard to the questionnaire created by CEBS to establish the 
nature of national discretions. This was also confirmed by interviewee B9, former CEBS and Dutch 
official. 
308 See, for example, p.60 of the Advice text. 
309 See EBA near-final draft Regulatory Technical Standard on Own Funds Requirements, see Recital 
(4). Also see AK BA, 2009, p.4; AK BA, 2010, p. 6, for German regulatory position.  
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Staff of the EBA have also offered guidance and interim solutions in 
the longstanding unresolved debate amongst experts as to how to define 
capital (EBA, 2012b). Moreover, the EBA has offered interim solutions when 
a particularly contentious issue is concerned, namely supervisory and 
financial reporting (for example, see EBA, 2011, p. 3):310 The attempt to 
harmonise supervisory and financial reporting from banks to supervisors 
across the EU (COREP and FINREP) exemplifies the difficulties in 
coordinating different risk management paradigms, which are embedded in 
particular sets of social relations.311 A key matter in this regard has been the 
large differences in national traditions in this field, which are inevitably tied 
to wider social relations, such as particular accounting standards, and an 
emphasis on quantitative or more qualitative approaches to banking 
supervision. For example, when CEBS was working on formulating the 
Guidelines on common supervisory reporting (COREP), the direction that 
was taken relied on a quantitative approach, which has been seen critically 
by regulators which favour more qualitative tools, such as BaFin.312  
Although agreement on the reporting guidelines could be reached, it needs 
to be taken into account that decision-making in CEBS still happened under 
a different pre-text due to the non-binding nature of its output: Whereas 
Guidelines could be agreed upon, implementation across countries varied. 
The FSA only implemented COREP and FINREP to a very limited extent at 
the time (CEBS, 2007, especially p.46) which allowed it to collect 
significantly fewer data points than other national authorities (FSA, 2007b, 
p.7, p. 24). This was more in line with its overall risk management 
philosophy at the time (FSA, 2006, p. 12f, p.33). BaFin implemented COREP 
partially but  refrained from making FINREP mandatory for its industry 
(BaFin, 2012b, p. 5), whereby it had especially spoken out against the 
heavily prescriptive rule-like nature of the framework as a form of 
unacceptable “maximum harmonization” (BaFin, 2005, p.45f). The reform of 
COREP and FINREP now fleshed out in the forum of the EBA will hence 
                                                 
310 Also, all interviewees pointed this area out has being particularly difficult to come to agreements 
on. 
311 COREP refers to the common reporting of supervisory information, such as the reporting of own 
funds by banks to supervisors. FINREP refers to the reporting of financial accounting data (including 
the balance sheet) by banks to their supervisors. 
312 Interviewee B12, EBA official. 
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require radical changes in reporting practices in countries like the UK and 
Germany (and much less so in countries such as Belgium which 
implemented most aspects of these frameworks in previous years).313 
Consequently, an agreement on these technical standards has reportedly 
been specifically difficult under the new EBA regime. In this light, the staff of 
the EBA advanced a pragmatic interim solution when FINREP is concerned, 
which permitted the issue to be decided at a later point while the 
Commission prepares new legislative proposals on the matter in order to 
avoid stalemate (EBA, 2011, p.3f). The staff of the EBA, then, primarily 
intervenes pragmatically to ensure that output is delivered according to the 
deadlines of the given legal requirements, rather than advancing a specific 
regulatory approach.  
The facilitating role played by the EU hub of national authorities has  
changed with the switch from CEBS to the EBA: The EBA has around a 
hundred staff to take a more proactive role in formulating technical rules, 
and the current Chairperson Andrea Enria is vocal in pushing for less 
discretion in rules and more convergence in practices.314 This potentially 
opens a new fault-line between the EBA staff, on the one hand, and national 
officials on the other hand. Tasks of the EBA in which the authority acts as a 
source of expertise in its own right – during the aftermath of the crisis most 
crucially its role in the ‘stress-testing’ of banks– mean that there are 
possibilities for establishing its ‘actorness’.315 However, in order to carry out 
stress-tests of banks the EBA remains dependent on data provided by 
                                                 
313 For an analysis in this regard when Germany is concerned, see Cluse and Wolfgarten, 2012. 
314 For example, with regard to the supervisory review process (Pillar 2 of Basel) in which regulators 
assess the soundness of a bank in light of its business model, Mr Enria –Chairperson of the EBA at the 
time of writing- has put forward to use EBA as a tool for more convergence in the way this is carried 
out across countries (see speech by Andrea Enria entitled ‘The future of EU regulation’, 29 June 2011, 
London).  
315 Art.22(2), Art.23, Regulation 1093/2010. 
A ‘stress-test’ verifies the soundness of a bank against various scenarios of heightened risk (such as 
the impact of the collapse of a systematically important financial institution on a particular bank). In 
this regard it needs to be pointed out that CEBS had been carrying out stress-tests since 2009. 
However, the increased responsibilities and public visibility of the EBA should not be underestimated 
when stress-tests carried out by the EBA are compared to CEBS exercises. The 2011 stress-test of the 
EBA was specifically controversial and its results were questioned by the banking sector and experts 
in the field. As many German banks showed to have a shortfall of capital in the test, the results were 
especially challenged by the German industry and regulator. For example, ‘European bank stress test 
results raise doubts, hopes’, EurActiv, 18 July 2011; see Jenkins and Atkins, 2011, ‘European banks 
have €115bn shortfall’, Financial Times, 8 December 2011; Storn, 2011, ‘Die Schwächen des Stress 
Tests’, Zeit Online, 9 December 2011). 
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national authorities, which has contributed to the problems occurring in the 
first rounds of these exercises.316 The methodology to be used in these 
stress tests has remained a source of tension between countries favouring 
stricter or more lenient tests (House of Lords, 2011, p.13). This, in turn, has 
arguably had the effect of lowering the EBA’s reputation as hub of expertise 
in its own right.317 Nevertheless, it has become clear that the authority does 
not shy away from making use of gathered data to perform its own analyses 
as a means to further its official objectives (such as harmonisation of 
practices across countries). This has, for example, been expressed in the 
exercise of calculating the capital requirements of the same bank by using 
different approaches as found in the practices of national regulators, 
thereby showing that these can lead to very different requirements for 
banks (Enria, 2012). Whereas interviewees have indeed commented upon 
the ‘self-confidence’ of the EBA as an actor in its own right, the restrictions 
posed on the EBA in terms of resource constraints in a time of high work 
pressure (i.e. the adoption of the CRR/CRD IV package which requires the 
EBA to adopt around 100 technical standards)318 are likely to restrain 
potential fault-lines between the European authority and its national 
counter-parts. Increasing staff numbers for the EBA would be likely to 
change this, whilst, however, it is doubtful that large national supervisors 
will change their view on “the eternal question of the staff”.319 After all, 
national regulators like the PRA and the BaFin engage proactively with the 
transnational process –which creates capacity in the absence of sufficient 
formal authority of the EBA– since they can get something out if it: It 
provides them with a chance to maintain their practices that are attached to 
very specific social relations at the national level.  
 
 
This section of the chapter has demonstrated that the standard-setting task 
of CEBS/the EBA shapes a coordinative pattern that is characterised by 
                                                 
316 This has also resulted in the decision of the EBA to cancel its 2013 stress-test due to differences in 
national approaches (and hence the data delivered to the EBA to carry out stress-tests) in order to 
await further harmonisation as a result of recent legislative efforts and the Banking Union. 
317 See supra note 62 and 63.  
318 See supra note 7. 
319 As expressed by Interviewee B4. 
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contention between national authorities, which is resolved through 
bargaining, deliberation and the pragmatic input of CEBS/the EBA. German 
and UK authorities engage heavily with this transnational process since it 
provides them with an opportunity to safeguard their established practices 
–which are embedded in social relations at the domestic level– to the 
greatest degree possible. In this regard, the pragmatic approach of CEBS/the 
EBA to facilitate coordination by providing solutions that are workable in 
differing settings of social relations is valued by national authorities. This 
part of the chapter has also shown that this coordination pattern remained 
very similar under CEBS and the EBA. This provides further evidence that it 
is indeed tasks and social relations –rather than the authority of a given EU 
body- that drive the coordinative behaviour of national authorities.  
 
 
6.2.2 Cross-Border Supervision in Colleges: CEBS and the EBA as 
Encumbered Facilitators of Contention 
Next to technical standard-setting, CEBS/the EBA also have the key task to 
facilitate the coordination of day-to-day supervision of cross-border 
banking groups in so-called supervisory colleges. This provides an excellent 
opportunity to explore the coordinative behaviour of the same set 
regulatory actors under a different task and potentially different social 
relations that are directly relevant to this particular task. Supervisory 
colleges have a distinct place in the work of CEBS/the EBA since all issues 
arising in transnational coordination are magnified in their realm: Concrete 
collaboration is needed in order to coordinate the supervision of a cross-
border bank. In order for coordination to function, the involved banking 
supervisors need to supply comparable types of information to the 
coordination process, they need to have similar understanding as to how to 
interpret it and when to act on it. This is especially so since the EBA was 
established since national authorities now need to decide jointly on the 
adequacy of the capital of cross-border banks within the given college based 
on a common risk assessment.320 Supervisory colleges pre-date the financial 
                                                 
320 This was introduced in Art.129(3) of the revised Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), approved 
by the European Parliament on 6 May 2009 (2009/111/EC), which applied from 31 December 2010. 
In the most recent updates of the CRD (‘CRD IV‘), the relevant provisions can be found in Art.72, 84, 
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crisis and have also been set up at the international level (D’Hulster, 2012). 
Hereby, the exchange of information, the reaching of common 
understandings of how to interpret it, and when to take action have been 
highly challenging for banking supervisors: Worries about the 
confidentiality of data (as, for example, it might be leaked to the press) and 
national data protection laws can be an impediment to free exchanges of 
information. Also, the use of different reporting standards and risk models 
can render it difficult for regulators to make sense of each other’s data and 
overall approach to risk management (D’Hulster, 2012, p. 305).   
CEBS started to take a proactive approach to alleviating the above 
difficulties by observing colleges and by formulating ‘best practices’ and 
detailed guidelines. In this regard, CEBS took a “pioneering role” in 
attempting to facilitate transnational coordination in this regard (ibid. p. 
313). The EBA has continued this approach and has been given more wide-
ranging authority to facilitate coordination between national supervisors. 
However, these enhanced powers have not been able to counteract the 
social relations that national authorities are embedded in with regard to the 
task of coordinating day-to-day supervision of cross-border banks: They 
have come under severe pressure from their governments to avoid bank 
failures at all costs. National supervisors do not perceive to gain an added 
value through coordination in supervisory colleges with regard to these 
social relations: The open exchange of information with other national 
authorities has the potential to become detrimental to this objective that 
emanates from the social relations they are embedded in at home, even 
though engagement with transnational coordination is the only possible 
means to gauge the full picture of the financial soundness of a cross-border 
bank on the whole: If, for example, a home regulator shares concerns about 
the health of a given bank with a host supervisor, and this host supervisor 
subsequently ring-fences the operations of the subsidiary of this bank 
operating in its country, the bank could get into financial difficulties in its 
home country. 
                                                                                                                                    
92, 100(1)(a) and 100(a). Also, see CEBS Guidelines for the joint assessment and joint decision 
regarding the capital adequacy of cross-border groups (GL39), 2010. At the time of writing, the EBA is 
consulting on the predecessor of these Guidelines in form of binding technical standards. 
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The work of supervisory colleges is often characterised with 
difficulties to solve coordination problems: Pervasive issues in this regard 
are problems with effective communication, particularly under time 
constraints. Reportedly, it can be difficult to communicate and jointly take 
decisions within the strict time limits of EU requirements. An example in 
this regard is the so-called model validation process, whereby banks can use 
their own models to estimate some forms of risk if these models comply 
with certain rules, and if they are authorised by their supervisor: In relation 
to cross-border banks, all national authorities that are involved in the 
supervision of the this bank need to agree on whether the model is adequate 
for the estimation of risk. As a result, BaFin has sometimes gone ahead alone 
and sought host supervisors agreement to a particular model validation only 
afterwards, while the FSA has sometimes gone significantly over the time 
requirement to be able to communicate with host supervisors (i.e. 
supervisors which supervise subsidiaries of a bank in their territory) before 
validating the internal model of a bank (CEBS, 2009b).321 Especially when 
BaFin is concerned, misunderstandings due to lack of frequent 
communication have been a problem according to host supervisors (ibid., p. 
13).  The French supervisor reported that misunderstandings during a joint 
model validation arose since BaFin was not using the college as main tool 
for communication in some cases (ibid.). Moreover, according to 
supervisors, language barriers can be an issue in college work (ibid., p. 11). 
Also, different supervisory philosophies (and hence different tolerance 
levels for the failure of banks) and a lack of common terminology render 
coordination in the day-to-day supervision of banks difficult (D’Hulster, 
2012, p. 305f). Differences in supervisory approaches lead, for example, to 
significant differences between risk-weighted assets across similar forms of 
banks (Basel Committee, 2013), showing why exchange between 
supervisors with regard to the soundness of a given bank can be difficult.322 
 
We see these differences in our daily engagement with supervisory 
authorities across the EU. Our experience in supervisory colleges 
                                                 
321 As laid out in the CEBS Guidelines on the implementation, validation and assessment of Advanced 
Measurement (AMA) and Internal Ratings Based (IRB) Approaches. 
322 Speech by Andrea Enria, Chairperson of the EBA at the time of writing, at the 4th Santander 
International Banking Conference, Madrid, 18 October 2011. 
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have, for instance, shown that these differences can range from 
technical issues such as scoring scales used to measure and 
categorise risks, to more fundamental distinctions such as in the 
methodologies used to define capital requirements.323 
 
In order to alleviate these problems, CEBS/the EBA has the ambitious task 
to facilitate coordination between national authorities in the college setting. 
Some of the methods employed in this regard are the Supervisory 
Disclosure Process and ‘peer review’, which are mechanisms to enable 
national regulators to study each other’s’ practices in a horizontal fashion, 
thereby providing for an increased understanding of how other regulators 
approach prudential oversight. These two mechanisms are complemented 
by trainings conducted by CEBS/the EBA (including seminars for officials 
that fulfil the same role in their respective home authority, see, CEBS, 2006), 
the facilitation of staff exchanges on part of the EU authority (set up in 2005 
under CEBS), the provision of online discussion forums and query systems 
(CEBS, 2006), and virtual networks of experts, for example to share 
reporting practices (ibid.). CEBS has also engaged in efforts focused 
particularly on the functioning of supervisory colleges by observing college 
meetings and publishing good practices and guidelines for setting up the 
college process. Indeed, CEBS played a very active role in pushing for the 
establishment of supervisory colleges (which were called ‘operational 
networks’ in the forum of CEBS at the beginning) and can hence be seen as a 
major driver towards the institutionalisation of this cross-border 
supervision model, thereby playing a pioneering role in this field in global 
comparison.324 This included a detailed peer review covering 17 colleges to 
assess whether the CEBS guidelines on colleges were are adhered to, 
thereby being able to provide evidence-based ‘good practices’ on the basis 
of the results of the peer review (see CEBS, 2010). CEBS thus employed its 
overview of practices across national regimes to facilitate the functioning of 
                                                 
323 Ibid. 
324 See speech by Arnoud Vossen, then Secretary General of CEBS entitled ‘Towards a New 
Architecture for European Banking Supervision‘, Euro Finance Week 2009, Frankfurt, Germany. The 
setting-up of supervisory colleges then became compulsory in the revision of the Capital 
Requirements Directive often referred to as ‘CRDII, especially see Art.42, 42a, 129, 131, 131a and 132, 
Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 
amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and  2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to 
central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis 
management. 
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supervisory colleges. Indeed, national officials state that college processes 
enable them to learn about other authorities’ regulatory approaches. As a 
BaFin official noted: 
 
In general, one also needs to say that the national supervisory 
review process –so the approach taken to supervision- differ. So 
you might have a clash between more quantitative and more 
qualitative approaches. But I’d say in this respect colleges have 
been a great asset in terms of fostering a better understanding of 
the various approaches.325 
 
In trying to establish a ‘common supervisory culture’, being a motor 
towards similar practices and providing detailed guidelines for the 
functioning of colleges and a peer review, CEBS/the EBA carried out a lot of 
work which is absent in international colleges. A particularly problematic 
issue in the functioning of colleges at a global level is the absence of a 
mediator in case of conflict between supervisors (D’Hulster, 2012, p. 303), 
which has been remedied in the EU: CEBS established a mediating role for 
itself and this mechanism was formalised in the EBA. In case of 
disagreement in the college setting, the EBA’s decisions are binding on the 
national regulators.326 The mediation panel hereby consists of the EBA’s 
chairperson and two members of the Board of Supervisors (i.e. two heads of 
national regulators).327  
Also, EBA staff can now take part in all college meetings and indeed 
does so in the case of ‘priority colleges’ (monitoring the largest banking 
groups) (EBA, 2012).328 The EBA has become increasingly involved in the 
second year of its operation, whereby the EBA staff reportedly attended 77 
college meetings (EBA, 2012, p.26). Moreover, EBA officials showed their 
determination to make a constructive contribution to the functioning of 
colleges by making use of their observations, such as by publishing a good 
practices guide relating the joint decision of a group’s capital adequacy 
(ibid., p.27). CEBS and the EBA make use of its specific form of expertise in 
                                                 
325 Interviewee B3, BaFin official. 
326 Art.21(4), Regulation 1093/2010.  
327 See Decision of the European Banking Authority adopting the Rules of Procedure of the Mediation 
Panel.  
328 See Art.21(10), Regulation 1093/2011. Informally, colleges had already invited CEBS Secretariat 
members to attend some of their meetings before EBA staff was granted this right formerly, see 
Speech by Arnoud Vossen, then Secretary General of CEBS entitled ‘Towards a New Architecture for 
European Banking Supervision‘, Euro Finance Week 2009, Frankfurt, Germany. 
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this realm: After all, CEBS and now officials of the EBA enjoy a bird’s eye 
view without a direct link to the interests of the respective industries and 
pressure from governments which provide the ultimate ‘safety-net’ for their 
banks. As a former Chair of CEBS stated “What’s the role of CEBS in all this? 
The Committee is neither a home or host authority.”329 Moreover, the EBA 
has also played a role in providing ‘peer group information’ about large 
cross-border groups in order for supervisors to be able to make more 
meaningful comparisons.330 This can be useful for supervisors such as 
BaFin, as it is essentially only the home supervisor of one large cross-border 
bank (Deutsche Bank), which renders it difficult to have reference points 
when making supervisory observations and decisions.331 
Despite these formal powers of the EBA, however, in practice CEBS 
and the EBA’s role in affecting coordinative behaviour has been extremely 
limited. For example, due to a lack of staff and a focus on the adoption of 
technical standards, the mediation mechanism had only been used once at 
the time of writing.332 Even the presence of enough EBA resources and 
expertise, however, would not ensure that the EBA could act as influential 
facilitator: Coordination problems are not solved in this realm despite the 
work of CEBS and the EBA since national authorities are not willing to 
engage with the transnational process to the necessary extent. This is a 
result of not perceiving this particular coordination task to be valuable as 
informed by the social relations they are embedded in with regard to this 
coordination task.333   The incentive structure provided by the social 
relations at home –the political pressure to avoid the failure of banks– is 
essentially set against the open sharing of information between home and 
host regulator (be it in a college setting or on a bilateral basis). The home 
                                                 
329 As expressed by José María Roldán, then Chair of CEBS, at the Conference on supervisory 
convergence in Europe, Den Haag, 3 November 2004. 
330 Speech by Arnoud Vossen, then Secretary General of CEBS entitled ‘Towards a New Architecture 
for European Banking Supervision‘, Euro Finance Week 2009, Frankfurt, Germany. 
331 As pointed out by Interviewee B1, industry representative. 
332 This process was just on-going as the research for this chapter was being finalised; hence, interviewees 
were not able to speak about the process and no documents were available. 
333 Please note that college related tasks in relation to Euro-Zone banks will shortly be taken up by the 
European Central Bank in relation to its new mandate proposed under the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM). In this regard, the incentive structures arising from the fiscal responsibility of a 
‘home’ government for its bank are due to be counteracted through a single resolution mechanism 
(for example, see Howarth and Quaglia, 2013b, 2014; also see House of Lords, 2012; and 
Schoenmaker, 2010). 
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regulator has an incentive to keep information about a potentially 
deteriorating health of a parent institution to himself for as long as possible 
due the worry that the host regulator might ring-fence its subsidiary as soon 
as becoming aware of potential problems, thereby possibly even creating a 
serious liquidity issue for the overall banking group that might not 
otherwise have arisen. The host regulator, in turn, has an incentive to 
exaggerate the risks emanating from the subsidiary in order to trigger a 
further supply of capital to the foreign operations on part of the parent 
company (for a detailed analysis, see D’Hulster, 2012; Herring, 2007). 
(Banks, in turn, might be able to exploit these incentive differences between 
home and host regulator, see, for example, Holthausen and Rønde, 2004).  
 
When push comes to shove –meaning the announcement of 
negative information about one’s own banks– then us national 
supervisors prefer to keep to ourselves. As host supervisor you can 
never be sure whether the home supervisor tells you the whole sad 
truth about the parent bank. That is understandable: The home 
supervisor always needs to expect that the host supervisor –whom 
he just informed so extensively on such a collegial basis– will take 
immediate steps that will endanger the whole banking group, such 
as a ring-fencing of the host country operations. So a healthy dose 
of suspicion is the natural mentality.334 
 
What’s tended to happen now is regulators get very nervous about 
other regulators having the same information that they have 
because they think they are going to second-guess the decisions 
that were made.335 
 
In this regard, industry representatives report that especially since the crisis 
hit supervisors have been keen to extract information from the given bank 
directly; i.e. host supervisors approach the parent of the bank directly 
instead of contacting the home regulator and home regulators contact 
                                                 
334 Speech by Jochen Sanio, then president of Bafin, entitled ‘Die Fortentwicklung der Bankenaufsicht‘, 
at the Conference ’Corporate Governance bei Banken‘, KPMG Audit Committee Institute, Frankfurt am 
Main, 28 May 2009. Translated by the author, original: “Wenn es ans Eingemachte geht, sprich: die 
Bekanntgabe von Negativinformationen über die eigenen Banken, dann geben wir als nationale 
Aufseher lieber die Auster. Als Gastlandaufseher kann man sich nie sicher sein, ob der 
Heimatlandaufseher einem die gesamte traurige Wahrheit über die Lage der Mutterbank sagt. 
Verständlich ist das: Der Heimatlandaufseher muss immer damit rechnen, dass der Gastlandaufseher, 
den er gerade so kollegial und umfänglich informiert hat, sofort etwas unternimmt, was die ganze 
Bankengruppe in den Untergang treiben könnte, etwa ein ‚ring fencing‘ der Gastland-Operation. Also 
ist ein gesundes Misstrauen die natürliche Geisteshaltung.“ 
Also, see FSA, 2009, p.99, for expression of the same problem from a practitioner’s point of view. 
335 Interviewee B1, industry representative. 
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foreign subsidiaries directly instead of relying on the host regulator’s 
knowledge about the subsidiary’s health.  
 
So you get someone saying, ‘oh, I can’t believe how bad this is, we 
found this really awful problem with Deutsche Bank’ and then 
someone else will say ‘oh yeah, we found an even worse problem’, 
and actually none of them really know what’s going on, and they 
always try to outdo each other.336 
 
Where are improvements needed? I have already made public 
statements reflecting the fact that EBA considers that the level of 
information exchange between supervisory authorities was not 
sufficient in recent months, as liquidity stresses in the system 
increased. The EBA has been clear to supervisors on the need to 
provide other college members with timely and sufficiently 
granular information concerning the liquidity and financial position 
of banking groups so as to ensure that home and host authorities 
have a clear and current understanding of the risks.337  
 
The lack of proactive engagement –and problem-solving– when this 
transnational process is concerned hence needs to be understood in relation 
to the perceived interest of national banking supervisors to avoid the failure 
of one of ‘their’ banks: The exchange of information in supervisory colleges 
could endanger the financial viability of a banking group: If for, example, the 
home regulator (such as BaFin in the case of Deutsche Bank) shares 
information about concerns of the soundness of a particular bank with its 
colleagues from authorities that supervise parts of the same banking group 
in their country, the latter could potentially ring-fence the operations of the 
subsidiaries operating in their country. This, in turn, could bring the 
operations of the bank in its home country into financial difficulties, which 
could –in the worst case scenario– lead to a government funded bailout of 
this bank. That national authorities perceive their interest to be the 
safeguarding of information –and as a result do not value the transnational 
coordination activities of CEBS and the EBA to warrant sufficient 
engagement– can only be understood in the context of the social relations 
they are embedded in at home: The link between banks and ‘their’ 
governments when financial aid is concerned means that governments have 
                                                 
336 Ibid. 
337 Speech by Andrea Enria, Chairperson of the European Banking Authority, at the 4th Santander 
International Banking Conference, Madrid, 18 October 2011. 
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put enormous pressure on banking supervisors to avoid a potential bank 
failure at all costs.  
Banking supervisors are interdependent in relation to the 
supervision of cross-border banks and have a functional rationale to engage 
with coordination (see Schoenmaker and Oosterloo, 2005): Only open 
sharing of information can result in an aggregate picture of the financial 
health of a cross-border banking group, which, in turn, is vital to all involved 
regulators (as a result of which they indeed attempt to obtain this 
information directly from banks). However, it is not these functional 
pressures, but the unfavourable assessment of transnational coordination 
on parts of national regulators as informed by the specific social relations 
they are embedded in, that drive their coordinative behaviour. The 
proactive attempt of CEBS and the EBA to counteract the ensuing 
coordination problems cannot offset national regulators’ perception of their 
own interest that derive from deeply embedded social relation at the 
national level.  
 
This part of the chapter provides an example of a case in which national 
regulators do not value the coordination task of an EU regulatory body 
sufficiently to solve coordination problems: In the context of the social 
relations they are embedded in at home –the pressure to avoid a bank 
failure at all costs– national authorities assess this task unfavourably. As a 
result, the efforts of CEBS and the EBA to solve coordination problems 
through their activities are relatively ineffective.  
 
 
 
6.3 Conclusions 
This chapter confirms that a standard-setting task results in a coordination 
pattern of contention, bargaining and deliberative persuasion: UK and 
German authorities try to convince other national regulators of the value of 
their approach to banking supervision by supplying skilled staff that tries to 
provide the ‘best arguments’ to the working groups of CEBS/the EBA, which 
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draft the technical standards that are later voted on by the Board of 
Supervisors. Since, however, regulatory practices in this realm are deeply 
embedded in the domestic setting, contention is at times difficult to resolve. 
As a result, the staff of CEBS/the EBA act as pragmatic facilitator of the 
standard-setting process, whereby they advance practical solutions for 
fostering agreement, rather than advocating a particular vision of sound risk 
management themselves. The banking regulators of the UK and Germany 
engage proactively with this transnational coordination process since they 
value it in relation to the social relations they are embedded in: Their 
regulatory practices are attached to the administrative traditions of their 
countries as well as their banking industries, which renders changes 
difficult to carry out, as well as extremely costly (on material and immaterial 
level). Hence, the UK and German authorities engage with CEBS/the EBA’s 
standard-task –thereby creating its capacity to set standards in the first 
place– since they value the opportunity to influence the end results in their 
favour. The pragmatic facilitator role of CEBS/the EBA hereby enters their 
positive evaluation of this task since the EU regulatory body usually tries to 
find compromises which allow national authorities to keep deeply 
embedded practices intact.  
 The case study also demonstrates that national authorities indeed do 
not engage heavily with a transnational process if they do not value it from 
the vantage point of the social relations they are embedded in: CEBS/the 
EBA also have the task of facilitating the coordinated supervision of cross-
border banking groups in so-called supervisory colleges. In contrast to 
technical standard-setting, however, these efforts are relatively ineffective 
and UK and German supervisors do not engage with the processes to a 
significant degree. Although banking supervisors are interdependent in 
relation to the supervision of cross-border banks –and are thus exposed to a 
functional pressure to coordinate– they often fail to do so since they do not 
value this task as informed by their social relations: The crucial social 
relations in this regard are found in the link between failing banks and their 
governments, which, in turn, have put severe pressure on their banking 
supervisors to avoid a bank failure at all costs in the aftermath of the 2008 
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financial crisis. In the setting of these social relations, there is an incentive 
for the home and the host supervisors of a cross-border bank not to share 
information about the financial soundness of this bank due to fears of the 
subsequent actions of their counterparts. Such an action could, for example, 
be a ring-fencing of resources on part of the host regulators when they get 
worried about the state of a given bank. In turn, this can cause the home 
branch of the bank to get into financial difficulties in the first place, 
potentially requiring a ‘bail-out’ of its government. 
 The chapter shows, then, that the same set of actors can be 
embedded in different social relations with regard to different tasks, hence 
leading them to value one transnational coordination process, but not 
another: Whilst UK and German banking supervisors perceive the 
engagement of standard-setting in CEBS/the EBA to be valuable to their 
work in the context of the social relations they are embedded in, they do not 
perceive the facilitation of coordinated supervision of cross-border banks to 
be valuable enough to engage with this transnational process to a significant 
extent. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that national regulators engage extensively in 
transnational coordination processes with their sister authorities. In doing 
so, they render it possible for EU regulatory bodies to fulfil their tasks and 
thus crucially support potential bureaucratic ‘rivals’ in their work. In light of 
what we know about the motivation of governmental authorities’ to protect 
their turf, this is surprising. It was hence examined what determines the 
coordinative behaviour of national regulators at the transnational level. The 
EU governance literature has developed three lines of reasoning in this 
regard, namely that coordinative behaviour is driven by professional norms, 
functional pressures and the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. The thesis demonstrated 
that all three literatures highlight aspects which are important for 
understanding coordinative behaviour. However, they underestimate the 
extent of the coordination problems inherent in these processes (which are 
pointed out by the relevant public administration literature), and over-
characterise coordination processes, thus failing to account for the extensive 
variation in coordination patterns that was observed in this study.  
The thesis accounts for this variation by demonstrating that the 
coordinative behaviour of regulatory actors in the EU is determined by the 
task they fulfil at the transnational level –since tasks provide specific 
institutional frameworks for their interactions– and their strategic 
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considerations that are informed by the social relations they are embedded 
in: After all, regulators want to get something out of their ‘investment’ at the 
transnational level. The thesis argues that tasks and social relations need to 
be recognised as determinants of coordinative behaviour since they allow us 
to explain the highly varied patterns of coordination that were observed in 
the empirical research carried out for this project: In some cases 
coordination was largely orchestrated by EU bodies (leading to rather 
hierarchical coordination patterns), in others coordination was 
characterised by bargaining and deliberative processes between national 
regulators. In yet other cases, coordination happened largely through 
competitive dynamics or mutual exchange and adjustment between national 
authorities. This thesis suggests that the different tasks and the differences 
in social relations that the involved regulatory actors are embedded can 
explain such variation, where the three above approaches have tended to 
focus on the similarities of transnational coordination processes across 
policy areas and national regulators. The first section of the Conclusion 
reiterates these findings of the study and elaborates on the manner in which 
the identified determinants of coordinative behaviour contribute to the 
relevant literature (Section 7.1). 
The thesis also demonstrates that British and German regulators are 
heavily engaged in transnational coordination processes, thereby 
contributing crucially to capacity building that renders the management of 
‘European’ risks without a ‘European’ state possible. Whilst the thesis does 
not analyse the effectiveness of coordination efforts as such, it nevertheless 
demonstrates that formal authority, expertise and resources on parts of EU 
bodies are not necessary in order to create capacities at the transnational 
level: As long as national authorities perceive the engagement with 
coordination activities to add value to their own work –however they define 
it– their participation can contribute crucially to creating ‘European’ 
capacities where these do not formally exist. This insight also has 
implications for the study of transnational coordination efforts at the 
international level, where coordination efforts are much more dependent on 
the willingness of national authorities to create capacities beyond their 
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jurisdiction. Equally, these findings are of interest to the study of 
coordination processes in public administration in general, especially with 
regard to the formulation of the conditions in which inter-organisational 
coordination can function. These wider contributions of this thesis are 
elaborated upon in the second section of the chapter (Section 7.2). 
 
 
 
7.1 What Determines Coordinative Behaviour at the 
Transnational Level? 
The empirical findings of this thesis demonstrate that coordination patterns 
differ vastly across policy areas and the involved national authorities (see 
Section 7.1.1). The thesis argues that existing explanatory approaches 
cannot adequately account for this variation. Rather, the observed 
differences can be explained by the different tasks regulatory actors carry 
out, as well as the different social relations they are embedded in (see 
Section 7.1.2). 
 
 
7.1.1 Observing Variation of Coordination Patterns 
The empirical findings of this study demonstrate the existence of a wide 
array of coordination patterns at the transnational level: Some coordination 
patterns are based on horizontal exchanges between national regulators, 
others on vertical relations between EU bodies and national authorities. We 
observed the occurrence of contention between the involved actors in some 
cases, whilst we found a focus on agreement between the involved 
authorities in others.  
 We found a coordination pattern mainly based on horizontal 
exchanges between regulators in banking regulation and supervision, drug 
safety, as well as food risk assessment. Whereas coordination between 
banking regulators in the forum of the EBA was shown to be riddled with 
contention and disagreement between the involved national regulators, the 
relations between food risk assessors and pharmaceuticals regulators in the 
forum of EFSA and EMA were instead characterised by the areas of 
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agreement between them (see Table 7.1). Mechanisms through which 
contention was reconciled and agreement was reached, however, differed 
crucially across all three cases (see Table 7.2): Coordination between 
banking regulators is characterised by bargaining and deliberative 
processes in which they attempt to convince each other of the value of their 
practices in the (sub-)working groups of the EBA. In the case of food risk 
assessment the coordination process is defined by mutual exchange of their 
practices and scientific outputs. This is often followed by mutual adjustment 
to each other’s scientific positions. In drug safety monitoring, in turn, the 
coordination process is defined by epistemic competition, in which the 
perceived ‘best’ model of data-gathering and evaluation sets the informal 
coordinated standard that other national authorities strive towards. In this 
case, then, coordination functions through competition in which the ‘best’ 
model wins, thus driving potential changes in practices among regulators in 
order to compete with the dominant model.  Hence, even in cases where 
coordination is mostly based on direct relations and exchanges between 
national authorities in the forum of an EU regulatory body, we find an 
extraordinary variety in the functioning of the coordination process.  
 
 
Table 7.1: Observed Coordinative Relations between Regulatory Actors 
 
 Agreement Contention 
Horizontal Exchanges Drug safety monitoring 
Food risk assessment 
Banking regulation and 
supervision 
 
Vertical Exchanges Food controls 
 
Maritime Safety 
 
 
 
 
A coordination pattern mostly based on vertical relations between 
the given EU regulatory body and national authorities was found in 
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maritime safety and food controls (see Table 7.2). The coordination process 
in these cases was characterised by the central role the staff of the involved 
EU regulatory bodies play in defining coordinated practices and driving 
change in the practices of national authorities. In maritime safety the 
modification of behaviour is largely based on the formal enforcement 
mechanism of the EU system (i.e. infringement proceedings). In the case of 
food controls, on the other hand, it is mostly based on persuasion of national 
authorities on part of the FVO before infringement proceedings become 
necessary. Whereas the UK and German maritime safety authorities contest 
the role of EMSA in this hierarchical coordination pattern, such contestation 
could not be identified among food control authorities in these two 
countries. Hence, we also find variation in coordination processes in cases in 
which coordination is based on vertical relations between EU bodies and 
national authorities (see Table 7.1).  
 
Table 7.2: Observed Coordination Patterns 
 
Bargaining and 
deliberation  
 
Epistemic 
competition 
 
Mutual exchange 
and adjustment  
Hierarchy 
Banking 
regulation 
 
Banking regulators 
attempt to convince 
each other of their 
regulatory approaches 
in deliberative 
processes in the EBA’s 
working groups to 
avoid the costs of 
adjustment. 
 
Drug safety 
 
 
 
Drug safety regulators 
compete to become the 
dominant model of 
data gathering and 
exchange to avoid the 
costs of adjustment.  
 
 
Food risk 
assessment 
 
Food risk assessors 
exchange information 
and adjust to each 
other’s scientific 
outputs to maintain 
their reputation.  
Food controls 
Maritime safety 
 
The FVO and EMSA (in 
conjunction with the 
Commission) define 
and enforce 
coordinated practices. 
Enforcement happens 
through ‘soft’ 
persuasion in food 
controls and through 
‘hard’ legal 
enforcement in 
maritime safety. 
 
 
Moreover, national authorities make use of and engage with transnational 
coordination processes in a variety of ways: Whereas food control 
authorities in the UK and Germany use the work of the FVO to improve 
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control over their own territory, maritime safety officials in the UK and 
Germany make use of EMSA’s coordination activities as an assurance that 
control is sufficiently exerted in other authorities’ jurisdictions. In drug 
safety, the UK regulator uses EMA processes to establish its model as 
dominant ‘gold standard’, whilst German authorities use it to gain access to 
an expertise that is perceived as superior and to modify practices to remain 
competitive with the dominant model. British and German food risk 
assessors, in turn, utilise their coordination activities in EFSA to reinforce 
public trust in their scientific outputs. The level of engagement of national 
authorities in transnational authorities was hereby also observed to differ: 
Whereas German and British authorities engaged with transnational 
processes very proactively in most of the studied cases, their involvement 
was less pronounced in the case of the coordination of the day-to-day 
supervision of cross-border banks. Overall, then, the way in which 
coordination functions varies greatly across policy areas and national 
authorities.  
 
 
7.1.2 Explaining Coordinative Behaviour: Tasks and Social Relations 
This thesis suggests that previous explanatory approaches cannot fully 
account for this vast variation in coordination patterns. It argues that the 
tasks of EU regulatory bodies –which are usually carried out by national 
officials coming together in the forum of these EU bodies– shape the 
coordinative behaviour of regulatory actors, and thus help us to explain 
variation: These tasks provide institutional frameworks, which set up 
specific relations between the involved authorities. In doing so, they provide 
specific incentive structures for strategic behaviour and provide particular 
frames for action. What ‘strategic behaviour’ means for the involved 
regulators –and whether they perceive their engagement with these 
transnational tasks to be ‘worth it’– is informed by the social relations they 
are embedded in their domestic setting and beyond. These social relations 
act as interpretative filter through which national authorities perceive the 
world, as well as constituting their main frame of reference, and thus need 
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to be seen as vehicles for interest formation. Since national regulators are 
the ‘operative arm’ (compare to Wilson, 2000 [1989], pp.31-110) of this 
transnational bureaucracy, they need to perceive their engagement with 
transnational coordination to add value to their own work (i.e. the main 
regulatory work they perceive themselves to be engaged with). The thesis 
hence stipulates that strategic concerns are the main determinant of the 
coordinative behaviour of the involved regulators, whereby ‘strategic 
behaviour’ is shaped by tasks and informed by social relations. Since tasks 
and social relations vary greatly across policy areas and national authorities, 
they can account for the observed variation. 
 
Professional Norms as Driver of Coordinative Behaviour?  
As was outlined in Chapter 1, the constructivist literature on EU governance 
emphasises that coordinative behaviour of regulatory actors at a 
transnational level is mainly driven by professional norms (for example, 
Eberlein and Grande, 2005; Majone, 1997; Joerges and Neyer, 1997). As a 
result, this literature has tended to focus on the conformities of coordination 
processes across vastly different policy areas and national authorities as it 
puts forward that mutual exchange, learning and deliberation are key 
mechanisms across different policy areas and involved authorities (for 
example, see the analyses of ‘experimentalist governance’ across vastly 
differing policy areas in Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010). In this view, the motivation 
of regulators to invest time and resources to transnational processes is 
mainly determined by peer pressure in their professional communities 
(Majone, 1997, p.272). This thesis instead argues that transnational 
coordination processes are characterised by variation, which cannot be 
adequately accounted for by solely focusing on professional norms as 
determinant of coordinative behaviour.  
The comparison between coordination processes among drug safety 
authorities and food risk assessors (see Chapter 3 and 5 respectively) seeks 
to substantiate this insight further: The scientific communities in the two 
involved cases can be deemed to have relatively similar professional norms, 
but the coordination process in the two cases differs. In the former case it is 
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characterised by epistemic competition, while being defined by mutual 
exchange and adjustment in the latter case. Undoubtedly, the processes also 
bear similarities: In both cases the main interactions occur on a horizontal 
level between national authorities and the involved actors are seeking 
agreement, rather than being in contention with each other. Mutual 
exchange, learning and deliberation and peer dynamics certainly occur in 
the processes in both cases and the professional norms of the involved 
actors are likely to inform their behaviour in crucial ways. However, if 
professional norms were indeed the main determinant of coordinative 
behaviour it would be unlikely for transnational coordination processes to 
be characterised by such variation, especially in cases where the 
professional norms of the involved authorities are supposedly similar. 
Arguably, the emphasis on professional norms neglects that interactions 
between regulators at the transnational level are shaped by the specific 
institutional frameworks –the tasks of EU regulatory bodies– which set 
them into specific relations with each other.  
The findings of this thesis also suggest that the focus on professional 
norms neglects that the involved national authorities are embedded in 
social relations beyond these norms: The assessment of the perceived value 
of transnational coordination on part of British and German authorities was 
shown to be crucially informed by their social relations in the domestic 
settings. Concerns about their reputation among political actors and the 
public (in case of food risk assessors) and the specific systems of data 
gathering and evaluation which are deeply embedded in national structures 
(in case of drug safety regulators) informed national authorities’ 
perceptions of their own interests in these cases. In this regard, this thesis 
conceptualises professional norms as part of the social organisation that 
regulatory actors are embedded in, thus putting forward that they can 
indeed be crucial: As ‘cultural biases’, they form part of the interpretative 
filter through which national authorities see the world (see Douglas, 1986; 
Wildavsky, 1992; Thompson et al., 1990). As such, however, they do not 
determine coordinative behaviour per se; rather, they need to be seen as 
part of the factors which inform actors’ perceptions of their own interests. 
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The professional ethic of ‘doing their jobs well’ is hereby crucial for most 
regulators (Brehm and Gates, 1997). 
 
 (Perceived) Functional Pressures as Determinant of Coordinative 
Behaviour? 
Another school of thought discussed in Chapter 1 emphasises that 
(perceived) functional pressures determine coordination behaviour. In this 
view, the perception of being interdependent with regulators in other 
countries prompts national authorities to coordinate their practices in the 
forum of EU bodies (for example, Van Boetzelaer and Princen, 2012). 
Indeed, this thesis also finds evidence in this regard: For example, the UK 
and German maritime safety authorities evaluate EMSA’s tasks positively –
despite their contestation of the inspection system– since they perceive 
EMSA to add value to their work by ensuring that authorities in other 
countries are taking their work seriously. In their view, this helps to avoid 
that they carry out their work to in vain under conditions of 
interdependence (see Chapter 4). British and German food risk assessors, in 
turn, clearly perceive themselves to be interdependent with their colleagues 
with regard to the maintenance of their reputation and this motivates their 
willingness to engage extensively in coordination processes in EFSA 
(Chapter 5). Such (perceived) interdependencies hence form part of the 
social relations that national authorities are embedded in. 
 However, we also observe proactive engagement –or at least absence 
of contention– in cases where it is more questionable whether the involved 
actors perceive themselves to be interdependent. This is especially true in 
the case of food risk controls, where the daily work of authorities is not 
dominated by reflections about interdependence with authorities in other 
countries. Rather, the complexities of overseeing a large network of control 
authorities –and their respective interdependencies– seem to be at the 
forefront of the minds of officials in overseeing authorities. Nevertheless, 
they engage with the FVO inspection process to a great extent and perceive 
this to be helpful. This finding is better explained by the specific set of social 
relations they are embedded in than by perceived interdependencies.  
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 Also, we observe a lack of engagement with coordination when 
interdependence is likely to be perceived by the involved national 
authorities: In this regard, the case of banking regulation and supervision 
presented in this thesis is instructive (Chapter 6): It is unlikely that banking 
regulators perceive themselves to be interdependent in relation to technical 
rule-making at the transnational level, but not with regard to the day-to-day 
supervision of specific cross-border banks (which could then explain their 
proactive engagement in the former, and absence of investment in the latter 
activity). Rather, this difference can be explained by UK and German 
authorities’ assessments of the value that each transnational coordination 
task can add to their work in the context of the social relations they are 
embedded in: In the case of standard-setting, these are their practices that 
are deeply embedded in national administrative structures and industry 
structures. With regard to cross-border supervision, these are the relations 
to their governments and the pressure that is exerted by them to avoid a 
bank failure at all costs. In this regard, the functionalist approach –as well as 
the constructivist approach– overestimate the extent to which national 
authorities’ coordinative behaviour is determined by factors beyond their 
country, such as transnational interdependencies and professional 
communities. This thesis shows that national regulators remain mostly 
embedded in their home countries: After all, the resources and authority 
that is granted to them are usually dependent on the maintenance of the 
social relations they are embedded in domestically.   
 Overall, this thesis advances that we need to understand how the 
coordination process functions (i.e. which pattern of coordination emerges 
as a result of a particular task) in order to understand why national 
authorities are willing to engage with transnational processes: Their 
assessment of which value a particular task can add to their own work is 
informed by the social relations they are embedded in, which are often 
found at the national level. The functionalist approach does not provide us 
with tools to observe how coordination functions or why regulators that 
perceive themselves as interdependent do not engage extensively in 
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transnational coordination processes. In this regard, it struggles to account 
for the variation of coordination patterns that were identified in this thesis.  
   
‘Shadow of Hierarchy’ induced Coordinative Behaviour? 
Chapter 1 points out that whilst EU regulatory bodies lack authority and 
resources, they operate within the legal system of the EU, which has been 
argued to cast a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ that can potentially induce 
transnational coordination (Eberlein 2010b; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008, 
2010; Scharpf, 1997). Indeed, the thesis shows that transnational 
coordination can be affected by the institutional framework of the EU: In 
maritime safety, relations between regulatory actors were shown to be 
strained by the Commission’s zealous enforcement of EU maritime safety 
law (see Chapter 4). Whereas this ‘shadow of hierarchy’ was very explicitly 
perceived as such by national maritime safety authorities, it did not induce 
mutual exchange between national authorities. To the contrary, it inhibited 
mutual exchange in the forum of EMSA due to a fear of being found to have 
incompliant practices. Acceptance of EMSA inspections and engagement in 
coordination in its forum was shown to happen despite –not as a result– of 
the enforcement possibilities of the Commission because the British and 
German authorities perceived EMSA’s work to add value to their activities 
by providing operational support and ensuring the overall effectiveness of 
the European port state control regime. In all other studied cases, concerns 
about Commission enforcement or the possibility for policy-makers to get 
involved in the detailed formulation of shared practices could not be 
detected.  
In this regard, the thesis puts forward that the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
is not a primary determinant of the coordinative behaviour of national 
authorities in the EU: Rather, the institutional frameworks provided by 
tasks and the social relations regulators are embedded in shape and inform 
coordinative behaviour. This is not to say that the institutional system of the 
EU is not crucial. The maritime safety case study clearly demonstrates that 
the possibilities of hierarchical enforcement and policy-making on part of 
the European Commission can have an impact on the relations between the 
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regulatory actors that are involved in transnational coordination. However, 
the institutional frameworks provided by tasks need to be seen as more 
significant as a determinant of coordinative behaviour than the broader 
institutional framework set by the legal system of the EU: As put forward in 
Chapter 1, the carrying out of tasks is an activity during which preferences 
are formed and re-assessed on a continuous basis (Cohen, March and Olsen, 
1972, p.2). In that regard, then, coordinative behaviour needs to be seen to 
be determined by processes in which the officials are actively engaged in, 
rather than institutional frameworks which remain a distant and abstract 
concept to officials involved in transnational coordination processes: In 
maritime safety, the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ was explicitly perceived by the 
involved national regulators because it had a very concrete impact on them 
on a regular basis: The European Commission enforces vigorously in this 
field as a result of the social relations that regulatory actors operate in  
when maritime safety is concerned. With regard to the European 
Commission this means that it can justify its raison d’être in relation to the 
IMO by enforcing rigorously. In other cases, however, action on part of the 
European Commission does not directly affect national authorities on a 
frequent basis. As a result, the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ remains abstract for 
national authorities and does not primarily drive their coordinative 
behaviour.  
 Overall, strategic –or interest-driven– behaviour on the other hand 
was indeed shown to be crucial throughout the thesis: National regulators 
engage in coordination if they perceive this to add value to their work and 
they respond strategically to the incentives emanating from the institutional 
frameworks provided by tasks of EU regulatory bodies. Rationalist accounts 
of bureaucratic behaviour (for example, Niskanen, 1994 [1971]), however, 
tend to regard interests as exogenously given, and do not consider how 
rational pursuits are constrained by institutional frameworks, such as tasks 
and social relations. They largely regard governmental authorities as 
motivated by preferences for more resources. Indeed, these aspects feature 
in the observations of this thesis: For example, British and German maritime 
authorities explicitly consider which EMSA activities can provide cost-
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savings to them and approve of those that do (COWI, 2008). Pharmaceutical 
regulators agree that they have a very concrete (and material) reason to 
engage with EMA’s work: National authorities receive money from the 
European agency if they take over the rapporteurship of pharmaceutical 
company’s market authorisation applications for a new drug.338 Food 
control officials were observed to at times consider the advice of the FVO as 
‘free’ expertise that they might otherwise have to pay for. In a wider sense, 
the engagement of British and German authorities with one-off decision-
making and standard-setting tasks at the transnational level provide them 
with an opportunity to avoid the material costs of having to modify their 
practices in favour of new formal or informal standards.  
 At the same time, this thesis shows that the ‘cost-benefit’ analyses of 
engaging with transnational coordination activities on part of national 
authorities are far more complex than pertaining to material considerations 
and cannot be detached from the social relations they are embedded in. 
Interests, then, are here not conceptualised as exogenously given: Whilst 
coordinative behaviour is seen as strategically driven, the thesis puts 
forward that we need to understand what the regulatory actors perceive to 
be their ‘interests’ (Wildavsky, 1987, 1992, 1994). This, in turn, is a complex 
mix of material and immaterial benefits they can derive from transnational 
coordination, depending on the tasks they are carrying out at the 
transnational level and the social relations they are embedded in. Arguably, 
the potential costs and benefits –in the widest sense– include such a 
plethora of aspects that we can only understand them by in-depth study of 
the particular social relations a given regulator is embedded in: What might 
be perceived as costly –be it in material, reputational or other ways– by one 
authority, might not be perceived as such by an authority that is embedded 
in different social relations. 
 The comparison between coordination in maritime safety and in food 
controls presented in this thesis is enlightening in this regard (see Chapter 3 
and 5 respectively): Although the EU regulatory body has an inspection task 
                                                 
338 Art.62(3), Regulation 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for 
human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency. 
7. Conclusion   
 
203 
 
in both cases –and coordination is thus largely based on a hierarchical 
pattern– the involved regulatory authorities assess the work of these EU 
regulatory bodies very differently in light of the specific social relations they 
are embedded in. In maritime safety, the context of a highly global 
regulatory regime renders the work of an EU body in this field questionable 
to British and German authorities, which contest the role of the EU in the 
field. Nevertheless, they assess EMSA –and their engagement with it- 
positively because they can derive distinct material savings from its work 
and because it provides them with reassurance that their colleagues in other 
countries are also doing their jobs accurately under conditions of 
interdependence. In the case of food safety control authorities, on the other 
hand, authorities in the UK and in Germany do not contest the work of the 
FVO. Rather, in the framework of the social relations of a heterogeneous, 
decentralised industry and administrative control system, they perceive the 
work of the FVO as helpful in gaining better control over this industry and 
the local authorities that they oversee. Hence, in order to understand what 
strategic coordinative behaviour indeed means, we need to comprehend 
what the involved authorities perceive to be their core work, and to what 
extent they regard transnational coordination to add or to distract from it. 
‘Adding value’ to their core work is inextricability linked to the safeguarding 
of their autonomy, for example, by helping them to carry out their work in a 
better way (such as in food controls)  or by maintaining their reputation (as 
found in food risk assessment) (Wilson, 2000 [1989], p. 179ff). Coordination 
is hence not inextricably linked to the loss of autonomy –as a result of which 
coordination between governmental authorities is usually is seen to be 
difficult (ibid., p. 192ff)– but can also be a means to enhance it.  
 
 
 
7.2 Contributing to Wider Debates about Coordination in 
Government 
The thesis demonstrates that capacities to manage ‘European’ risks without 
a ‘European’ state are created not despite but because national authorities 
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are embedded in their domestic social relations. This helps us to specify the 
conditions in which transnational administration can function. It also has 
wide-ranging consequences for the study of transnational coordination at 
the international level, in which formal hierarchical structures are absent 
(see Section 7.2.1). The thesis also has implications for the study of 
coordination in public administrations within the national realm. Indeed, 
perceived interdependence and formal authority might be less important 
for engaging particular organisational units in coordination efforts than 
their perception of whether coordination adds value to their day-to-day 
work (see Section 7.2.2).  
 
 
7.2.1 Capacity Building at a Transnational Level 
The thesis demonstrates that national authorities are willing to engage 
proactively in transnational coordination if they perceive this to add value 
to their work in the context of the social relations they are embedded in. The 
implication of this finding is that the building of capacity to manage cross-
border risks does not necessarily require allocation of formal authority and 
resources to the supranational level. This perhaps does not seem surprising 
since we know from the literature on coordination and control in public 
administration that ‘hierarchy’ is by no means the only available form of 
exerting control in a bureaucratic system (for example, Hood, 2000; Ouchi, 
1979). However, in relation to an emerging ‘European’ bureaucracy this is 
especially significant since the findings of this study show that the creation 
of ‘European’ capacity to manage ‘European’ risks is not incongruent with 
interests that emerge from the domestic social relations that national 
authorities are embedded in. Rather, national authorities are often willing to 
engage –thus creating capacity– not despite but because of their national 
settings. In this regard, this thesis helps us to specify the conditions for the 
functioning of a transnational administration, which sets standards, 
monitors practices and modifies behaviour as one administrative apparatus 
at the transnational level (compare to Hood et al., 2001), instead of 
administering the regulation of a given industry separately in each Member 
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State (Hood, 1976, p.17): Transnational administration functions if the 
involved national authorities can make use of their activities at the 
transnational level to enhance their work at home. The observations made 
in this thesis give us reason to believe that this is usually the case when 
national authorities perceive the work of EU regulatory bodies to provide 
them with expertise they lack, if they value the reassurance that other 
regulators are carrying out their work adequately, or if the engagement with 
coordination provides them with a chance to maintain their current 
practices or their reputation.  
 In the EU governance literature, ‘networks’ of national authorities 
are often described as a means of the Commission to use national 
administrative capacities (Wilks, 2005; also see Eberlein, 2008). Whilst this 
view is supported by the empirical evidence presented here, our findings 
add another dimension to this issue: The implications of the argument of 
this thesis is that national administrations might indeed also be able to use 
transnational processes to enhance their own capacity to carry out their 
work effectively. Transnational coordination helps British and German 
authorities, for example, to maintain public confidence in their work. In drug 
safety, German authorities gain access to additional expertise that they 
could not create within their domestic social relations. Food control 
authorities use the FVO audit process to increase control over their own 
territory. In this regard, one might argue that these processes are concerned 
with mutual capacity building of bureaucratic actors (also see Bach and 
Ruffing, 2013), rather than the ‘Europeanisation’ of national bureaucracies 
(see Knill, 2001). It might hence not be the relevant question to ask whether 
the creation of EU regulatory bodies strengthens the European Commission 
(Keleman, 2002) or the Member States (Kreher, 1997). Rather, it arguably 
needs to be seen to result in an overall strengthening of bureaucracies, and 
particularly highly specialised authorities. The concern of governments –
such as demonstrated in the Dutch subsidiarity review (Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken, 2013) – might thus be adequate from the point of view 
of political actors to the extent that they are concerned about the 
‘uncontrolled’ autonomy of regulatory authorities. However, it remains 
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questionable whether this concern should indeed be focused on the creation 
of EU agencies as strengthening of the ‘EU bureaucracy’, rather than also 
being concerned with the strengthening of national authorities. The flip-side 
of this insight –which is likely to please national governments– is that 
transnational administration can function without transferring more 
resources or powers to the EU-level if national authorities can make use of 
transnational processes for their ‘national’ work. 
This is linked to the perennial question of the ‘effectiveness’ of 
transnational coordination processes in bringing about ‘coordinated’ 
practices. In this regard, the EU governance literature has largely focused on 
the formal institutional and organisational set-up of EU regulatory bodies 
and their networks of regulators (for example, Eberlein and Grande, 2005). 
Weaknesses in the formal set-up –such as the lack of authority and 
resources of the involved EU bodies– are often seen as impediment to 
‘effective’ coordination (Coen and Thatcher, 2008, p.67f). The findings of 
this study suggest, however, that the effective engagement of national 
authorities with transnational coordination activities are not dependent on 
the formal authority of the EU body in which they meet, but on whether they 
perceive the task they carry out at the transnational level to add value to 
their regulatory work at home. 
This is exemplified in the case of banking regulation and supervision 
(see Chapter 6): The way coordination functions –and why national 
authorities choose to engage or not to engage with transnational processes– 
remained very similar under CEBS and the EBA, although the latter has 
significantly more resources and authority than the former used to have. 
The findings of this study raise the question whether effectiveness is also –if 
not primarily– a question of whether national authorities perceive the tasks 
of EU bodies to add value to their own work. This implies that crucial 
changes to coordination patterns and the level of engagement of national 
authorities –and hence potentially effectiveness– can be expected if the task 
of and EU body and/or the social relations that a national authority is 
embedded change, rather than if the formal authority of an EU body is 
altered. Additional comparative research on cases where such a change took 
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place is needed in order to substantiate this insight further. Overall, 
however, the different interpretation of this aspect on part of the EU 
governance literature and this thesis is also likely to lie in a different 
interpretation of ‘effective’ coordination. The cited literature usually 
emphasises that effectiveness is to be equated with fully coordinated (i.e. 
‘harmonised’) practices. This thesis, however, sees coordination as a 
dynamic feedback loop in which practices are never ‘coordinated’ as such; 
rather, they can only ever be in the process of being coordinated (see 
Section 1.3.2). 
 The insight that formal authority is not necessarily crucial in 
determining coordination behaviour renders transnational coordination at 
the international level into a particularly tough –and hence valuable– field 
for further investigation of the argument developed in this thesis: The lack 
of formal authority on part of international bodies is usually seen as a major 
hindrance in their ability to convince national authorities to support their 
work. If the formal authority of international regulatory bodies is indeed 
less crucial for observing proactive engagement on part of national 
authorities than whether these authorities perceive the task that is carried 
out transnationally to add value to their own work at home, we might be 
able to explain some of the variation in the level of engagement of national 
regulators in international coordination processes. A valuable starting point 
in this regard could be the comparative study of international coordination 
processes in the banking, securities and insurance sectors, which take place 
in the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), and the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS): Proactive engagement of national authorities has been 
strongest in banking, less developed in the field of securities and until 
recently underdeveloped in the insurance sectors. Whilst differing 
functional pressures for international coordination are frequently cited as 
main determinant of coordinative behaviour in this regard (for example, 
Davies and Green, 2008), an investigation about the extent to which the 
observed differences can be explained by tasks and social relations could 
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further elucidate transnational coordination in these cases, as well as the 
argument that was developed in this thesis.  
Further depth to this analysis could be added by the comparison of 
transnational coordination at the international and at the EU level in each of 
these financial sectors: National authorities have been more proactively 
engaged in EU-level efforts in the securities and insurance sector than they 
have been at the international level. This provides an opportunity to 
evaluate the respective role of functional pressures and formal authority of 
coordinating bodies on the one hand, and regulatory tasks and how they are 
assessed by the involved regulators in light of the social relations they are 
embedded in on the other.  
 
 
 7.2.2 Coordination Processes in Public Administration 
Whilst this thesis has focused on the specific context of coordination at a 
transnational level, coordination processes are of course far from unique to 
this arena. Indeed, coordination between different constituent units might 
be deemed to be at the core of the functioning of public administration: 
Within ‘national’ bureaucracies, different offices, ministries or 
administrative sub-units can have responsibility for the same –or over-
lapping– issues, thus requiring them to coordinate (Hood, 1976, p. 17f; 
Wilson, 2000 [1989]). This is especially so in relation to the highly 
specialised bureaucracies we observe today. Equally, coordination between 
authorities that oversee policy implementation and ‘street-level’ 
bureaucrats is likely to remain a perennial issue in public administration. 
The findings of this study arguably expand upon the inhibiting and enabling 
factors of coordination between organisations or organisational units in the 
broadest sense. 
 A key insight of organisation studies with regard to coordination has 
been the importance of the recognition of mutual interdependence on part 
of the involved organisational units (for an overview in this regard, see, 
Alexander, 1995, p. 31ff). Rather than focusing on the importance of 
(perceived) interdependence, this thesis focuses on the strategic aim of 
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organisational units to enhance their own work through their coordinating 
activities as informed by the social relations they are embedded in. This 
provides an angle that can potentially help us to enhance our understanding 
of why administrative units across all levels of government do or do not 
engage proactively in coordination in cases where coordination has been 
mandated. The empirical research conducted for this thesis on German and 
British regulatory regimes provide examples in this regard: For instance, the 
overseeing food control authorities in Germany seem to engage proactively 
in coordinating their activities in a cross-Länder working group since FVO 
audits started to focus on audit systems of countries, rather than inspecting 
individual businesses. They perceive their coordination with colleagues 
from other German regions to aid them in receiving good evaluations from 
the FVO, as well helping them to control the food control systems in their 
respective Länder more effectively.  
 Arguably, the approach developed in this thesis could hence provide 
us with fresh insights into why, for example, governmental units seem to 
engage proactively in particular coordination efforts –such as ‘joined-up 
governance’ or ‘whole-of-government’ initiatives, as well as coordination 
between interdependent implementation agencies- whilst not doing so in 
others. In contrast to the study of transnational coordination between 
regulators which are very similar in relation to their expertise and 
responsibilities, the study of coordination between governmental units 
which exhibit crucial differences –for example, ministerial units from 
different policy areas with fundamentally differing forms of expertise and 
professional norms- would allow us to specify the scope conditions of the 
argument developed in this thesis. If the argument holds under conditions of 
involved administrative units that exhibit crucial differences, we would 
expect them to engage proactively in coordination if they perceive the 
particular coordination activity they are involved in to add value to their 
main line of work –as perceived through the particular context of social 
relations they operate in on a daily basis– even in the absence of 
hierarchical pressure and perceptions of interdependence.  
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Overall, this would imply that the structuring of coordination 
activities needs to start with the core questions of what the involved 
organisational units see as their main task and in which setting of social 
relations they carry it out. In other words, in order to understand why 
coordination functions –and to structure coordination in a manner in which 
it is workable– we need to consider what the involved organisational units 
value; rather than merely focusing on the objectives of the given 
coordination process. In this regard, the thesis helps us to elucidate the 
conditions for intra-organisational administration: When coordination is an 
auxiliary task existing to the ‘core business’ of an organisation, the 
engagement with coordination processes depends on the involved 
organisations ability to use coordination to support them in their core 
business. In principle, this should be possible even in situations where 
organisations are not interdependent (or do not perceive themselves as 
such) or where they are potential rivals in a given field.  
Arguably, ‘adding value’ to their core business is what Wilson means 
when he refers to the drive of bureaucratic actors to maintain their 
‘autonomy’ (Wilson, 2000 [1989], p. 179ff): When organisations are able to 
use coordination in order to maintain or to enhance their autonomy, inter-
organisational administration has a chance to function. What is surprising is 
that this should even be possible when rival governmental authorities are 
concerned: The support of EU regulatory bodies on part of national 
authorities is a case in point. This is the case when an authority perceives 
other potential threats –such as political interference or loss of public 
support- to its autonomy to be greater than its ‘rival’ agency. As pointed out 
by Wilson, coordination with other governmental authorities is often 
associated with precisely this kind of loss of public support or with political 
interference (ibid., p. 190f). This thesis adds to this ‘Wilsonian’ insight that 
coordination can indeed be a means to safeguard bureaucratic autonomy 
vis-à-vis the ‘non-bureaucratic’ world, rather than only being associated 
with its loss. 
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Appendix  
 
 
List of Interviewees (anonymised) 
 
Interviewee D1, former pharmacovigilance official of the MHRA (then MCA) and 
representative to EMA (then EMEA), scientific expert in pharmacovigilance. 
Interview conducted on 15 December, 2011.  
 
Interviewee D2, pharmacovigilance  official of the PEI and representative to 
EMA, scientific expert in pharmacovigilance. Interview conducted on 20 
December, 2011. 
 
Interviewee D3, pharmacovigilance  official of BfArM and representative to 
EMA, scientific expert in pharmacovigilance. Conjoint e-mail interview with 
interviewee D4, responses received on 27 January, 2012. 
 
Interviewee D4, pharmacovigilance official of BfArM, scientific expert in 
pharmacovigilance. Conjoint e-mail interview with interviewee D3, responses 
received on 27 January, 2012. 
 
Interviewee D5, pharmacovigilance official of EMA, former official at the 
European Commission (DG Sanco) and the MHRA. Interview conducted on 3 
February, 2012.  
 
Interviewee M1, official of the Dienststelle Schiffssicherheit (Ship Safety 
Division). Interviews conducted on 26 September, 2012, and 19 December, 
2012. 
 
Interviewee M2, former official of EMSA, official of the Maritime Directorate of 
Luxembourg. Interview conducted on 31 October, 2012. 
 
Interviewee M3, official of EMSA, former national representative to the IMO and 
official of the MCA. Interview conducted on 28 November, 2012. 
 
Interviewee M4, former official of EMSA and the European Commission (then 
DG TREN), expert in maritime law. Interview conducted on 29 November, 2012. 
 
Interviewee M5, official at the UK Department of Transport and representative 
to EMSA. Interview conducted on 30 November, 2012. 
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Interviewee M6, official of the European Commission (DG MOVE) and 
representative to EMSA. Interview conducted on 7 December, 2012. 
 
Interviewee M7, former official of EMSA (Administrative Board), former official 
at the UK Department of Transport. Interview conducted on 12 December, 
2012. 
 
Interviewee M8, official of the Dienststelle Schiffssicherheit (Ship Safety 
Division). Interview conducted on 19 December, 2012. 
 
Interviewee M9, port state control inspector of Dienststelle Schiffssicherheit 
(Ship Safety Division). Interview conducted on 19 December, 2012. The author 
also accompanied the inspector on a six hour port state control inspection in the 
port of Bremen on 19 December, 2012. 
 
Interviewee M10, official of the MCA. Interview conducted on 10 January, 2001. 
 
Interviewee F1, official of EFSA (Advisory Forum), food safety expert. Interview 
conducted on 17 January, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F2, official of EFSA, food safety expert. Interview conducted on 22 
January, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F3, official of the BfR and representative to EFSA, food safety 
expert. Interview conducted on 3 February, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F4, official of the FSA and representative to EFSA. Interview 
conducted on 4 February, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F5, former official of the FVO, official of the European Commission 
(DC SANCO). Interview conducted on 5 March, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F6, official of the FVO. Interview conducted on 6 March, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F7, official of the European Commission and representative to EFSA 
(DG Sanco). Interview conducted on 10 March, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F8, official of Thuringia Ministry for Social Affairs, Family and 
Health (food controls). Interview conducted on 13 March, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F9, official of the European Commission (DG Sanco). Interview 
conducted on 13 March, 2014. 
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Interviewee F10, official of the FVO, former official in food controls in Bayern 
and Hesse. Interview conducted on 13 March, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F11, official of the Hessian Ministry for the Environment, Climate 
Protection, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (food controls). Interview 
conducted on 17 March, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F12, official of the BMELV (Federal Ministry of Consumer 
Protection, Food and Agriculture). Interview conducted on 17 March, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F13, official at the FSA (food controls). Interview conducted on 19 
March, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F14, official of the BVL (Federal Office for Consumer Protection and 
Food), food controls. Interview conducted on 4 April, 2014. 
 
Interviewee F15, official of the Ministry for Climate Protection, Environment, 
Agriculture, Nature and Consumer Protection of North-Rhine-Westphalia. 
Interview conducted on 9 April, 2014. 
 
Interviewee B1, industry representative (government and regulatory affairs 
unit at a major bank). Interview conducted on 11 April, 2013. 
 
Interviewee B2, official of BaFin (International Policy Division). Conjoint 
interview with interviewee B3 conducted on 2 May, 2013. 
 
Interviewee B3, official of BaFin (International Policy Division). Conjoint 
interview with interviewee B2 conducted on 2 May, 2013. 
 
Interviewee B4, official of the European Commission (DG MARKT), former 
observer at CEBS. Interview conducted on 2 May, 2013. 
 
Interviewee B5, former official of BaFin and the CEBS secretariat. Interview 
conducted on 2 May, 2013. 
 
Interviewee B6, former official of CEBS, the FSA and the European Commission 
(DG ECFIN). Interview conducted on 3 May, 2013. 
 
Interviewee B7, former official of CEBS and the EBA, official of the Dutch Central 
Bank. Interview conducted on 10 May, 2013. 
 
Interviewee B8, former official of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central 
Bank) and representative to CEBS. Interview conducted on 28 May, 2013. 
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Interviewee B9, former official of CEBS and the Dutch Central Bank. Interview 
conducted on 31 May, 2013. 
 
Interviewee B10, official of the EBA, former official at the Bank of Italy. 
Interview conducted on 27 June, 2013. 
 
Interviewee B11, former official of the FSA, BaFin and CEBS, former industry 
representative. Interview conducted 11 July, 2013. 
 
Interviewee B12, official of the EBA, former official of the French Financial 
Markets Authority. Interview conducted on 17 July, 2013. 
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